C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

222finally manage to do this – thanks to the DRM and by means that Heinrich did not wish to describe indetail – the Dayton Accord had already been signed. 1180In view of the long animosity between the Americans and the French, it is however doubtfulwhether the US services showed all their cards to the French. Various Canadian intelligence officialsstated, according to the German author Udo Ulfkotte, that the NSA did in fact monitor many highlevelconversations. Ottawa was ideally situated in this respect, because through participation in theUKUSA alliance the Canadians had access to American and British Comint and to material from Third-Party countries. According to Canadian officers the NSA was able to intercept, break and read thecoded military traffic of the Bosnian Muslims, the Serbs and the Bosnian Serbs. The Serbs and theBosnian Serbs tried to prevent this with the use of electronic warfare equipment, but this usually madeno difference. The code was often broken within about 15 minutes. Most other communications viatelephone, fax, telex and e-mail were monitored too. The NSA reportedly also received many interceptsfrom the Austrian Military Intelligence Service (HNA) and for a long time the GCHQ was able tolocate and monitor Karadzic by his mobile phone. 1181 This last claim may be doubted, however, becauseat that time there was no extensive GSM network in place in the Republika Srpska. It could only havebeen his satellite phone, which indeed could be intercepted for satellites as was done, for example, inthe case of tracking Osama Bin Laden. 1182Since 1994 a special Bosnia Group had been operating at the NSA. A ‘four-hour turnaroundtime’ was applied for Sigint from Bosnia and Serbia: following interception a signal was translated,processed and analysed and within four hours was on the desk of the intelligence customer, such as theCIA or the State Department. According to an American intelligence official, in this period this NSAteam carried out one of the best operations in its history. 1183 Canadian and US officials drew howeverattention to the problem already mentioned earlier: the issue of how the flow of communications trafficshould be processed. A Canadian analyst cited the example that the NSA was able to search for thework ‘tank’ in the intercepted signals; the problem was that this could also turn out to be a Serb whospent an hour complaining on the phone about the leaking petrol tank of his truck. 1184 Besides all thesefactors, one should also consider that the interception of diplomatic communications before the fall ofSrebrenica was of very limited value: the attack was a purely military operation. It was not to beexpected that relevant military signals regarding the eastern enclaves would be exchanged throughdiplomatic channels. Only the traffic between Pale and Belgrade could have contained suchinformation. This is why the NSA mostly focussed on military communications traffic during theBosnian conflict.Messages to and from units of the Yugoslavian Army was sometimes relatively easy to interceptas these units often used conventional radio equipment. The intercepts were supposedly revealing. Itappeared that the VJ was closely involved in the war and handled almost all tasks for the VRS in thefield of ‘command, control and communications’. Moreover, Belgrade reportedly ensured theoperational status of the VRS air defence and early warning systems and is said to have providedmilitary experts to do this work. The NSA and CIA are also reported to have discovered the coaxialcable system that linked Belgrade to the sites from where air defence missiles were fired (in militaryterminology, SAM sites). ‘We have unequivocal intelligence that Milosevic has his hand in the cookie1180 Assemblée Nationale, Srebrenica: rapport sur un massacre, Assemblée Nationale, no. 3412, 2 parts, Paris 2001, Part 2,Audition de Jean Heinrich, 08/02/01, pp. 179-186.1181 Ulfkotte, Verschlusssache BND, p. 31.1182 Peter Finn, ‘Bin Laden Used Ruse to Flee’, The Washington Post, 21/01/03.1183 Confidential interview (13). Later 15 translators from this unit were offered to the Tribunal in The Hague, but theTribunal did not wish to employ them.1184 Confidential interviews (9), (47) and (62).