C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

303Mostar and loitered in Zepa area for three hours. However, the UAV was confronted with bad weatherbut no artillery or refugees were observed. Bad weather played an important role in these days becauseon 18 July a Predator flight cancelled due to foul weather. But the US intelligence community had moreImint platforms at its disposal.American C-130s with special infra-red sensors were also deployed above Srebrenica. Theseflew from Brindisi (Italy) above the eastern enclaves if circumstances were favourable for nocturnaloperations. They probably flew on the orders of the DIA. On 10 July these platforms identified at17.00 burning houses in the enclave. At 22.30 hours on 12 July, the infra-red sensors of these C-130sdetected a large mass of prisoners in the vicinity of Srebrenica (the exact position is unknown). Theinfra-red sensors enabled these special C-130s to follow both the column of Muslim men and the VRSadvance on Zepa and Gorazde. The C-130s observed campfires along the road throughout the nightand registered the heat from the tank and lorry engines. Other US Imint platforms confirmed 4 militarytrucks plus sedans next to a house. 1653What happened to this Imint and was it shared with Zagreb HQ and BHC? It was sharedindeed with the senior UN leadership. This intelligence regarding campfires was conveyed to UNleadership on the morning of the 14 th . In particular, intelligence passed was about the primary andsecondary position of the VRS, with campfires at locations 2 km, 4.5 km and 6 km south-west ofSrebrenica, and approximately 13, 14, 15 km north-east of Zepa. The position of additional VRS unitslocated in a certain area was also reported. This intelligence was also delivered to Sarajevo, briefed tothe UN leadership, and injected into the Zagreb overall threat assessments for Zepa delivered again tothe UN leadership, in the COS’s office at noon on 15 July. 1654In this phase the stories about warcrimes started to circulate more persistently. The storiesabout mass executions were greeted with incredulity at first. But when more and more signs emergedthat atrocities had taken place on a mammoth scale and that thousands of men were still missing, theImint activities were stepped up. The photos which a KH-11 had taken of Srebrenica and theimmediate surroundings were now analysed. Suddenly, the Americans were taking the rumours of massmurders more seriously. The U-2 flights now targeted the eastern enclaves more often and the analystswere instructed to analyse the images.A report to General Michael Hayden, Director of Intelligence at US EUCOM, stated thatMladic had told a UN official that hundreds had been killed in the Bandera triangle inside the enclaveSrebrenica. By then, the ‘collection priorities’ in the American intelligence community had changed.They were now: ‘1) Zepa; 2) Potocari and Srebrenica; 3) Gorazde and 4) Tuzla camp and the column ofmen and boys’. Even so, requests for ‘atrocity verification’ through Imint were still rejected. At thattime, there was still insufficient evidence or indications. 1655As described earlier, on 15 July, a Predator again headed for Eastern Bosnia. Its mainassignment was ‘Bratunac males key priority’. But the quality of the video footage was disappointing.The main targets were still the men in Bratunac. The UAV flew above Zepa, and then more reportscame on a regular basis which entered the LOCE directly. On the same day, Hayden heard that,according to UNMO reports, some 10,000 men had disappeared. On 17 July, another US asset flewover Branjevo farm at Donja Pilica. 1656 A photo was later released by the US Administration. 1657However, the author was shown much sharper photos than this one, which clearly showed a greatmany people and corpses as well as lorry tracks and digging operations. 1658 On 21 September, anotherU-2 flight showed that Branjevo farm seemed totally deserted. 1659 This U-2 also flew above Glogova,1653 Confidential interview (54) and confidential information (80).1654 Confidential interview (54) and confidential information (80).1655 Confidential interview (53).1656 Interview with J. Schouren, 04/12/99.1657 For the photos: www.fas.org.irp/Imint/bosnia16.html1658 Confidential interview (7). See also: ICTY, Krstic Case, OTP Exhibits, Volume II, Ex. 24/2-24/3.1659 ICTY, Krstic Case, OTP Exhibits, Volume II, Ex. 24/4.