C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

294the various US intelligence services. The computer systems of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marineswere often incapable of communicating with one another. The chairman of a Congress Committeewhich investigated this said ‘When it came to Imint, it was like we had four separate countries out thererather than four services from one country’. 1583Second, low-hanging cloud, mist between the mountains and valleys, poor weather anddarkness often made it impossible to make good quality photos. Third, the ‘enemy’ often takes accountof Imint and employs counter-measures. For example, India was able to conceal its nuclear tests fromspy satellites by planning and conducting these tests during a period beset by sandstorms. 1584 During theGulf War all sorts of cardboard missile systems were attacked which had been identified in the deserton the basis of Imint. Tanks and artillery that had already been eliminated were sometimes re-targetedbecause the analysis of the Imint was inconclusive. Sometimes, the Iraqi Army moved these destroyedtanks to another area to create the impression that they were new materiel. The same happened inBosnia with the result that NATO planes attacked previously eliminated VRS tanks. After nightfallVRS soldiers moved the tanks a few hundred metres, giving the impression that they were new tanks.However, opportunities for misleading the enemy, though present, are often limited. For example,experts say that a spy satellite does not have to follow a circuit exactly above a target in order to takegood photos. 1585Then there is the issue of time. This must not be overlooked. The analysis of Imint makesheavy demands on specialists, as new images must constantly be compared with previous ones. Thequestion that needs to be answered is what has changed in relation to the old situation and whatconclusions can be drawn from this. These analyses are highly labour-intensive, even with the aid ofsophisticated computer systems. The ‘enemy’ takes account of the capacity and possibilities of Imintand constantly moves operational weapon systems to confuse the observations of satellites, U-2s andUAVs. For example, Serb Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) sites were moved every three or four hourswith the result that the Americans regularly attacked old and deserted sites. 1586 Sometimes, dummy SA-6missiles were set up, only to be identified after a U-2-mission, a UAV flight and a thorough analysis. 1587Systems can also be hidden in bunkers, caves, sheds and garages. These can only be detected byinfra-red sensors, and then only on the basis of heat emanating from the engine. These operations arealso beset by problems because it is oten impossible to determine whether the shed holds a tractor or atank. Such problems can have a profound influence on the intelligence product derived from Imint.Members of the US intelligence community claimed that Imint was not the best method for locatingthe confrontation lines, especially amid the mist-covered and forested mountains around Srebrenica. Byway of example, they pointed out that, in the spring of 1995, Imint was no use in pinpointing thewhereabouts of the UNMO hostages, because there was no approximate idea of where they were beingheld. 1588 Finally, it is a misconception that all Imint is published in the form of photos. No more thantwo or three photos of Bosnia appeared each week in most reports because photos take up too muchspace. Usually, it is only the analysis of the Imint that is published. After all, reports sent by theintelligence services to high-level policy-makers must be short and concise. For example, theIntelligence & Research section of the State Department could only produce two-page reports upon theorders of Secretary of State Christopher. One American analyst wondered how on earth he couldexplain such a complicated conflict to Christopher, given the permanently shifting political and militarycircumstances. 15891583 Christopher Andrew, ‘How we won the spy game’, The Times, 10/12/01.1584 Jeffrey Richelson, ‘Examining US intelligence failures’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, September 2000, p. 44.1585 Confidential interview (62).1586 Confidential interview (31).1587 See for example: MoD, MID/TCBU. MID/Klu, Missile Order of Battle, 22/10/95.1588 Confidential interview (54).1589 Confidential interview (13).