388Hilsman, Roger, ‘After the Cold War. The Need for <strong>in</strong>tellig<strong>en</strong>ce’, <strong>in</strong>: Graig Eis<strong>en</strong>drath, NationalInsecurity. U.S. <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> After the Cold War, Phila<strong>de</strong>lphia, 2000.R.Rudner, M., ‘Canada’s Communications Security Establishm<strong>en</strong>t from Cold War toGlobalization’, <strong>in</strong> Matthew Aid and Cees <strong>Wiebes</strong> (ed.) Secrets of Signals <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> dur<strong>in</strong>g the Cold War andBeyond, London, 2001.S.Sarg<strong>en</strong>t, Lt. Col. Richard L., ‘<strong>De</strong>liberate Force’ <strong>in</strong>: Robert C. Ow<strong>en</strong>, <strong>De</strong>liberate Force. A Case Study <strong>in</strong>Effective Air Campaign<strong>in</strong>g, Maxwell AFB, 1998Schmidt-E<strong>en</strong>boom, E., ‘The Bun<strong>de</strong>snachricht<strong>en</strong>di<strong>en</strong>st, the Bun<strong>de</strong>swehr and Sig<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong> the Cold War andAfter’, <strong>in</strong>: Matthew Aid and Cees <strong>Wiebes</strong> (ed.) Secrets of Signals <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> dur<strong>in</strong>g the Cold War and Beyond,Lond<strong>en</strong>, 2001.Sims, J<strong>en</strong>nifer, ‘What is <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong>? Information for <strong>de</strong>cision makers’, <strong>in</strong>: R. Godson, E.R. May and G.Schmitt, U.S. <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> at the Crossroads. Ag<strong>en</strong>da for Reform, Wash<strong>in</strong>gton, <strong>1995.</strong>W.<strong>Wiebes</strong>, Cees, ‘‘Hookers and sportscars?’. <strong>De</strong> theorie <strong>van</strong> het <strong>in</strong>licht<strong>in</strong>g<strong>en</strong>werk’, <strong>in</strong>: P. Koedijk, J.L<strong>in</strong>ss<strong>en</strong> <strong>en</strong> D. Engel<strong>en</strong> (red.), Verspie<strong>de</strong>rs voor het Va<strong>de</strong>rland. Ne<strong>de</strong>rlandse spionage voor, tijd<strong>en</strong>s <strong>en</strong> na <strong>de</strong> Kou<strong>de</strong><strong>oorlog</strong>, D<strong>en</strong> Haag, 1996.<strong>Wiebes</strong>, Cees, ‘The Netherlands <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> Community: Past, Pres<strong>en</strong>t and Future’, <strong>in</strong>: Lars ChristianJ<strong>en</strong>ns<strong>en</strong> and Olav Riste (Eds), <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> <strong>in</strong> the Cold War. Organisation, Role and International Cooperation,Oslo, 2001.<strong>Wiebes</strong>, Cees, ‘Dutch Sig<strong>in</strong>t dur<strong>in</strong>g the Cold War, 1945-1994’, <strong>in</strong>: Matthew Aid and Cees<strong>Wiebes</strong> (ed.) Secrets of Signals <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> dur<strong>in</strong>g the Cold War and Beyond, London, 2001.Woolsey, James, ‘The American <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> Community’, <strong>in</strong>: Hesi Carmel (editor), <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> for Peace.The Role of <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> <strong>in</strong> Times of Peace, London, 1999.Articles and PeriodicalsA.Agee, Lt. Colonel Coll<strong>in</strong> A., ‘Too Much Data --Too Little Intel?, <strong>in</strong>: Military <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> ProfessionalBullet<strong>in</strong>, January-March 1999.Aid, Matthew M., ‘The Time of Troubles: The US National Security Ag<strong>en</strong>cy <strong>in</strong> the Tw<strong>en</strong>ty-FirstC<strong>en</strong>tury’, <strong>in</strong>: <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> and National Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Autumn 2000).SR-71 Blackbird back <strong>in</strong> bus<strong>in</strong>ess, Air Combat Command News, 24/01/97.‘Les Avions-Espions Francais Gabriel et Sarigue’, Air & Cosmos/Aviation International, No. 1460, 21-27/02/94.Andrew, Christopher, ‘Conclusion: An Ag<strong>en</strong>da for Future Research’, <strong>in</strong>: <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> and National Security,Vol. 12 (January 1997) 1.Ashton, B., ‘Mak<strong>in</strong>g Peace Agreem<strong>en</strong>ts Work: United Nations Experi<strong>en</strong>ce <strong>in</strong> the Former Yugoslavia’,Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. 30 (1997) 3.‘Bosnia Un<strong>de</strong>rscores <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> Gaps’, Aviation Week & Space Technology, Vol. 142 (1995) 12.‘Fr<strong>en</strong>ch Support Bosnian ELINT Ops’, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 14/08/95.B.Bata, J., ‘serbi<strong>en</strong>s geheime Auslandskontakte’, <strong>in</strong>: Auss<strong>en</strong>politik, No. IV, 1993Bazolu, Duygu, ‘Implications for Turkey’s relations with Western Europe’, <strong>in</strong>: Mathias Jopp (ed.), TheImplications of the Yugoslav Crisis for Western Europe’s Foreign Relations,Chaillot Paper 17, Paris, 1996.B<strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>r, David, ‘Bosnia’s bombers’, <strong>in</strong>: The Nation, Vol. 261, No. 10, 02/10/95.Betts, R.K., ‘<strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> Warn<strong>in</strong>gs: Old Problems, New Ag<strong>en</strong>das’, <strong>in</strong>: Parameters, Spr<strong>in</strong>g 1998.Boyd, Colonel H. All<strong>en</strong>, ‘Jo<strong>in</strong>t <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> <strong>in</strong> Support of Peace Operations’, <strong>in</strong>: Military <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong>Professional Bullet<strong>in</strong>, January-March 1999.
