C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

179violations were observed. These included 26 helicopter flights from Bosnia to Serbia and 4 violations ofthe No Fly Zone in Bosnia. The track headings were mainly in the direction of Belgrade.Gudmundsson also had an opinion on what the helicopters were transporting from Bosnia toBelgrade as opposed to the other way around. According to him, the helicopters were transportingvaluable goods on their return journey, and flying back unobserved from Serbia was no great problem,because look-out posts on the airfields and at the borders could be used to check if UNPROFOR orICFY mission observers were in the vicinity. Gudmundsson observed further that these flightssometimes took place after one or two days of heavy fighting in Bosnia. They were apparently notmedical flights, because they were permissible, and these flights were unannounced.Gudmundsson determined that in two cases a NATO jet fighter had been close to a helicopter,but that no action was taken. Neither were the helicopters ever intercepted, but the question waswhether an AWACS was able to detect these low and slow flying helicopters; according toGudmundsson it was possible, but ‘the findings are normally filtered out by the computer system’. Hehad noticed something else remarkable: not a single violation was seen simultaneously by both theBelgrade airfield Surcin and by UNPROFOR or ICFY. This could mean that only helicopter flights athigh altitude were seen by Surcin, but if that was the case, the Serbian air defence alarm would havesounded after observation, which never happened. This could indicate that the air defence was aware ofthe origin of these helicopters; perhaps the helicopters were equipped with a transponder that operatedon a certain military frequency, to simplify coordination with the Serbian anti-aircraft defence. 923Gudmundsson concluded that if a helicopter had been ‘seen’, it would also have to return, sothat the total number of violations would have to be doubled. All in all, the air border between Serbiaand Bosnia was not closed, and if the aircraft flew back from Serbia to Bosnia they would be able totransport important cargo. ‘The amount of suspected helicopters turning back to Bosnia have capacityof carrying substantial operational, logistic and personnel support to local authorities or commanders. 924On 30 March, Owen was briefed on Gudmundsson’s findings. It remained unclear who carried out theflights, with what goal, and what the helicopters had transported. An attached map did indicate thatthere were many fights near Srebrenica. 925 Serbia responded with irritation to the conclusions of thisreport. 926 On 11 April, Nieminen had another talk with Milosevic, the basis for which was anUNPROFOR report with evidence that between 2 and 7 April 1995, 25 helicopters had flown fromSerbia to Bosnia. He showed Milosevic all the reports and demanded that this stop. If not, then he andhis mission would finally depart. After this, the flights from Serbia to Bosnia did not stop completely,but they did become less numerous.Western intelligence services on the support of the VJ to the VRSThe reports of Serbian supplies continued. According to a Canadian UNPROFOR worker, many heavytrucks arrived in the area, which was controlled by the Bosnian Serbs, through border crossings withSerbia. 927 At the same time, British intelligence services also investigated the supplies to the VRS. InMarch 1995, the British military intelligence service determined that this was taking place, and by the VJusing helicopters, according to various intelligence reports. British diplomats in Belgrade were notcompletely convinced, however; they disagreed with this analysis by Joint Headquarters in Salisbury of923 A transponder issues a unique signal enabling air traffic control to identify the aircraft on the radar screens.924 Confidential collection (12), Lt.Col Gudmundsson to Brig. General Tauno Nieminen, 28/03/95. Report of 5 pages plus2 maps of violations.925 Confidential collection (6), Nieminen to Owen and, 30/03/95.926 UNNY, DPKO. Nieminen to Owen and Stoltenberg, 11/04/95; Kirudja to Akashi, CBZ-956, 11/04/95 and Kirudja toAnnan, Z-588, 12/04/95.927 Tom Quiggin, ‘srebrenica en de internationale gemeenschap in Bosnië’ (‘srebrenica and the international community inBosnia’), De Internationale Spectator, Vol. 52 (1998) 2, p. 81. Quiggin pointed out that supporting supplies continued to flowfrom Croatia and Serbia to the Muslim rebel Fikret Abdic in Bihac.