C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

269aid being sent to Sarajevo. Both parties even shot at UN planes bringing the aid. As these were thenprevented from delivering the goods, the prices on the black market rose. 1415Corruption hit UNPROFOR in another way, too. A member of General Smith’s staff said: ‘TheCoded Cables of the UN were sold in Sarajevo for $1000’. 1416 The Bosnian Minister Muratovic made nosecret to the temporary Dutch chargé d’affaires, Glaubitz, of the fact that Bosnian Muslims wereintercepting UNPROFOR communications. 1417 Insiders knew this already, but that did not makeMuratovic’s admission any less remarkable.The fact that UNPROFOR messages were being intercepted at the very highest level was alsoconfirmed by a message from the 2 nd Corps, which reported on 11 July 1995 that it had listened in threetimes to a phone call through an open line between Generals Janvier and Zdravko Tolimir.1418 TheABiH also intercepted phone calls between Generals Mladic and Janvier on 9 and 10 July, 1419 andbetween the Dutch General Nicolai and the General Staff of the VRS. 1420 UNPROFOR headquarterswas also a favourite target of the Bosnian intelligence services. 1421 For example, all faxes from the ChiefPolitical Officer of UNPROFOR in Sarajevo, Phillip Corwin, were intercepted by the BosnianMuslims. 1422 This equally applied to the UNPF headquarters in Zagreb; here the Croatian services wereresponsible. According to a member of the UNPF intelligence staff in Zagreb, the Croatian nationalsecurity and military intelligence services systematically monitored UNPROFOR traffic in Croatia andhad engaged interpreters especially for this purpose. Rumour had it that they were experiencingproblems with Belgian traffic, because Belgian officers tended to switch often between French andFlemish. 1423The Croatian Army benefited considerably from UNMO intercepts, especially during the attackon the Krajina. They were among their best sources of intelligence. 1424 This was confirmed by the PostMission Report of the UNMOs in UNPROFOR and UNPF, which said that, between 1992 and 1996,the Communications Security of UNPROFOR ‘was a real disaster for UNPROFOR/UNPF’. TheUNPF headquarters in Zagreb and the UNMO headquarters both used unprotected land lines for theirdaily reports and ‘for that period UNMO (and UNPF in general) has become unwillingly (let’s hope)“the second intelligence agency” for Croatian Army’. The satellite connections used by theUNPROFOR units were also an easy prey for the warring factions’ interceptors. The headquarters ofUnCivPol and the UNMOs in Srebrenica were monitored by the ABiH. Dutchbat made this publicafter it was discovered. 1425 The communications traffic of the UNMOs was similarly intercepted andread by the ABiH and as such became another a key source of military information. 1426Up till then, open communications had been one of the cardinal principles of a UN operation.However, an UNPROFOR evaluation report stated: ‘It is right for an academic PeacekeepingOperation, but for such an active operation like UNPROFOR it is not. There is a strong belief that itshould be reconsidered on the basis of sad experience of this Mission’. The report stressed yet againthat all the warring factions had stolen or seized large amounts of UNPROFOR communication1415 Confidential interview (80).1416 Interview with James Baxter, 16/10/00.1417 NMFA, DEU Srebrenica, Glaubitz to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, no. 25, 03/09/96.1418 NIOD, Coll. CD-Roms. Message from 2 nd Corps to Odbrane Republike VoVJ TaVJ, no. 02/8-0101215, 11/07/95.1419 ICTY, OTP Ex. 738, List of Exhibits contained in Ex. 364 (2 volumes of Intercepts), Conversation 9 July/1 and 10July/1, 09/07/95 and 10/07/95.1420 NIOD, Coll. CD-Roms. ABiH Komanda 2. Korpusa to Komanda 28. Divizije br. 02-/8-1132, 09/07/95 and ABiHKomanda 2. Korpusa to Komanda 28. Divizije br. 02-/8-1142, 10/07/95.1421 ‘sFOR discovers eavesdropping center in Sarajevo’, Glas Javnosti, 13/01/01.1422 Corwin, Dubious Mandate, p. 165.1423 Confidential interview (45).1424 Thomas Quiggin, Response to ‘No Cloak and Dagger Required: Intelligence Support to UN Peacekeeping’, in: Intelligenceand National Security, Vol. 13 (1998) 4, p. 206.1425 Interviews with Bob Patchett, 19/11/99 and E.A. Rave, 13 and 14/12/00.1426 For example: NIOD, Coll. CD-Roms. Komanda 2. Korpusa, Tuzla to Generalstab ABiH, Sarajevo, no. SP. 06-712-24-7/95, 15/07/95.