C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

27to generate an all-source perspective. Second, that all-source product was gone through with a fine lensto provide for the fullest possible disclosure to the UN. This resulted in two sets of products, orsometimes even more, for every product produced by these four specialized all-source analytical centersproducing daily or twice-daily intelligence reports on developments in the Balkans. The US officialcomplained (perhaps rightly so) that there remain too many individuals who judge the value of a reportbased on the classification it bears. This was foolishness, and the official hoped that such a perspectivewill die out soon enough. The US official remarked adamantly that is was such an ignorant perspectiveby asserting that ‘unclassified = worthless’. 89Nonetheless, within the UN in New York, there was constant resistance to the use ofintelligence in peacekeeping operations. Van Kappen did personally have a strong suspicion that thepermanent members of the Security Council do not consider this to be a problem and there is certainlyno urge to change the situation. 90 The question arises, however, as to whether that position is nowoutdated, and whether the UN needs its own intelligence service and should engage in intelligencegathering. Smith points out that such signals have already been sent. For instance, the AustralianMinister of Foreign Affairs has proposed that ‘a group of professionals from various countries withexpertise in intelligence (...) be recruited and approved by the Security Council’. This unit should haveaccess to classified material, with a view to providing independent advice to the Security Council.However, this suggestion was given a sceptical reception, because it appeared unlikely that the officialsof this unit would be able to completely divorce themselves from their national intelligence services.The question that then arises is whether the intelligence to be gathered by this unit would actually bereliable and free from value judgements. 91In 1992, the European Community, Russia, the Scandinavian countries, Australia, Canada andNew Zealand made a proposal to establish an independent intelligence-gathering facility at the UN forearly warning purposes, and to give the UN an effective instrument for preventive diplomacy. Theproposal ‘touched off a furious response from the United States, which appears to be resolutelyopposed to any moves that would enhance the UN’s ability to gather and analyse sensitive informationin an independent fashion’. 92Another problem, of course, is that the UN, with more than 180 members, is unusual in theworld of intelligence in that it has no ‘national interest’ on which to concentrate. The needs among thepolicy makers in the UN Secretariat are also highly diverse, making it difficult to give direction to suchintelligence gathering. 93Provisionally, it would therefore appear that an effective intelligence organization under theDPKO is not to be expected in the very near future. The unwillingness among most countries is stilltoo great, because intelligence would then have to be gathered about the member states. Erikssontherefore asserts: ‘peacekeeping organizations (especially the UN) as they exist today cannot maintainan advanced, comprehensive and combined intelligence service of their own at a strategic level’. 94 Theformer British permanent representative at the UN, Sir David Hannay, expressed himself in similarterms. His first argument was that member states would not be prepared to pay. Secondly, he suggestedthat it would form too great a threat to their own national security. And thirdly, the DPKO in NewYork would not know what to do with all the information gathered, because it had insufficientpersonnel to process it. 9589 Confidential information (80).90 F.E. van Kappen,’ Strategic Intelligence and the United Nations’, Paper presented at the NISA/IDL Conference‘Peacekeeping and Intelligence’, Delft, 15/11/02. A senior German intelligence official expressed similar views to the author.Confidential interview (99) and confidential information (88).91 Hugh Smith, ‘Intelligence and UN Peacekeeping’, Survival, Vol. 36 (1994) 3, p. 188.92 Curtis, Deception, pp. 200-201.93 Välimäki, Intelligence, pp. 34-38.94 Pär Eriksson, ‘Intelligence and Peacekeeping Operations’, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 10(1997) 1, p. 1.95 Sir David Hannay, ‘Intelligence and international agencies’, in: Shukman (ed.), Agents, p. 179.