C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

165The attempt at a cover-upAs mentioned above, Le Hardy’s report covered the Black Flights, and therefore had to be rendered‘harmless’. For this reason, the Americans were said to have exerted pressure on Force Commander DeLapresle to withdraw his earlier report to New York, in which he reported that, among other things,advanced military technology had been delivered, and that the origin of the military cargo and the cargoaircraft themselves was unknown. 827 A British researcher stated that this could only mean thatAmerican military experts must also have flown to Bosnia to train the ABiH to handle this equipment.The Americans did not want this to be revealed, and they therefore wanted De Lapresle to issue astatement to the effect that ‘no unauthorized air activity occurred at the Tuzla airfield’ on 10 and 12February. 828The morning briefing of South European NATO Command (AFSOUTH) on 16 February paidattention to the flights. According to these reports, there was no question of actual observation ofHercules aircraft (the Norwegian observations were therefore simply denied) and the escort aircraftmentioned were involved in Close Air Support training, according to the report. The Dutch liaisonofficer, Colonel J. Beks, considered this to be a strange moment for such training. He had ‘picked up’ aletter from Mladic to Smith and he found it remarkable that Mladic had already protested on 13February. Beks interpreted the instructions and overreaction of American officers involved as anattempt to cover up the Special Operations activities, in the context of arms supplies to the ABiH.According to Beks, this was not to the benefit of NATO cohesion, and could even jeopardize theimplementation of Deny Flight. Beks made the following comparison: ‘A defensive player on thefootball team has no trouble with occasionally (...) letting a ball through.’ 829The actual cover-up started with the ‘official report’ of Colonel Douglas J. Richardson of theUS Air Force. He spoke to Moldestad, and made it clear to him that he had not used night visionbinoculars, had not seen a cargo aircraft, and had only heard sounds that resembled the engines of a C-130. According to Richardson, Moldestad then started to have doubts. Richardson also made clear tohim that on that night NATO jet fighters were in the process of a Close Air Support training missionover Tuzla, between 20.00 and 05.00 hours. According to Richardson, these had been underUNPROFOR control. Richardson came to the conclusion that Moldestad had made a mistake, and thathe could have seen neither any NATO aircraft nor a C-130. 830 Unfortunately for Richardson,Moldestad’s observation was at 17.45 hours, well before 20.00 hours. The question now is what wasreally going on.According to the American Colonel Timothy C. Jones, two Danish Forward Air Controllerswere working with two A-6 E jet fighters, which were exercising at low altitude over Tuzla. Accordingto him, two F-18 jet fighters were also flying to the south of Tuzla. Besides the two Danes, accordingto Jones, no one else knew that NATO aircraft were operating in this region, which is rather unlikely:Le Hardy’s earlier report suggests that Norwegians in Tuzla also saw them. They had made subsequentenquiries in Sarajevo, but neither had Bosnia-Hercegovina Command been informed of Close Air831Support training. Sarajevo had therefore not responded to the messages from Tuzla.Jones denied furthermore that the UN observers used night vision binoculars. This was actuallyincorrect: a British SAS soldier had made an observation with such binoculars. In October 1994 theForce Commander had already been pointed out blind spots in the No Fly Zone that were apparentlyinevitable. It was decided then to issue night vision binoculars to observers in the areas around Tuzla. 832The use of night vision binoculars was also confirmed in the Senior Staff Meeting with Akashi on 13827 O’shea, Crisis at Bihac, p. 157.828 Confidential interview (67).829 MoD, DCBC, Fax to Col. Van Veen, 16/02/95.830 Confidential collection (12), Memo for the Record by Colonel USAF Douglas Richardson, Tuzla ‘sitings’, 17/02/95.831 Confidential collection (12), Report Le Hardy to MA Commander, BHC, ‘Incident at TAB’, 13/02/95.832 UNNY, DPKO, File #81302, FC Eyes Only, Point Paper No Fly Zone Monitoring, 23/10/94.