C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

285operational in Bosnia, like the P-3C and EP-3 Orion planes (used by NATO). The P-3C Orion had‘eyes’ and ‘ears’ and had been active since early 1994. After the arrival of US ground troops, it sent liveimages to ground stations in Mostar, Banja Luka and Tuzla. However, it is unlikely that these weredeployed in operational Imint missions above the eastern enclaves in the summer of 1995. 1517 However,from 1994 onwards there been problems because the overwhelming majority of targets were small ormobile rather than large, fixed sites. In the beginning US flyers even used 15 year-old hand-held 35 mmcameras, for they lacked timely imagery, according to a published account and Pentagon memos. In July1994, a confidential NATO report claimed that of the 206 aircraft assigned to the operation DenyFlight only 14 were capable of air reconnaissance tasks. But some NATO members had their ownnational assets, which contributed to the overall intelligence picture. 1518Another excellent tool for observing troop movements and the repositioning of tanks andartillery was the Joint Stars aircraft, more commonly known as JSTARS, but these were not fullyoperational in the Balkans until 27 December 1995. The JSTARS were one of the great successes of theDesert Storm campaign. These E-8Cs (converted Boeing 707s) were able to register troop movements,tank formations and artillery positions at great distances with almost 100% accuracy. This is known asthe detection of ‘Moving Target Indicators’ in military jargon. The JSTARS had direct contact with theground commanders via near-real-time satellite connections. 1519But, as was pointed out by the former director of the French military intelligence services,General Jean Heinrich, Bosnia was not Iraq. The CIA knew what was happening on the ground in Iraqbecause it was desert terrain, something US intelligence services were comfortable with. The Americanswere not used to flying over mountainous, densely-forested areas where small groups moved around inmisleading ways, Heinrich said. 1520 The JSTARS also owed its success in the Kuwaiti desert to a stringof other factors: large numbers of tanks, armoured vehicles and trucks that operated in largeformations; low levels of civilian motorized traffic; a clear and broad dividing line between the twosides; no place to hide military materiel from radar missions; minimum vegetation and inhabited areas;flat terrain; air supremacy; and clear targets. Apart from air supremacy, none of these ideal operationalconditions existed in Bosnia. On the contrary, in Bosnia the JSTARS were later confronted withmountains and hills and with ‘false radar returns’ from bare mountain expanses in what was later theFrench sector (in Republika Srpska). These signals were interpreted as moving targets andformations. 1521The JSTARS did not operate well in Bosnia. They could not distinguish between civilian andmilitary traffic along the narrow roads. Sometimes a signal denoting a convoy was received, but thisusually turned out to be vehicles passing each other. In any case, the ABiH and VRS generally travelledby bus to the theatre of war and not in long military convoys. Aside from the fact that the enclaves hadno priority in the US intelligence community, the JSTARS had the greatest difficulty observingmovements of troops, tanks and artillery in Bosnia. 1522As the JSTARS were not fully operational in the Balkans until December 1995, the Americanand the international intelligence community (especially within NATO) did not have access to thisintelligence platform in the summer of 1995. But even if they had, it is unlikely, given the local1517 Daniel Wakin, ‘Camera in Sky Keeps Eye on Bosnia’, The Washington Post, 19/12/97.1518 Tony Capaccio, ‘Intelligence, Imagery Shortfalls Mar NATO Air Campaign’, Defense Week, 05/12/94 and confidentialinformation (81).1519 Annual Command History, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, Fiscal Year 1995, Top Secret, 30/09/96.1520 Assemblée Nationale, Srebrenica: rapport sur un massacre, Assemblee Nationale, No 3412, 2 part, Paris 2001, Deel 2,Audition de Jean Heinrich, 08/02/01, pp. 179 - 186.1521 Colonel Collin A. Agee, ‘Joint Stars in Bosnia. Too Much Data - Too Little Intel?’, Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin,(October-December 1996), pp. 6-10. See also in the same issue: Captain Bruce A. Niedrauer, ‘Joint Stars Support to SpecialOperations Command’, pp. 15 - 17.1522 Captain Kristin M. Baker, ‘Operation Joint Endeavor. Joint Stars in the Balkans’, Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin,(October-December 1996), pp. 27 - 29 and Graig Covault, ‘Joint Stars Patrols Bosnia’, Aviation Week and Space Technology,19/02/96, p. 45.