C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

270equipment and that the Sigint units of the VJ, the VRS and the ABiH were therefore able to interceptUNMO communications 24 hours a day ‘as the most reliable source of information’. 1427 A ScandinavianUNMO in Sarajevo was for example introduced to a Bosnian Serb officer who would act as his liasion.The VRS official told him simply that he actually did not need an introduction because he knew alreadyeverything about the UNMO because he did read the daily reports sent to this UNMO. 1428 Even theCoded Cables sent from Sarajevo or Zagreb to New York were unsafe. All sides to the conflict wereable to read them. 1429As was revealed during the UNSCOM mission in Iraq, the UN had learned very little from theSigint war against UNPROFOR. The Iraqi intelligence service was able to decipher and read codedcommunication with UN headquarters in New York. Apparently, the crypto programme was too weakand could be easily broken. At that time, it was impossible to buy strong American crypto softwarebecause of the stringent export controls imposed by the National Security Agency. After all, weakcrypto software also enabled the NSA to read the messages. After the Iraqi operation was discovered,UNSCOM switched to the Pretty Good Privacy software, which was still unbreakable at that point. 1430Various Croatian intelligence services carried out intelligence operations against UNPROFOR.The Office of National Security served as an umbrella organization for the Croatian ForeignIntelligence Service, the Intelligence Service of the General Staff, the Security Intelligence Service of theMinistry of Defence, and the Intelligence Service of the Croatian Army. All of these agencies wereactive against UNPROFOR. Bureau IV of the latter organization was in charge of military Comintoperations, which were coordinated from the Lucko air base in Zagreb. Bureau IV had close ties withthe Bundesnachrichtendienst and the CIA, both of which provided equipment and organized training. TheCroatian National Signals Intelligence service also collected Sigint outside Croatia. 1431Members of an European intelligence service also emphasized that at the start of the conflictthe Croatians delivered a lot of computer hardware to Belgrade. All this hardware had, however, beenfitted with a ‘back door’ so that the Croatian intelligence services could look over the Serb shoulders.Tudjman’s son reportedly played a key role in these operations. 1432 The Croatian weekly publicationGlobus printed quotations from telephone conversations which purportedly took place betweenPresident Clinton from his presidential plane Air Force One and President Milosevic. The Croatianservices allegedly listened in to hundreds of such calls. 1433In addition, NATO intelligence flowed to the Croatians via the Bundesnachrichtendienst, much tothe displeasure of NATO members, who knew that the Serbs had infiltrated deep into the Croatianintelligence services. This had been going on since 1989 through Operation Labrador, when Milosevic hadordered that a Serb network be set up within the Croatian intelligence community. Intelligence from USand German services ended up in Belgrade via this route. 1434 However, BND officials deny that thishappened. 1435The National Service for Electronic Monitoring – which formed part of the Croatian Agencyfor National Security – focused on intercepting civil internal and foreign communications. This section,1427 Confidential collection (5), UNMO in UNPROFOR/UNPF, Post Mission Report 1992 - 1996, Zagreb 1996, p. 29.1428 Confidential interview (100).1429 MacKenzie, Peacekeeper, p. 319.1430 ‘UNSCOM Hurt by Weak Encryption’, in: Intelligence Newsletter, no. 403, 05/04/01 as published on 18/04/01 on:http:/216.167.120.50/1431 Miroslav Tudjman, ‘The First Five Years of the Croatian Intelligence Service’, National Security and The Future, Vol.1(2000) 2, p. 47 - 74.1432 Confidential information (48).1433 ‘Ophef over gesprekken tussen Clinton en Milosevic’ (Commotion about calls between Clinton and Milosevic’), DeVolkskrant, 07/02/02; Alex Todorovic, ‘Tapes reveal Slobo chummy with Bill’, The Gazette (Montreal), 07/02/02 and ‘Inleaked Milosevic tapes, father knows best’, The New York Times, 07/02/02.1434 Marko Milivojevic, ‘Croatia’s Intelligence Services’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 6, No. 9, pp. 404 - 410 and Confidentialinterview (15).1435 Confidential intervies (99) and (100).