<strong>De</strong>lafon, G. <strong>en</strong> Sancton, Th., <strong>De</strong>ar Jacques, Cher Bill: Au cœur <strong>de</strong> l’Elysée et <strong>de</strong> la Maison Blanche1995-1999, Paris, 1999.Dijkema, W. (red.), Dutchbat <strong>in</strong> vre<strong>de</strong>snaam: januari 1995 -- juli 1995, Rijswijk, 1996.Director of C<strong>en</strong>tral <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong>, The Future of Eastern Europe: National <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> Estimate,Wash<strong>in</strong>gton D.C., 1990.Do<strong>de</strong>r, D. <strong>en</strong> L. Branson, Milosevic´: Portrait of a Tyrant, New York, 1999.Dorril, Steph<strong>en</strong>, MI 6. Insi<strong>de</strong> the Covert World of Her Majesty’s Secret <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> Service,New York, 2000.Drew, E., On the Edge: the Cl<strong>in</strong>ton Presid<strong>en</strong>cy, New York, <strong>1995.</strong>Dumas, R., Le Fil et la Pelote: Mémoires, Paris, 1996.Dzamic, Dragan, Psi Rata na Balkanu, Beograd, 2001.EEis<strong>en</strong>drath, Craig (ed.), National Insecurity. U.S. <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> After the Cold War, Phila<strong>de</strong>lphia, 2000.Elands, M. et al., Van telegraaf tot satelliet: 125 jaar telecommunicatie <strong>in</strong> <strong>de</strong> Kon<strong>in</strong>klijke Landmacht1874-1999, D<strong>en</strong> Haag, 1999.Engel<strong>en</strong>, D., Inlicht<strong>in</strong>g<strong>en</strong>di<strong>en</strong>st Buit<strong>en</strong>land. E<strong>en</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitutioneel on<strong>de</strong>rzoek naar <strong>de</strong> Buit<strong>en</strong>landseInlicht<strong>in</strong>g<strong>en</strong>di<strong>en</strong>st/Inlicht<strong>in</strong>g<strong>en</strong>di<strong>en</strong>st Buit<strong>en</strong>land (1946-1996), ‘s-Grav<strong>en</strong>hage, 1996.Engel<strong>en</strong>, D., <strong>De</strong> Militaire Inlicht<strong>in</strong>g<strong>en</strong>di<strong>en</strong>st 1914-2000, D<strong>en</strong> Haag 2000.Franchet, Commandant; avec la collaboration <strong>de</strong> Sébasti<strong>en</strong> Font<strong>en</strong>elle, Casque bleu pour ri<strong>en</strong>: ce que j’aivraim<strong>en</strong>t vu <strong>en</strong> Bosnie, Paris, <strong>1995.</strong>G.Gajic, Dobrila Glisic, Srpska Vojska. 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U.S. Covert Action & Counter<strong>in</strong>tellig<strong>en</strong>ce, NewBrunswick, 2001.Gow, J., Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War, London, 1997.Graaff, Bob <strong>de</strong> <strong>en</strong> <strong>Wiebes</strong>, Cees, Villa Maarheeze, <strong>De</strong> geschied<strong>en</strong>is <strong>van</strong> <strong>de</strong> <strong>in</strong>licht<strong>in</strong>g<strong>en</strong>di<strong>en</strong>stbuit<strong>en</strong>land, D<strong>en</strong> Haag, 1998.Grant, Charles, Intimate Relations: Can Brita<strong>in</strong> Play a Lead<strong>in</strong>g Role <strong>in</strong> European <strong>De</strong>f<strong>en</strong>ce – and Keepits Special L<strong>in</strong>ks to US <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong>?, London, 2001.Guisnel, Jean, Les pires amis du mon<strong>de</strong>: Les relations franco-américa<strong>in</strong>es à la f<strong>in</strong> du XXè siècle, Paris,1999.Gutman, R., A Witness to G<strong>en</strong>oci<strong>de</strong>: the 1993 Pulitzer Prize-w<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g Dispatches on the ‘EthnicCleans<strong>in</strong>g’ of Bosnia, New York etc., 1993.Gutman, R. <strong>en</strong> D. 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101MIS/CO. Intelligence sharing wit
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117his benefit, and many others. It
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121negative assessment: not to go t
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139intended to monitor the border c
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141opinion. 665 After Croatia had n
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143Lake’s statement. 676 As a Can
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147Later that day, Galbraith report
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149form of photos taken by spy sate
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151In the summer and autumn of 1994
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161and 1 rocket launcher for a TF-8
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163the convoys from Croatia with ar
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167Force Commander and with General
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169urging it, because they suspecte
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171General and researcher, Brendan
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173mm guns, 2000 pistols, 211,000 h
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175divergent opinions on the Serbia
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181and Jugoslavija Publik. Accordin
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187from the enclave a total of 140
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191the warring factions, namely tha
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195In addition Comint can be import
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197policymakers, however. As a resu
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203125 linguists to provide transla
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205time intercepts involved here we
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207conclusion that the contribution
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217million messages, sent via Intel
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219Zagreb, Morgan, - Svensson was o
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221Monitoring targets in SerbiaOffi
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235get O’Grady out of Bosnian Ser
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239Comint archive and other archive
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241Bokhoven Couzy supported him in
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243communications traffic of UNPROF
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247The role of the Netherlands: no
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249made by Krstic and other Bosnian
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251messages, which were intercepted
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253later treetops were used. Throug
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257equipment, planned operations, t
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261community that the situation was
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263commander of the Bosnian-Serb Dr
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277Chapter 7Imagery Intelligence in
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2792. What instruments were availab
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283and has provided policy-makers w
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313Chapter 8Was ‘Srebrenica’ an
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315gathered intelligence, then it m
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317the VRS attack should aim to tak
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319In January 1995 a European intel
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