C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

330digging trenches and was going around heavily armed. The VRS had however showed Patchett a mapwith new lines of confrontation, which indicated that the Swedish Shelter Project would come underVRS control. He expected that once the VRS had started its attack this would be continued; that wasthe usual pattern. The VRS aim was to bring its own lines closer to the boundaries of the enclave. InJune Patchett observed that the VRS was cutting down a lot of trees and dragging them away withtractors. This could be to open a route, or for commercial purposes. It was not possible to say that theVRS was engaged in a build-up. 1835On 25 June the UNMO team in Srebrenica reported that there was very little news about theVRS. The ABiH were openly displaying their weapons and new uniforms were reported. 1836 Theoverview for the period 25 June to 1 July, drawn up by the UNMO headquarters in Zagreb, also gaveno indication that an attack was imminent. No forecasts to this effect were made. 1837 The UNMOs weretherefore surprised when ABiH commander Becirovic reported that two buses and two trucks hadbeen observed at Zeleni Jadar on the afternoon of 5 July which had dropped off VRS troops. Allthrough this day, 5 July, troop concentrations had been observed around the enclave. In their reportthe UNMOs expressed their surprise that the ABiH had not reported these preparations (which hadnot been observed by Dutchbat). 1838It was only on 6 July that more serious reports were received from the UNMOs. It reportedserious bombardments; at this point however the attack had already begun. Becirovic stated at ameeting with Dutchbat and the UNMOs that in the past 24 hours a concentration of VRS troops hadgathered. He requested Karremans to plan his rotation of DutchBat III with its successors, theUkranians, carefully so that the VRS was given no chance to allow UN soldiers to depart and then notto permit any replacements. He seems not to have expected the conquest of the enclave. 1839 TheUNMOs commented that the ABiH had prior knowledge of these preparations but had not reportedthem, which can be interpreted as an indication of the ‘underrated attitude they attached to it’. TheUNMOs thought that if the VRS movements on 5 July were reported at an early stage then the attackof the following day ‘could have been pre-empted and counter measures taken to prevent it’. 1840According to all three UNMOs the collapse of the defence was due to a weak chain ofcommand in the ABiH. The orders, sometimes contradictory, were simply not followed by some units.This led to total confusion, which in turn resulted in pointless troop movements from one side of theenclave to the other. The VRS knew about this weakness and exploited it. 1841 In addition the weakposition of Commander Becirovic, following the departure of Oric from the enclave, may have played apart as well. To summarize: diaries, UNPROFOR reports, debriefings of and interviews with UNMOsprovide evidence that is at odds with the claims by various cited authors: the UNMOs did not haveprior tactical knowledge.The observations of the JCOsIn an analysis of reports by Joint Commission Observers in Tuzla and Srebrenica it is concluded thatthey had no indications whatsoever of an attack. 1842 It should be noted here that the JCO team in the1835 Interview with Bob Patchett, 19/11/99.1836 MoD, SMG. UNMO SNE to UNMO HQ, Sarajevo, No. IN 551, 25/06/95. See also the report from UNMO HQZagreb: UNPF, Geneva, Box 75, UNMO HQ Daily Sitrep, 25/06/95.1837 UNGE, UNPF, Box 75, UNMO activities, UNMO HQ Zagreb, MIO Office, Infosum for the period 25 June-01 July,1995, 03/07/95.1838 NIOD, Coll. CD-ROMs. Komanda 28. Divizije to Komanda 2. Korpusa, 6 July 1995, Str. pov. br. 01-163/95. UNMOSrebrenica to TX 061700B Jul 95 and Archive MoD, MIS/Army. UNMO HQ Sector BH-NE to UNMO HQ BH COMD,06/07/95.1839 Confidential collection (5). Report: Report on The Battle of Srebrenica, 21/07/95.1840 MoD, MIS/Army. No. 153, UNMO Srebrenica to TX, No. 5220, 06/07/95.1841 Confidential collection (5). G-2 Air, Flt. Lt. Hooper, ‘Debrief in UNMOS from the Srebrenica enclave’, 23/07/95.1842 Confidential information (1).