C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

134office, which was opposite the communication centre: ‘normally speaking, no interpreter wasinvolved.’ 638Ultimately, it was the Dutchbat officer, Major P. Boering, who was able to give a possibleexplanation. He immediately associated this incident with the preparation of the Displaced Persons’delegation for the meeting with Mladic on the morning of 12 July. Information was given to theinterpreter in connection with this meeting, and he had attempted to phone members of the Bosniangovernment. With this in mind, the interpreter was given a desk and a telephone. 639 But still no answerhas been given to the question of how the text came to be on the floppy disk. It may have been that theinterpreter was also permitted to translate this letter on the laptop. In this case there was thereforeprobably no question of espionage or of a far-reaching breach of security in Dutchbat III.11. ConclusionsThe information position of the Dutch intelligence and security services at the start of the outbreak ofthe conflict in Yugoslavia was neither strong nor unique. In this area, the Foreign Intelligence Service(IDB) no longer played any significant role, as the service was on the point of being disbanded. Duringthe deployment of soldiers to Bosnia, the Netherlands therefore had no independent foreignintelligence service of its own, which meant that the government was deprived of a potentiallyimportant information source. According to various intelligence officers, this was regrettable during thewar in the Balkans. 640 They were of the opinion that each state that cherishes its sovereignty andindependence must have not only a diplomatic service and armed forces, but also an intelligenceorganization of its own. The voice of a state that does not have such a facility counts for less in thechoir of nations. As Peter Hennessy once said: ‘Intelligence is without question an influence-multiplierin the sense that it enables a state to apply its other instruments of influence more effectively’.641 Onecould add to this that a nation also has a duty to protect its sons and daughters from the consequencesof having no intelligence. It is not just about taking a place at the table of nations, it is about honouringthose who sacrifice on their nation’s behalf. A well-functioning IDB could have played an importantrole in gathering intelligence on Bosnia. As things were, only scant intelligence was available.The National Security Service (BVD) concentrated on domestic security. After all, thestationing of Dutch soldiers in Bosnia could have consequences for state security and the democraticrule of law. With hindsight, that threat was not as bad as might have been expected. Serb, Bosnian orCroat secret services were all but inactive in the Netherlands, and hardly carried out any operations.Attempts were made on a limited scale to raise funds or to send arms and ammunition to the region.The service did keep close track of whether mercenaries were recruited and who was responsible forthis. The BVD was also very much occupied with mapping out politically related crime among ex-Yugoslavs, and investigating whether this was geared towards supporting the war effort of states andmilitias.In 1995, the service established that the developments in the former Yugoslavia had onlylimited consequences for state security. The changed situation in the Balkans prompted only a mutedresponse among the ex-Yugoslavs. This did not develop into organized political activity. The fear of ahorizontal threat (within the Yugoslav community) and a vertical threat aimed against Dutch subjectsand institutions receded sharply. After the expulsion of two Serb intelligence officers, the BVDcontinued to pay attention to monitoring and influencing activities on the part of the Serb embassy.The remarks made in 1994 about a criminal network with political connections were more or lesswithdrawn. Organized crime may have been a phenomenon to be taken seriously, but there were hardly638 Report of telephone conversation with Sergeant Major E.A. Rave, 11/06/01.639 Interview with P. Boering, 13/12/01.640 Confidential interviews (18 ) , ( 25 ) , ( 31 ) , ( 34 ) and ( 36).641 P. Hennessy, ‘The secret service, open to question’, in: The Independent, 15/10/96. See also: ‘Intelligence and policy: What is constant? What is changing?’, in: Commentary, No. 45 (June 1994),p. 4.