C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

133One envelope contained several floppy disks. The floppy disk in question (probably one ofseveral floppy disks) contained part of the archive of Dutchbat’s internal and external communicationtraffic. This was stored on floppy disks because the computer’s hard disk was erased after the fall ofSrebrenica, in order to prevent it falling into the hands of the VRS. On 12 July, Franken was ordered bythe Royal Netherlands Army Crisis Staff to ensure that as little as possible fell into VRS hands. Thehighest priority was the destruction of computers, laptops and satellite communication equipment. 630However, this instruction did not prevent material ultimately falling into the hands of the VRS. In total,equipment worth more than 31 million guilders, including 5 million guilders in communicationsequipment, was lost, destroyed or taken by the VRS. 631One of Karremans’ last messages was found on one floppy disk, translated into Serbo-Croat. Itwas message TK 95114 to Janvier, Bosnia-Hercegovina Command, Sector North East, Voorhoeve andthe Royal Netherlands Army Crisis Staff, in which he reported on his meetings with Mladic on 11 and12 July. In it, Karremans announced that he was not in a position to protect the Displaced Persons andhis own battalion, that at that time he was unable to identify a suitable representative among theDisplaced Persons, and also no ABiH representative, because the ABiH was in the process ofattempting to open a corridor to Tuzla. How this translation had found its way onto the floppy diskwas a mystery to interviewed MIS personnel. 632 If there was a question here of espionage or of a farreachingbreach of security in the compound, the translator would have had access to one or morestand-alone Dutchbat computers. This individual may have been working for an intelligence or securityservice of the ABiH or the VRS.The head of the MIS/Army, Bokhoven, was on holiday in these days in July. He said his deputynever informed him of this incident. He acknowledged immediately that this should have happenedbecause of the potentially compromising nature of this fact. The Chief of Staff of the RoyalNetherlands Army Crisis Staff, Colonel Dedden, was informed on 12 August 1995 by the MIS/Armyabout a document in Serbo-Croat found in a Dutchbat vehicle in Zagreb. However, Dedden was633unfamiliar with the existence of such a floppy disk.The discovery of the floppy disk would appear to be astonishing. It raises the question of whotranslated the text and who ordered it. The interpreters were fluent in English, and were in a position toconvey the substance of the discussions as well as the requirements of Mladic verbally or in writing tothe highest authorities in Srebrenica. The incident also raises the question of whether this translator hadlong had access to Dutchbat’s internal communication system or to Karremans’ laptop. It has beenestablished that many interpreters regularly worked for intelligence and security services and had a dutyto report to the ABiH. 634 Since the discovery of the floppy disk was never reported to the Head of MIS,he never ordered the matter to be investigated. Karremans stated that he himself knew of no diskettefrom Zagreb, nor of the translation of one of his own messages. Neither had he given instructions foranything to be translated: ‘Why should I?’ 635This answer from Karremans is remarkable, because one of the interpreters of the UNMOsstated before a Bosnian State Committee that on the morning of 12 July he was translating a letter thatKarremans had sent to Janvier and the Royal Netherlands Army Crisis Staff in The Hague. Theinterpreter did not make clear who had instructed him to do so. 636 Deputy Battalion CommanderFranken was equally unaware of this translation. 637 Rave also had no explanation for the translated TK95114; according to him, Karremans normally wrote this sort of message on his own laptop in his630 MoD, Archive SMG , Box 1005 , the Royal Netherlands Army Crisis Staff to Franken, No. 6146/31, 12/07/95.631 MoD, Archive SMG , Box 1005 , G-4 Royal Netherlands Army Crisis Staff to CS Royal Netherlands Army Crisis Staff, No. G4/950810/05, 10/08/95.632 Confidential interviews (28 ) , ( 23 ) and ( 25).633 MoD, Archive SMG , Box 1004 , Interview with Colonel Dedden of the Royal Netherlands Army Crisis Staff, 12/08/95.634 Confidential interviews (19 ) , ( 20 ) and ( 37).635 E-mail from Thom Karremans to NIOD , 17/07/01.636 Bosnian State Commission for the Collection of Facts of War Crimes, Witness X.637 E-mail from Franken to NIOD , 01/06/01.