C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

101MIS/CO. Intelligence sharing with the foreign sister services was also proceeding poorly. There werecomplaints from abroad in the direction of the MIS; they kept asking when the Netherlands was goingto start producing intelligence on Bosnia. However, the MIS was able to provide extremely little, andtherefore also received little intelligence from abroad in return. There was actually some Sigint available,but the Technical Information Processing Centre (TIVC) of the Royal Netherlands Navy had atendency to keep it to its chest.The foreign services knew perfectly well that the MIS was strongly divided internally. Partly forthis reason, the balance in the relationship between the MIS and its foreign counterparts constantlyworked to the detriment of the Netherlands. The foreign intelligence services also took advantage ofthis under the motto ‘divide and conquer’: they ‘went shopping’ for information at the MISs of theArmed Forces and invariably obtained something in this way; the one service often did not know whatthe other had given away. 458 Furthermore, the MISs of the Armed Forces were more concerned withgetting credits from their respective Commanders-in-Chief than with informing the Minister. FormerMIS/CO staff spoke of ‘a sick atmosphere’ within the service and its productivity at that time wascompletely undermined by mutual competence conflicts and the lack of actual operations. These werethe circumstances under which Kok departed as Head of the MIS in June 1995. 459His successor was Brigadier General J.C.F. Knapp, who was appointed on 25 June 1995 as thenew Head of MIS. It was apparent not long after his arrival that relations between the MISs of theArmed Forces in this period were still less than cordial, to put it mildly. Knapp too was confrontedwith the strong territorial boundaries that the three MISs had erected around their own areas. This wassometimes taken to extremes; the demarcation between the MISs was so emphatic that Knapp, as Headof the MIS, was not welcome at the TIVC complex in Amsterdam or the MIS/Air Force building.Van Idsinga’s report on the integration of the MISs into a single MIS was Knapp’s startingpoint upon taking office. The report stated that the Royal Netherlands Army, Navy and Air Force werereluctant to contemplate an expansion of the MIS/CO, 460 but Knapp had now been given a very clearpolitical signal and instruction to realize the goal of one unified MIS. 461 Knapp’s motto was always thatthe MIS was a support service, primarily to serve the Ministry of Defence and secondarily the interestsof ‘The Netherlands Incorporated’. In his ‘will and testament’ on his departure on 1 October 1997, heagain indicated that an intelligence section and a section for military security would have to be formed.As Head of the MIS, Knapp regularly visited the three MISs of the Armed Forces, and thenreported directly to the Minister. To this end, Knapp did not first approach the CDS, and in so doinghe reinstated Duijn’s tradition. With strong backing from Voorhoeve, Knapp made a start on theonerous task of integrating the MISs. He initially received little cooperation from the individual MISs,but this later changed. On the one hand, this was because he appointed civilian personnel from theMinistry of Defence to various key posts in the MISs of the Armed Forces. From the point of view ofintegration, this was a smart move, because it diminished the pull that the Commanders-in-Chief of thevarious Armed Forces exerted on the Heads of their respective MISs. Financial aspects also lent ahelping hand. The MIS/Navy in particular realized that collaboration was beneficial, because theMIS/CO was holding the purse strings. This attitude resulted in the MIS/CO taking over the TIVCfrom the MIS/Navy. Knapp’s main reason for leaving the job was that he was given no formal462appreciation expressed in the form of rank.It can be deduced from the above that, in the first half of the 1990s, the heads of department ofthe MIS/CO had little room for manoeuvre in their task of advising the Minister and providing himdirectly with intelligence. What is more, the MIS/CO only had one analyst available with respect to458 Confidential interview (25). See also: De Graaff and Wiebes, Villa Maarheeze, pp. 343 - 354.459 This reconstruction is based on an interview with P . Kok, 07/06/00 and various confidential interviews (18 ) , ( 34 ) and ( 86).460 MoD , Archive MIS/CO, Report Van Idsinga, DIS/95/21.11/809, 29/03/95.461 For this see also: MoD, Archive MIS/CO, Letter from HMID Knapp + Memorandum Realization Memorandum Department M IS/ Army, No. DIS/96001532, 19/07/96.462 This reconstruction is based on an interview with J. Knapp, 21/03/01 and confidential interviews (29 ) , ( 34 ) and ( 35).