C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

331enclave was seriously confined by Karremans in its freedom of movement; they were allowed only toaccompany Dutch patrols. The commander of the JCOs reported in May that ‘there were constantrumours at this time from the ABiH that the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) were planning to attack theEnclave’. On 25 May the JCO commander reported that BHC had informed him that ‘a move on theeastern Enclaves was a real possibility and that if this occurred then Srebrenica would be the first’. Thiswas probably an analysis by Smith following the NATO bombardments near Pale. This informationwas passed to Dutchbat, ‘who it is reported, did not believe it’. 1843On 8 June representatives of the ABiH convened an urgent meeting with Dutchbat and theJCOs and ‘gave them detailed plans for an ‘imminent attack’ on the Enclave’. This did not lead to anyalarms being sounded: the JCOs were not impressed. Such rumours had often been heard and ‘werethus hard to take seriously’. Furthermore the JCOs had received ‘no confirmatory evidence for theplan’. From this it can be deduced that General Smith and the British intelligence services also knew ofno such plans. This was also revealed during the morning briefing on 25 June, where General Smithdeclared that the problems was ‘that we have very little intelligence on what Mladic’s movementsare’. 1844 On 5 July five tanks, five APCs and four trucks were seen heading in a southerly direction. Thisreport came from a UNHCR official and the commander of the JCOs reported this to his headquartersin Sarajevo; the attack started a day later. On 7 July the commander reported that Dutchbat and hisheadquarters in Sarajevo both believed that the VRS operation would be on a limited scale and wasintended only to teach the ABiH a lesson. He did however add: ‘There was (…) no way of knowing forsure.’ The attack was continued but the JCOs still remained uncertain about the intentions of the VRS.The team clung to the analysis that the attack was aimed only at the southern tip and ‘even after theattack had started in July it was only in the last 2 days that it became evident that the Serb objective wasto overrun the whole enclave’. 1845 It must therefore be concluded that the JCOs, due in part to theirlimited operational freedom, knew little or nothing about the build-up of the VRS troops and theplanned attack. There was constant uncertainty about the true aims of the VRS. Apparently the JCOs’headquarters had no additional information either.Prior knowledge at UNHCRIn a report of 25 June the UNHCR representative examined the situation around Srebrenica in moredepth. The population was starting to become worried by statements made by Karadzic about stoppingthe supplies to the enclave. 1846 The following day the director of the hospital in Srebrenica gave aninterview to the Bosnian state broadcasting company. The director declared that if nothing was donewithin 14 days to improve supplies, the situation in Srebrenica would become disastrous. Thepolicymakers in Pale could not have wished for a better confirmation that the Serb strategy ofstrangulation was working. The director mentioned the many rumours about military operationsoutside the borders of the enclave. ABiH troops had reportedly infiltrated in Han Pijesak; a Serb villagehad been burned down close to Milici; there was fighting around Vlasenica, and shelling of the enclavewas expected. Dutchbat had warned the population not to gather at the marketplace. 1847The UNHCR reports contain no further references to a planned attack. Nonetheless, accordingto an article written in 1997 by the UNHCR special envoy to the former Yugoslavia, José MariaMendiluce, things were very clear.1843 Confidential information (1).1844 Corwin, Dubious Mandate, p. 130.1845 Confidential information (1).1846 MoD, CRST. UNHCR, Srebrenica to UNHCR, Zagreb, No. IN. 001, 25/06/95.1847 MoD, CRST. UNHCR, Belgrade to UNHCR, Zagreb, No. IN. 004, 26/06/95.