C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

349coming 24 hours. 1963 On 11 July the analysis of the MIS/Army still stated that it was ‘hardly likely’ thatthe Bosnian Serbs wanted to take the entire enclave. After all, the VRS did not have sufficient infantryto occupy the enclave in the long term. 1964 In an analysis from March 1997 of the information positionof the MIS/Army it was established that the service’s own sources and those of its counterparts offeredlittle indication that the VRS was planning an attack. Shelling and troop movements were in evidence atthe start of July, but these occurred frequently and ‘were thus not of an exceptional nature’. 1965Was there thus no specific plan from which such an operation could be inferred? As early asAugust 1995 a MIS officer claimed that the conquest was not a preconceived strategic plan. The VRSwanted to control the southern road and to achieve this had to clear the adjoining area. When the VRStroops realized how weak the resistance was, they pushed on further. When the resistance of the ABiHproved to be negligible, the enclave fell swiftly and unexpectedly. Perhaps an operational plan had beenprepared and ‘shelved’ earlier, which the VRS then put into practice when the resistance proved to beweak. This could explain why Dutchbat considered that the whole operation was prepared andexecuted so well. 1966 This is an analysis which seems to fit the later findings of the Tribunal. OperationKrivaja ‘95 originally did not envisage the conquest of the enclave, but when the resistance of the ABiHand UNPROFOR proved to be so limited on 9 July, on that day it was decided to conquer the entireenclave. 1967 The ad hoc nature of the VRS decision-making was confirmed by the military security officerof Dutchbat IV, N. Franssen. He spoke to a Dutchbat soldier who was among the 55 prisoners. Heattended a celebration in Bratunac at which high-ranking VRS officers were also present. They told himthat they originally had no intention of taking the enclave as a whole. But their probing attacks met withalmost no resistance, and so the VRS proceeded with the conquest. 1968 A former official of the Tribunalconfirmed this ad hoc nature of the VRS attack to the French parliamentary investigationcommission. 1969What was true of the MIS/Army was also true of the MIS/Air Force. One year after the fall ananalyst drew up a ‘Chronological Overview Srebrenica 1 March 1995 to 26 July 1995’ on the basis ofthe facts available at the time. This once again shows that the MIS/Air Force had no prior tacticalknowledge. Troop movements were observed at the eastern edge of the enclave on 5 July, althoughthese were not reported by Dutchbat. On 6 July the same happened in the south of the enclave. Thistime it was reported by Dutchbat. 1970 But an attack on the enclave was not expected.The Military Intelligence Service of the Central Organization (MIS/CO)A study of the reports by the MIS/CO produces the picture described below. At the start of May 1995the Intelligence Department of the MIS/CO stated that probably no new major military operationswould be undertaken by the ABiH and the VRS. It was, however, conceivable that the VRS would oncemore take the military initiative. The possibilities for doing this seemed limited in view of the shortageof infantry. 1971 At the start of June it was reported that VJ troops were regularly being deployed, aroundthe eastern enclaves in particular. This was chiefly being done to allow VRS soldiers to take a few days’1963 MoD, SMG. Report on Srebrenica project, Overview Sitrep Royal Netherlands Army Crisis Staff Morning Report,05/07/95 and 06/07/95.1964 MoD, MIS/Army. INTSUM No. 131/95, 11/07/95.1965 MoD, MIS/Army. Memorandum: to CDS; Re: Intelligence on attack on Srebrenica; Drafter: Lt. Col. Van Geldere;Annotation: Col. J. Mulder Head MIS/Army; 18/03/97.1966 MoD, SMG. Report of conversation, 03/08/95 and confidential interview (28).1967 Butler, ‘srebrenica Military Narrative – Operation Krivaja 95’, 15/05/00, pp. 950764-950765.1968 MoD, SMG 1006/18. Report of conversation with N. Franssen, 15/08/95.1969 AFP Press release, Testimony by Ruez, 22/02/01.1970 MoD, DCBC, Box 66. ‘Chronological overview of Srebrenica 1 March 1995 to 26 July 1995’, 11/07/96 and confidentialinterview (31).1971 MoD, MIS/CO, Memorandum: ‘Developments in the former Yugoslav Federation’, No. 20/95, 02/05/95.