C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

267Intelligence Community had no access to such intercepts. The ABiH ‘was in a better position to collecttactical intelligence such as this’. 1404The Comint on the attack on Srebrenica, the column, and the later executions of the ABiHsoldiers was not passed on to the Dutch Military Intelligence Service (MIS) either. Archival researchand interviews with MIS staff revealed that no-one knew anything about the intercepts until thepublication in the press in 1995 and the trial of General Krstic. 1405 The fact that this Comint was notshared is another indication that the intercepts were not available in real time. Otherwise, one has tocountenance the cynical idea that the ABiH and the political leaders in Sarajevo were prepared tosacrifice Srebrenica and thousands of Muslims to win over the West once and for all to the side of theBosnian Muslims. This thought was actually expressed before and after the fall of Srebrenica by theBosnian Foreign Minister Sacirbey, who said: ‘Well, now we have one problem less’. 1406A CIA official who worked in the region also suggested during an interview that there was acertain disinterest regarding the events in the enclave. Srebrenica was scarcely broached in his talks withsenior Bosnian commanders and government officials. The war crimes committed in the enclave didnot top the list of questions that the ABiH wanted to solve or urgently discuss with the CIA. Instead,pertinent questions posed earlier by the CIA officer on the matter were avoided. There has never beena clear explanation for this. Apparently, everything revolved around Sarajevo, and Srebrenica waspushed into the background. 1407 That this should apply to the mass murders is, however, a cynicalscenario that cannot be supported with convincing evidence.What if the ABiH had shared its intelligence with UNPROFOR?If the ABiH had actually been in possession of real-time Comint and passed it on to UNPROFOR,could this have influenced the fate of Srebrenica or saved the male Muslims? ‘What if’ questions are, bydefinition, difficult to answer. A senior member of the US Intelligence Community took the view that itwould have made no difference; he pointed out that both the ABiH and UNPROFOR knew that theenclave was under attack. They knew that a large group of soldiers had left the enclave but, for variousreasons, neither of them took action.UNPROFOR could perhaps have interpreted its mandate more freely or exerted pressure onPale and Belgrade, but this would have taken so much time that it would not have helped to saveSrebrenica or the men. 1408 On the other hand, the immediate publication of these intercepted messagesmight have turned the tide for the men and boys in the column. The Bosnian Serbs might have haltedthe mass executions if their scale had been made known to the outside world. Pale and Belgrade wouldprobably have had to give in to diplomatic, military and other pressure. The only people with whom theBosnian Government was prepared to share its volatile Comint were journalists. In October andNovember 1995 the Bosnian Foreign Minister, Sacirbey, offered the aforementioned ABiH interceptsto various journalists. However, he waited until months after the fall of Srebrenica, perhaps in anattempt to improve his own negotiating position. 1409 The obvious conclusion from this is that neitherthe Bosnian military nor political leaders shared the intercepts with UNPROFOR, the UN in NewYork or the US intelligence services. Presumably, this was mainly because the Muslims did not havereal-time communication intercepts.1404 Roy Gutman, ‘UN’s Deadly Deal’, Newsday, 29/05/96.1405 Confidential interviews (21), (22), (24) and (27).1406 Interview with Andeljko Makar, 12/06/00.1407 Confidential interview (12).1408 Confidential information (13).1409 Confidential information (6).