C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

71Sarajevo, which was quite remarkable in view of the presence of the many British troops there,according to a CIA official. 322 And the BND also met with distrust. According to German intelligencesources the French themselves were also reluctant to share information with the BND. And laterduring the war in Kosovo the CIA was sometimes reluctant to share UAV Imagery with the BND. 323There was definitely a British representation of SIS, albeit not on the level of Chief of Station.This is apparent from the book written by Richard Tomlinson, who spent some time in Bosnia for SISand carried out various clandestine operations in Sarajevo and Tuzla, under cover as a political advisorto General Rose. 324 The problem with his book, however, is that it probably does not describe thepersonal adventures of Tomlinson. Instead he presumably presents the experiences of his predecessoras his own. However, it is true that he ran agents in Sarajevo and Tuzla. 325 Interviews conducted for thisreport have revealed that the SIS recruited agents up to the highest regions of Izetbegovic’sgovernment and cabinet. 326The British SIS, like the German Bundesnachrichtendienst, also had excellent sources close toMladic, according to the Canadian intelligence officers. The Canadians themselves recruited goodsources within the Bosnian government. From the Canadian side it was emphasized that in Sarajevotoo the French intelligence services had built up an excellent working intelligence system. According toCanadian intelligence officails, the French military intelligence service was the best organized inSarajevo. The French had an excellent and centralized working system which operationally, tacticallyand strategically stood head and shoulders above everyone else’s. It was an integrated all-sourceintelligence system. 327 The Canadian view was, not surprisingly, shared by the former head of theFrench military intelligence service (Direction de Renseignement Militaire or DRM), General Jean Heinrich.According to him, up to 1995 this service had an information level that was actually above that of theCIA. The American services had an extraordinarily weak intelligence image ‘at home’; their point ofview on the war in Bosnia was to change only in the practice of the conflict. According to Heinrich, theCIA knew what was happening on the ground in Iraq, because there they were dealing with a desert. Itcorresponded well with the CIA’s method. But, as Heinrich observed, flying over an area that waswooded and hilly, with people who moved in small groups in a misleading manner, was different fromwhat the US services were accustomed to from Iraq.Heinrich pointed out that the CIA had other resources, but that all resources were deployed fortechnical investigation, electronic monitoring and Imint. According to him, the CIA had almost noHumint whatsoever. According to Heinrich, an intelligence service, especially in a conflict involvingproblems of this type, must have a large number of ‘censeurs humains’ on the ground, as well as a verystrong analytical capacity. Heinrich claimed that the director of the CIA, Woolsey, even visited him to328discuss changes in his own intelligence system.This assertion was not based on French chauvinism, but was probably consistent with reality.Many interviews with (former) staff of the Dutch Military Intelligence service (MIS) and foreignservices indicate that the American information position was indeed not highly regarded. 329 A DISofficial recalled Heinrich as ‘a dreadful chap’, who was extremely anti-American. Neither did he speak aword of English, which did not make bilateral contacts and liaison any easier. 330 This did not detract322 Confidential interview (12).323 Confidential interviews (98) and (99).324 Tomlinson, The Big Breach, pp. 130-174.325 Confidential interview (80).326 Confidential interviews (8), (79) and (80).327 Confidential interviews (9), (12) and (47).328 Assemblée Nationale, Srebrenica: rapport sur un massacre, Assemblée Nationale, no. 3412, 2 parts, Paris 2001, Part 2,Audition de Jean Heinrich, 08/02/01, pp. 179-186.329 For this, see Chapter 3 of this study and confidential interviews (8) and (9).330 Confidential interview (8).