C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

125organizations that could possibly inflict damage on the security or readiness of the Armed Forces. Amilitary security officer was therefore also responsible for activities that were geared towards protectinghis own units (personnel and equipment) against sabotage, subversion, terrorism and espionage. 591 Thiswas a combination of defensive and offensive counterintelligence work. Osint, Humint and Sigint wereavailable for the execution of all these tasks. 592In order to carry out this task, the MIS/CO included a Counterintelligence and SecurityDepartment, and together with the Security Bureaus of the MISs of the three Armed Forces thisformed the Security component. As with the intelligence component, the nature of the security task haschanged drastically since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Although Russian services are still monitored, andaccount is still taken of antimilitarist actions, the attention has shifted somewhat. Foreign intelligenceservices were also active in areas where Dutch soldiers were deployed in peacekeeping operations andas such could constitute a threat.The Counterintelligence Bureau within the Counterintelligence and Security Department hadtwo components: a Counterintelligence Section with 3 analysts (from the Army, Navy and Air Force)and an Operations Section. In September 1992, the Head of the MIS, Duijn, made a start on setting upan Operations Department, under the control of the Counterintelligence Bureau. The formal objectiveof the Operations Department was the acquisition of high grade, not freely accessible information viaHumint and technical resources. The operational activities consisted of planning, tracing, approaching,training, securing, running and controlling human sources, and using them with Humint-relatedtechnical resources. 593 This section started with 12 and gradually expanded to 50 people. Originally itwas only concerned with counterintelligence, but later it also became involved in intelligence gatheringoperations at home and abroad.From the outset, the collaboration between the Counterintelligence Bureau and the OperationsDepartment was not as good as it could have been. There were different views on counterintelligencework. The Operations Department also did not want to share all its intelligence with the Bureau, andallowed no access to its sources; only finished intelligence was issued. In August 1993, the OperationsDepartment started drawing up an outline for taking over the tasks of the Foreign Intelligence Service(IDB). The MIS/CO Operations Department had a close relationship with the National SecurityService (BVD). Within the MIS/CO, various sections within the counterintelligence domain were thenmerged to form a department of 24 people.594Initially the Operations Department had nothing to offerin the way of intelligence. In connection with the rapidly escalating situation in Yugoslavia, the Head ofthe MIS therefore asked the Minister whether the MIS/CO could be permitted to take a more‘offensive’ approach in other countries.As outlined above, the Ministerial Committee for the Intelligence and Security Services(MICIV) had determined in 1993 to hand over the tasks of the IDB to the MIS and BVD and that inprinciple the MIS and BVD would only be allowed to use ‘passive’ human sources in the Netherlands.Only if necessitated by the national interest could ‘offensive’ use be made of human sources. In brief,actively recruiting agents and operating with agents and sources in other countries was subject torestrictions. The Head of the MIS at the time, Kok, therefore advocated a more active use of Humint,partly because the information position of the MIS/CO was insufficient. He also referred to themeeting of the Committee on the United Intelligence Services in the Netherlands (CVIN) of 17February 1994. There it was established unanimously that, in view of the involvement in the conflict inYugoslavia, the national interest was then such that a more active use of human sources was required.This might involve stepping up the interrogation in Bosnia of Displaced Persons, soldiers and other595Dutch citizens stationed in the conflict region. However, Kok was not given the go-ahead to operate591 MoD, Archive MIS/Army, DOKL/IV, Col. J. Mulder to Head AI MI S , Col. B. Werger, 23/02/96.592 Engelen, De Militaire Inlichtingendienst, pp. 148 - 151 and Kluiters, Supplement, pp. 131 - 132.593 MoD, Archive MIS/CO,Folder 438-0420 , Head AO to HMID, Annual plan 1997 of the Operations Department, No. AO 960708, 06/1/97.594 Confidential interviews (19 ) , ( 29 ) and ( 25).595 MoD, Archive CDS, Commodore P.C. Kok to Minister Voorhoeve, No. DIS/94/095/398, 18/02/94.