C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

367was a correct analysis, as was later revealed by VRS documents. 2070 Although conversations in Londonhad indicated that the British services were fairly concerned, there was no hard intelligence on thiseither. The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) doubted the reliability of a source in the VRS. Thereports of the Defence Intelligence Staff and the CIA only reached the Netherlands MIS after the fall.A study of it shows that these did not contain any hard indications. Furthermore, the Service did notreceive any intelligence from other services, such as the German or the French organizations. Dutchanalysts concluded that other foreign intelligence services had no information either. The DCBC andcivil servants on the Minister’s staff, who were dependent on the reports from UNPROFOR and theMIS, therefore knew nothing either. Perry gave his word to Voorhoeve that the Pentagon also had noprior knowledge. The report to the effect that the US intelligence community had discovered fromintercepted telephone calls before the attack that buses were being gathered was not confirmedeither. 2071The Americans did not have good Sigint coverage in Eastern Bosnia and did not operate withtheir own interception equipment from Tuzla. In any case, documents and interviews have notindicated that active Sigint support was provided to the ABiH. The only assistance came from the USSpecial Forces officer, who worked in Tuzla as a liaison officer. According to an UNPROFOR officialthe US services always worked through this officer. 2072 This officer was probably involved in the secretflights to Tuzla and was probably the contact man for the MPRI staff who were sometime reported tobe in Tuzla. 2073It was not only that the attack came totally unexpectedly but, as the Dutch Ministerial Councilalso established, 2074 from the Western perspective it also represented new tactics and a new strategy,irrespective of whether these were applied ad hoc or had been devised beforehand. The usual approachwas to exert pressure on the boundaries of the Safe Areas to gain control of the higher ground. No oneexpected that the enclave would be taken. This was because some assumed that the VRS hadinsufficient troops to overcome the numerically superior ABiH forces in house and street fighting. 2075Apparently the Western intelligence services overlooked the possibility that more local factors mightplay a role in deciding to attack. Giving evidence to the Yugoslavia Tribunal, General Krstic of the VRSstated that the decision to attack Srebrenica was taken for two reasons. The first was a directive fromthe general staff in March 1995, ordering the separation of Srebrenica from Zepa. The second reasonwas the hit and run operations conducted from the enclave and the constant infiltrations into BosnianSerb territory. 2076 The Western services had an insufficient perspective on the local events and theeffects these had on the thinking of the Bosnian Serbs. Their goal – to reduce the size of the Safe Area– was not known either. This also applied to the decision of 9 July to go ahead and take the entireenclave, when this appeared opportune due to the weak resistance of the ABiH and possibly also due tothe lack of a vigorous response by UNPROFOR in the form of NATO air strikes or armed resistanceon the ground.The Bosnians had equally little insight into the reasons for the VRS attack. Insofar as can beestablished they never became aware of the directives issued by Karadzic and Mladic for the separationof Srebrenica and Zepa. Unfortunately there are no reliable sources which can be consulted to give a2077precise answer to the question why the decision was taken to attack, and why 6 July was chosen. The2070 MoD, MIS/CO, Chronology of the Events by Lt. Col. Van Geldere, 23/10/97.2071 MoD, MIS/CO, Chronology of the Events by Lt. Col. Van Geldere, 23/10/97.2072 Interview with Hans Holm, 13/03/99.2073 Interviews with C.L.Brantz, 11/06/99 and H. Haukland, 03/05/99. See also UNGE, UNPROFOR, Box 193, SNE 23May – 15 October 1995. Haukland to Comd. Unprofor, 31/05/95 and Hagman, UN-NATO, p. 93.2074 Objectivized summary of the minutes of the Ministerial Council meetings of 18/08/95 and 25/08/95, prepared for thepurposes of the present NIOD study.2075 Confidential information (25).2076 ICTY, (IT-98-33), OTP Ex. 399/a bis, Interview with Radislav Krstic, 18/02/00.2077 Attempts by the NIOD for interviews with Karadzic or his political advisor Zametica faltered. An appointment for aninterview with Mladic was granted by the Bosnian Serb general but the war in Kosovo did him change his mind.