C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

105Originally, the European Bureau’s products relating to Yugoslavia resulted from barter with theforeign partners, which had been set up by one of the staff more than 20 years previously. 474 An USofficial who had served in the US Army for 20 years, confirmed while he still worked at the DIA thatthe MIS/Army had been the most prolific producer of intelligence on the former Yugoslavia withinNATO during the Cold War. In his opinion, the MIS had excellent intelligence, but the analysis was ofinferior quality. Conversely, some US intelligence occasionally came the way of the MIS/Army viaNATO in Mons, but there was no real will to share it on the part of the Americans. 475The European Bureau’s sources were mainly Osint, UNPROFOR, sister intelligence servicesand the military attaché in Belgrade. The European Bureau did not originally have Sigint at its disposal.There was rigorous compartmentalization within the MIS/Army. Separate reports with Sigint went tothe Deputy Head of the Intelligence Department, and European Bureau staff originally did not get tosee them. This improved later; the European Bureau staff then did receive Sigint (once a week). Thequantity also grew, because the head of the MIS/Army Intelligence Department at the time wanted aweekly briefing.The European Bureau also had access to foreign material through organizations such as theECMM and UNMO. With respect to the foreign partners: good and direct contacts with theAmericans, the Germans and the Italians had been built up over the years. At the MIS/Army too, thequality rating of intelligence from foreign intelligence services was variable. ‘Not so good’ and ‘nothingunique’ were common characterizations. The liaison with the French services did not function well:French intelligence that did find its way to the MIS/Army was generally considered to be unsound.Contact with the DIS was limited. The European Bureau did receive DIS reports for perusal. Moregenerally, the DIS was said to have come up-to-speed slowly, but the reports were later rated as goodquality. In addition, material was occasionally obtained from the Danish MIS and the DIA. 476 Theproducts of the Bundesnachrichtendienst were rated as good; this service had good Humint sources,especially in the vicinity of Banja Luka and on the border with Serbia. The BND was also said to haveaccess to Comint from communications traffic by the Vojska Republika Srpska (VRS) and the ABiH. 477The MIS/Army made do with what it hadA significant problem with which not only the European Bureau, but also other Bureaus initially had tocontend, was a lack of good and reliable maps. The maps of Yugoslavia dated from the 1960s orsometimes even earlier, and it was even the case that the words ‘Führer Stab des Heeres, Ausgabe 1943’could be found printed at the bottom of some maps used by the MIS/Army. 478 The most reliable mapsused were the Royal Dutch Touring Club (ANWB) map of Yugoslavia and the street map of Sarajevoproduced for the 1986 Winter Olympics. The maps that subsequently became available were repeatedlyupdated on the basis of Imagery Intelligence supplied by the French SPOT satellite. 479 The MIS/Armymade a three-dimensional sketch at the time of Dutchbat’s deployment.Dutchbat worked in the enclave with ten year old Yugoslavian maps, which was extremelyinconvenient in discussions on establishing a demarcation line or in the event of incidents. After a visitto the enclave by the Chief of the Royal Netherlands Army Crisis Staff, the maps were translated to480Dutch standards, but this revision also failed to improve communication between Dutchbat and thehigher levels of command within UNPROFOR. The higher command levels worked with maps made474 Confidential interview (37).475 Confidential interviews (38 ) and (75 ).476 Confidential interview (22).477 Confidential interview (38).478 Confidential interview (34). See also: Paul Ruigrok, ‘Den Haag wist van niets, maar de onderofficieren moesten terug’ (‘Den Haag knew nothing, but the NCOs had to go back’), in: VrijNederland, 30/10/93.479 Interview with H. Bosch, 10/10/01.480 MoD, Archive CSKL, no. CRST/374, Brantz to BLS et al, 06/06/94, appendix: Trip report to Bosnia-Hercegovina, p.3.