C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

111In other words, the flow of information from the higher echelons to Dutchbat III in Srebrenicawas zero. For instance, Wieffer tried regularly for six months and three weeks to reach the Ukrainianbattalion in Zepa by telephone. He had reams of different telephone numbers, yet he never managed toreach a single Ukrainian on the line. This meant that he remained in the dark as to what exactly washappening in Zepa, even though it was only 8 kilometres to the south as the crow flies. The flow ofinformation from another UN unit, stationed right alongside Dutchbat III, was therefore non-existent.The only thing left for Wieffer to do was to analyse the daily Situation Reports from BHC,extract some general information from them and use it in briefings within the battalion. Wieffer was anintelligence officer, but, certainly in the final months, he worked 18 to 20 hours a day intheOperationsroom (the command post) because of the shortage of staff. He had only been on sixpatrols and had therefore been outside the compound six times. Therefore, according to Wieffer, acomplaint in a debriefing statement to the effect that the intelligence section personnel had littlefreedom of movement was correct. 509 The importance of good contact with the local population fromthe point of view of intelligence gathering was also lost on Dutchbat III. Dutchbat I had frequentcontact with the population but Dutchbat II adopted a more detached attitude. Dutchbat III copiedthis attitude and became even more detached. This was also caused by the fact that, for securityreasons, Karremans banned contact between the locals and Dutchbat soldiers. This ban was notgenerally observed; at some OPs there was an element of regular contact with the local population. 510Intelligence gathering via Humint was severely restricted in this way. In addition, no structurewas set up for intelligence gathering. The Military Security man, Sergeant Major E.A. Rave, occupiedhimself in Dutchbat III mainly with counterintelligence and security, and not so much with thegathering of military intelligence. That was supposed to be Wieffer’s task, but he did not get the chanceto carry it out. 511 The lack of diesel diminished contact even more. Reducing the number of patrolssaved fuel, but it also meant even less contact with the local population and the ABiH, so that thesupply of intelligence diminished. Because Dutchbat also operated no night-time patrols and the staticOPs were fully illuminated at night, so that they were visible from a distance, ‘our intelligence story wasof course not really kosher. It just doesn’t work like that. You have to be active at night, because that’swhen it’s all happening in the enclave. Your OPs also have to have maximum observation. This meansyou have to switch the light off. But what can you do? Those were the rules and so that’s what wedid’. 512 Neither did Wieffer receive any additional intelligence from the British JCO unit in the enclave.Intelligence from the JCOs?Since the end of 1994 there had been a JCO team in the enclave. 513 On 18 March 1995, a two-man JCOteam arrived in Srebrenica. They relieved a team of four JCOs consisting of two British marines,another British soldier and a Swedish soldier. General Rose had sent the JCOs 514 to Srebrenica becausehe was receiving no intelligence whatsoever from the enclave. He wanted to have his ‘own ears andeyes’ in the eastern enclaves. According to a British UNPROFOR officer, there was a closed circle ofDutch officers who gave little away and also shared little information with UNPROFOR commanderRose (later Smith). 515On 17 May, a third British soldier joined this new team. The patrol was detached to thecommandos in Potocari. The JCOs were mainly involved in the regular reconnaissance patrols. Shortlyafter his arrival in the enclave, the JCO commander had a meeting with Karremans and offered him509 Interview with E. Wieffer, 18/06/99.510 See Chapter 8 of Part II of the Srebrenica r eport.511 Interviews with E.A. Rave, 13/12/00 and 14/12/00.512 Interview with E. Wieffer, 18/06/99.513 Interview with C.A. Le Hardy, 08/10/97.514 The JCO’s in Srebrenica were British SAS soldiers.515 Confidential interview (43).