Boyle, Alan, ‘spies <strong>in</strong> the watch for atrocities’ <strong>in</strong>: MSNBC Interactive, 26/03/99.Brady, Christopher, ‘<strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> Failures: Plus Ç Change …", <strong>in</strong>: <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> and National Security, Vol. 8(October 1993) 4.O’Bri<strong>en</strong>, K. <strong>en</strong> Nusbaum, J., ‘<strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> gather<strong>in</strong>g for asymmetric Threats, Part I and II’, <strong>in</strong>: Jane’s<strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> Review, October and November 2000.Brands, William J., ‘<strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> and Foreign Policy: Dilemmas of A <strong>De</strong>mocracy’, <strong>in</strong>: Foreign Affairs, Vol.47(1969) 2.Burton-Rose, D. <strong>en</strong> Mads<strong>en</strong>, W., ‘Corporate Soldiers. The U.S. Governm<strong>en</strong>t Privatizes the Use ofForce’, <strong>in</strong>: Mult<strong>in</strong>ational Monitor, March 1999.C.Charters, David A., ‘Out of the Closet: <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> Support for Post-Mo<strong>de</strong>rnistPeacekeep<strong>in</strong>g’, <strong>in</strong>: The Pearson Papers, No. 4, <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> and Peacekeep<strong>in</strong>g,Halifax, 1999.Clark, Phillip S., ‘Russia has no reconnaissance satellites <strong>in</strong> orbit’, <strong>in</strong>: Jane’s <strong>De</strong>f<strong>en</strong>ce Weekly, 08/05/01.Covault, Graig, ‘Jo<strong>in</strong>t Stars Pat<strong>rol</strong>s Bosnia’, <strong>in</strong>: Aviation Week and Space Technology, 19/02/96.Crawford, Timothy W., ‘Why Ever Not Never? <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> Cooperation <strong>in</strong> United Nations SecurityAffairs’, Paper prepared for the Annual Confer<strong>en</strong>ce of the Canadian Association for Security and <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> Studies,Ottawa, 28/09/02.D.<strong>De</strong>utch, J., ‘The CIA and Bosnia: An Exchange’, <strong>in</strong>: New York Review of Books, 06/06/96.Diamond, John M., ‘Re-exam<strong>in</strong>g Problems and Prospects <strong>in</strong> U.S. Imagery <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong>’, <strong>in</strong>: InternationalJournal of <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> and Counter<strong>in</strong>tellig<strong>en</strong>ce, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2001.Dixon, Lt. 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Col. George K., USA, ‘Operation Jo<strong>in</strong>t En<strong>de</strong>avor: Comb<strong>in</strong>ed-Jo<strong>in</strong>t <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> <strong>in</strong> PeaceEnforcem<strong>en</strong>t Operations’, Military <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong>, October-<strong>De</strong>cember 1996.H.Han<strong>de</strong>l, M., ‘The Study of <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong>, <strong>in</strong>: ORBIS, Vol. 26, No. 4 (W<strong>in</strong>ter 1983).Harlf<strong>in</strong>ger, Mark , USAF, ‘C-ROFA Becomes Ars<strong>en</strong>al of IO’, Spokesman, <strong>De</strong>cember 1997.Harvey, D., ‘<strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> Notes’, <strong>in</strong>: American <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> Journal, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Spr<strong>in</strong>g/Summer 1995).389
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197policymakers, however. As a resu
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315gathered intelligence, then it m
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317the VRS attack should aim to tak
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319In January 1995 a European intel
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