C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

362UN operations took fifth place in the list of priorities for military intelligence. In this context it is notsurprising that ‘a senior intelligence official’ at SHAPE, Mons stated that General Rose ‘lost ownershipof the picture of the battlefield to the point where it was irrecoverable’. According to this official, thisresulted in decision-making on military operations that was based on a non-objective picture. 2043 Whatwas not stated here was that the US services did not trust Rose and thus slowly cut off the supply ofintelligence.Another important factor was that US analysts did not expect that the VRS would wish to takethe enclave due to the risk of high losses, air strikes and the problem of the refugees.2044 CIA directorJohn Deutch emphatically denied that his organization was forewarned and also pointed to thedifficulties experienced in finally discovering the photographs of the mass graves. 2045 Deutch’s claimswere confirmed by others. The Intelligence Head of the US EUCOM and later Director of the NSA,General Michael Hayden, concluded in the Defense Intelligence Journal with respect to the attack onSrebrenica: ‘The quick fall of Srebrenica was as significant as it was unexpected. It was brought aboutby the “massing” of a force that would have been a disappointing crowd at many high school basketballgames.’ The major strategic changes that were usually generated by long-term processes were in thiscase, according to Hayden, the result of just a few tanks. 2046And Hayden was in a position to know because he had access to virtually all intelligence. HisYugoslav Joint Planning Cell at US EUCOM interpreted ‘the gathering of groups of people in schoolyards in connection with the capture of Srebrenica as being “in the nature of a demonstration” whenthese had in fact been troops belonging to the Serb Army in Bosnia’. 2047 There was a consensus at theState Department, the Pentagon and the CIA: the VRS would never want to conquer the entire enclave.Following the assault the US intelligence community established that intelligence was indeed available,but that the indications were too vague to be analysed effectively and in time. The journalists StephenEngelberg and Tim Weiner of the New York Times were told more or less the same at a confidentialbriefing at the State Department and NSA. They were reportedly presented with a very accurate picturein which the Americans held nothing back. 2048 A former director of the NSA declared: ‘Gleaning hardfacts from the avalanche of information was like trying to take a drink of water from a fire hose.’ Ittranspired that the best information was obtained from NGOs, the UN and the press. 2049After the fall of Srebrenica the Netherlands MIS started an investigation into what its foreignpartners knew. It transpired that in June 1995 the CIA and SIS received indications that the VRS wasplanning to start operations. The CIA had a ‘variety of reports’ which stated that an offensive wouldstart in June 1995. According to the CIA the ABiH offensive around Sarajevo had caused a temporarydelay in the VRS operations. A CIA report of 10 July, that was first received by the MIS/CO after thefall of Srebrenica on 12 July, also showed that the aforementioned ‘variety of reports’ never reached theMIS. The British foreign intelligence service is also said to have had indications that the VRS wouldattack the enclave with ethnic cleansing as the ultimate objective. The report itself was dated 15 Junebut (just like the CIA report) it was first received by the service on 12 July. Due to a misunderstandingit remained at the British embassy. The report was in fact not dated, had no attached evaluation, noindication of the reliability of the source, etc. 2050 The news of the attack had, according to a seniorBritish intelligence official, been passed to SIS by a source close to Mladic. This possible attack was thesubject of discussion within the British intelligence community, where opinions were divided as to thereliability of the source. In the first week of June the British Joint Intelligence Committee repeated the2043 ‘Bosnia underscores intelligence gaps’, Aviation Week and Space Technology, 20/03/95, p. 56.2044 Charles Lane and Thom Shanker, ‘Bosnia: What the CIA Didn’t Tell Us’, The New York Review of Books, 09/05/96.2045 ‘The CIA and Bosnia: An Exchange’, New York Review of Books, 06/06/96.2046 Michael V. Hayden, ‘Warfighters and Intelligence: one team - one fight’, Defense Intelligence Journal; Vol. 4 (1995) 2 , p. 18.2047 Välimäki, Intelligence, pp. 104.2048 Confidential interview (13).2049 Stephen Engelberg and Tim Weiner, ‘srebrenica’, The New York Times, 29/10/95 and confidential interview (13).2050 Confidential interview (18)