C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

122the answer is a flat “no”. If you just followed The Herald Tribune, CNN and Le Monde a little, you couldfind out quite a lot. They were often compilations of open sources. That sums it up neatly’. 574Under Ter Beek, the MIS/CO was sometimes involved in confidential briefings on the securitysituation in Bosnia at the request of the Parliamentary Permanent Committee for Defence. Forexample, such a briefing was requested on 22 February 1994, shortly before the deployment toSrebrenica. The Head of the MIS was to take account of the objectives and resources of the warringfactions, the threat to the Dutch troops and the living conditions in Srebrenica and Zepa. 575The next question is whether Ter Beek’s successor, Voorhoeve, had a different view of the rolethat the MIS could play. According to the Minister, the task of the MIS/CO was to continue to give acurrent, accurate analysis of the state of affairs on the basis of what they heard, saw and especiallypicked up from allies. He had the impression that the Netherlands had ‘only very limited intelligenceresources. Therefore we were very heavily dependent on what the larger allies told us’. His assessmentwas that the best intelligence on Bosnia resided with the British, the French and the Americans. TheMinister therefore admitted that there were only limited opportunities to actively gather intelligence inother countries. An official from the MIS/CO once said to Voorhoeve: ‘It is really a pity that we havedisbanded the foreign intelligence service’. 576The Hague therefore had only extremely limited intelligence resources. The question then iswhether the ministry or the government made any additional effort in the area of intelligence, and if theMIS ever remarked that, should Dutch soldiers be sent to Bosnia, they might need more resources andmanpower. Voorhoeve was unable to recall any instance when this had been raised for discussion.Neither did Parliament ever insist that additional efforts be made in the area of intelligence. This alsoapplied to Sigint: there was no additional effort put into this. He confirmed that the conflict in theMinistry of Defence had more to do with protecting Sigint against excessive cutbacks: intelligencecapacity was also expected to make a contribution to the almost one billion guilders worth of cuts.There were also Defence officials who thought that Sigint generally yielded little. There was a familiarexpression: ‘We’d rather have a frigate than ... ‘, which could be completed with a term like ‘signalsIntelligence’. ‘You then know exactly where the resistance lay’, said Voorhoeve. In brief, there were noadditional enhancements in the area of intelligence; neither Parliament nor the Ministry of Defence northe Cabinet insisted on it. Voorhoeve: ‘I think that conclusion is correct’. Otherwise, up until the fall ofthe enclave he had not noticed that the Dutch intelligence position was nothing special. The Ministerassumed that what he received in MIS reports was mainly based on the resources of far larger foreignservices, which also operated under fewer legal restrictions.Voorhoeve stated later that he was not impressed by the information position of the MIS/CO.The analyses that he received every two weeks did not rise above the average International Herald Tribunelevel. 577 This was also clear from the report of a parliamentary hearing of Minister Voorhoeve. TheMinister declared that for a number of reasons the possibility of gathering reliable intelligence did notexist. According to him, this was related to whether or not a country had a history as a great power. Asan example, he referred to Britain, which had the possibility of dropping special forces behind enemylines and thereby starting espionage activities. In a war situation, the Netherlands could do the same,but ‘within the framework of UNPROFOR we had no spies among the Serbs’, Voorhoeve said. ‘Wetherefore relied on the UN’s larger intelligence capacity. That makes you the requesting party, and thenyou simply have to take what you’re given. My assessment is that we did not receive any timely,adequate warnings from other intelligence services regarding what was about to happen. I saydeliberately: no timely, adequate warnings. The Netherlands made maximum use of its own analysiscapacity, and was therefore left with the "fog of war"‘. 578 Voorhoeve therefore relied on the intelligence574 Interview with A.L. ter Beek, 13/01/00.575 MoD , Archive Stasdef 1994, Brigadier General A. Kolsteren to BLS and HMID, No. S94/061/589, 13/02/94.576 Interview with J. Voorhoeve, 01/10/01.577 Interview with J. Voorhoeve, 01/10/01.578 Vertrekpunt Den Haag, Deel 1 Rapport, p. 182.