C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

174to Tuzla. Incidentally, the DIS received a direct order from the British government not to investigatethis affair. This was not permitted for the simple reason that the matter was too sensitive in theframework of American-British relations. The DIS also obtained intelligence on the secret supplies tothe ABiH from the German military intelligence service and the Bundesnachrichtendienst, because some ofthe flights departed from Frankfurt. However, no American-German alliance existed in the matter ofclandestine support to the ABiH. 889Cengic had set up the entire operation. The Cengic family owned numerous companies inTurkey, and during the war Cengic worked in Ankara as a military attaché, and would reach anagreement there with the Turkish government on secret arms supplies. They were to take place in Tuzlawith the involvement of the Special Branch of the Turkish General Staff. This unit had also beenresponsible for covert operations in the past. 890 The Pentagon had likewise identified Cengic as themain link between the supplies from Islamic countries, such as Iran, Turkey and Pakistan. 891 Even theDutch national security service BVD observed that Turkish aircraft repeatedly dropped arms over areasthat were under ABiH control. The service described the Turkish action as a ‘solo performance’. 892MIS/Navy reports also mention the involvement of Turkish aircraft; it was observed that Turkey wasin a position to fly with C-130s to Tuzla directly or via third party countries. 893 The conclusion must bethat the United States ‘turned a blind eye’ to the Croatian pipeline, but in the case of the Black Flightsto Tuzla Air Base, they deliberately closed their ‘eyes’ (of the AWAC aircraft) for the direct Turkishflights. US aircraft did not themselves fly to Tuzla, because their discovery would have seriouslyembarrassed the US government and put transatlantic relations under even greater pressure. Suppliesvia a third party country were a simpler solution for the United States.4. Military assistance to the Bosnian SerbsThe clandestine arms supplies to the ABiH were not the only thing to stir up feelings: so too did thesupplies to the Bosnian Serbs. According to some sources, Russian intelligence services even had asecret arms agreement with the Bosnian Serbs. 894 Throughout the entire war, accusations were madethat Serbia supplied arms and ammunition on a large scale to the VRS. For example, an article in theNew York Times asserted that hundreds of Serbian helicopter flights had been recorded over northeastBosnia. An anonymous UNPROFOR officer stated: ‘We have not seen anything on this scale beforeand doubt that the Bosnian Serbs could organize this number of helicopter flights without the activeinvolvement of the Yugoslav Army.’ 895 To Annan’s irritation, this article, ‘which runs counter to everyelement of analysis provided to us by yourselves’, led directly to a request from the non-alignedcountries for a debate in the Security Council. Annan requested Akashi to report all messages abouthelicopter flights directly. Akashi had already informed Annan that cross border flights were probablynot involved, and that the number of flights observed from the ground was exaggerated. 896It was evident that the border between Serbia and Srpska was used regularly for the clandestinesupply of arms and oil. A special organ was even created for its supervision: the ICFY MonitoringMission, a product of the Yugoslavia Conference, which was established on 17 September 1994. TheFinnish General Tauno Nieminen was the head of the mission from 13 January to 14 December 1995.He maintained regular contact with UNPROFOR, but worked mainly for the ICFY. There were889 Confidential interview (8).890 ‘Turska pokusavala da naoruza bosanske Muslimane’, Borba, 05/12/94 and confidential information (36).891 Robert Fox, ‘Iran’s cases of cash helped buy Muslim victory in Bosnia’, The Daily Telegraph, 01/01/97.892 NMFA, 911.31. BVD to CVIN+ participants, 29/04/93, p. 25.893 MoD, MIS/CO, File 438,0315, AR Briefing, no. 7/1995, 20/02/95.894 Johan Peleman, ‘Wapenhandel naar Bosnië-Herzegovina’ (‘Arms trade to Bosnia-Hercegovina’), Noord-Zuid Cahier, No.22(3), September 1997, pp. 92-94.895 Roger Cohen, ‘U.N. Reports Serbian Helicopters Are Flying Into Bosnia’, The New York Times, 21/09/94.896 UNGE, UNPROFOR, Box 124. Akashi to Annan, no. Z-1457, 22/09/94 and Annan to Akashi, no. 3101, 22/09/94.