C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

252underway the VRS could sometimes call upon the Serb planes operating from Banja Luka, where some40 or 50 aircraft were stationed, some with Sigint capabilities. According to a ABiH general, the MIGscould do very little or nothing at all because of the No-Fly Zone. 1324Like the VJ, the VRS had a network of permanent interception stations at diverse locations.This was based on a detailed plan for the communication traffic of the Bosnian Serbs, which wentunder the code name of Vatra (Fire). 1325 The interception device that was used most by the VRS wasthe RPK-3. It also used Hungarian-made Sigint trucks which had come from the VJ. Bosnian militarysources claimed that the Hungarians had always had excellent technical equipment. These trucks wereconverted by the VJ and fitted with the most suitable equipment. These trucks were capable ofintercepting two HF, four VHF, and two air force frequencies.Furthermore, the VRS had special scanners, which could easily intercept tactical intelligence atbattalion level. A former ABiH general claimed that the VJ and VRS also had special helicopters withSigint and Imint capabilities at their disposal. Some Bosnian Serb MIG-21s had Sigint as well as Imintequipment on board. The information would allegedly be relayed directly to the special Sigint trucks.Comint turned out to be a crucial source of information for the VRS. A VRS document dated 1993shows that 70% of all intelligence received by the VRS high command came from Sigint. 1327 The mainintelligence targets of the VJ and the VRS were the radio connections of the ABiH. When the conflicterupted, the VRS seized the Stolice tower to the north of Tuzla. This tower was the axis of all thecommunication traffic in Eastern Bosnia. The VRS cut off all the connections between Bosnianterritory and Eastern Bosnia, with the result that Tuzla became isolated. It then cut off all connectionswith Croatia, Sarajevo, and Srebrenica.Until early July 1993 this communication tower was still being used by the ABiH. At that timethe telephone connection ran from Tuzla via the Stolice Tower to Srebrenica; this line was definitelytapped by the VRS. After that, the communications of the 2 nd Corps of the ABiH in Tuzla ran toSarajevo via Konjuh and to Croatia via Okresanica. When the main centre of communication, theStolice Tower, fell into the hands of the VRS, the number of ABiH phone lines fell from 1080 to only24.1328 After the tower had been seized, the ABiH made several attempts – also with the aid of tanks –to destroy it, but without success. It did, however, manage to inflict some damage. 1329 Thereafter, the2 nd Corps switched to high voltage cables for their communication. Most likely, the lightningconductors were used for connections. 1330 This gave the ABiH access to a few extra channels for whichspecial equipment was used. This type of telephone connection was set up mainly with Sarajevobecause the high-voltage cables with Croatia were severed. In addition, there were undergroundtelephone cables between Tuzla and Srebrenica and between Srebrenica and Sarajevo, which wereprobably destroyed by the VRS during the conflict. There were no separate telephone lines for thearmy.The VRS units responsible for electronic warfare did not have such a difficult job, as the ABiHhad no special receivers. Most of the units, including the 28 th Division in Srebrenica, used a YEASUFM Receiver FT-411E. This was a Japanese-made walkie-talkie which worked on the 144 - 146 MHzfrequency. It had a range of between five and ten kilometres and a capacity of 2 Watts. The VRS couldmonitor this traffic because it normally operated with the same equipment or with Motorolas, whichcould intercept the YEASU. Though the YEASU had a small aerial, the 28 th Division could still reachTuzla from the enclave if they used an extended aerial (such as a wire in a tree) on the top of amountain. Initially, an extended aerial was mounted on the roof of the Telecom building in Srebrenica;13261324 Confidential interview (73).1325 Cekic, Aggression, p. 199.1326 Confidential interview (73).1327 Judgement in the Krstic Trial, § 112, p. 41.1328 For suspicions: MoD, MIS/Bakker Commission, Vreman to Van Dijk, Debriefing report, 09/03/95.1329 Confidential interview (73). See also: MoD, Sitraps, HQ SNE to BHC, Sitrep, 29/06/94.1330 MoD, MIS/Bakker Commission. Vreman to Van Dijk, Debriefing report, 09/03/95.