C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

251messages, which were intercepted using Yugoslav and Russian equipment, were taped but were notdirectly relayed to a ground station. It was not until the end of a mission that the tapes were analysed.These MIGs were stationed at Ladjevci air base near Krajevo in Serbia. They were often moved to keepthem out of sight of US spy satellites and U-2 missions. Sometimes, they flew over the Drina foroperations above Bosnia. The VJ also used special Elint freight aircraft. 1318Like Croatia, Serbia had special UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) for Sigint operations. Beforethe war these were stationed in Bihac, and some of them fell into Croat hands. They were originallymade in East Germany and ran on MIG 21 engines. They took off like a jet and could stay in the airbetween 45 and 60 minutes. The Yugoslav Navy had a special Sigint ship which was initially stationedin the port of Split but which was later transferred to Kotor in Montenegro. This ship was equippedwith both Comint and Elint capabilities and was used constantly to monitor UNPROFOR and NATOtraffic. During the war in Kosovo the VJ also used Sigint to mislead NATO. Special units wereassigned the task of sending out disinformation. It was not possible to ascertain whether this also tookplace during the conflict in Bosnia, but it cannot be ruled out.The VJ was the first organization responsible for Sigint in Serbia and had specially trainedpersonnel for this purpose. Each worker was allocated a specific set of frequencies and had to tape themost important messages. The interceptor noted the time of interception and the subject of themessage. He then took his notes and the tape recording to his superior for analysis. The interceptionstation then informed the commanders of the other military units, who decided whether or not toinform the president. Routine military intercepts were sent direct to a brigade for analysis. If themessages turned out to be highly important, they were sent on immediately to the Commander-in-Chiefvia secure land lines. Every week, President Milosevic received a two-hour intelligence briefing, whichincluded Sigint. Milosevic considered Comint especially important to the political and military decisionmakingprocess. He would have received tapes of, among other things, the telephone calls betweenIzetbegovic and political and military policy-makers in Washington. 1319 He supposedly also heardtelephone calls made by Karadzic. This led him to conclude that Karadzic was only using the Krajina asa concession to Mladic in exchange for areas in Bosnia: Karadzic knew that, in terms of militarystrategy, Mladic was more attached to Western Bosnia and the Krajina. Karadzic himself was moreinterested in Eastern Bosnia as it was geographically contiguous with Serbia. 1320The telephone traffic between the enclave Srebrenica and Izetbegovic was also monitored. On22 April and 4 May 1994 the VRS intercepted and allegedly taped two calls between Naser Oric andIzetbegovic in which Oric announced a military offensive. The two men also discussed thehumanitarian situation in the enclave. 1321 Oric was in permanent contact with the General Staff inSarajevo and sent them reports on a regular basis. 1322The VJ assisted the VRS by giving them old equipment. Up to the Dayton Accord VRS officerscould participate in the special Sigint training in Belgrade. Afterwards, the VJ stopped this, saying thatthe VRS could not afford to pay for the training. Between 1993 and 1995 the VRS and the VJcooperated closely in Sigint and Elint. Intelligence on NATO air strikes were especially shared in full;this gave the VRS time to switch off their radar systems and bring certain installations to safety (seealso Chapter 7). The Krajina Serbs were also connected to this warning system and had excellent Sigintcapabilities. Nevertheless, the bombings inflicted serious damage on the VRS Comint and Elintsystems 1323 , which made the VRS even more dependent on the VJ for Sigint. When the conflict was1318 Confidential interview (73).1319 Berislav Jelinic, ‘Croatian citizen is the primary financier of both Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic’, in: Nacional, Issue294, 05/07/01.1320 Confidential interview (95).1321 MoD, Sitraps. HQ DutchBat to HQ SNE, 15/05/94.1322 Report of a meeting with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Committee for Compiling Data on Crimes against Humanity andInternational Law, Belgrade, 11/06/98.1323 For a photo of the elimination of such a communication antenna see Lutgert & De Winter, Check The Horizon, p. 445.