C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

149form of photos taken by spy satellites that revealed aircraft on Turkish airfields. Two days later, theCIA saw the same aircraft in Zagreb or other airports in Croatia. The aircraft flew via Turkey, where astopover was sometimes made, before resuming the flight over the Black Sea via Bulgarian andRomanian air space to Zagreb, where the arms were unloaded. Part of the consignment was forwardedto Bosnia; Croatia was said to have received thirty per cent of the supplies. The CIA recordedapproximately eight flights a month and also received reports from the Croatian intelligence services.When the CIA got wind of the supplies, it produced a difference of opinion between theAmerican ambassador Galbraith and the CIA station chief there. The station chief asked Galbraith toexplain, and he answered that he was aware of the secret consignments from Iran; the station chiefwould just have to contact Miroslav Tudjman. The station chief would not be palmed off so easily. As amatter of fact, the State Department can covertly encourage anything the President tells them to. Whatwould have been illegal was the involvement of the CIA without a ‘written finding’. Covert diplomacyis not illegal. Covert action by the CIA is, however, illegal unless there is a finding. The station chieftherefore asked Galbraith where the finding was, because without a finding he was not allowed tocooperate in the operations, which would then be illegal. If that was the case, it could have major policyconsequences.The chief of station raised the alarm with his headquarters in Langley, which subsequentlywondered who knew about this at the State Department and in the National Security Council (NSC). Aparallel was drawn with the Iran-Contra affair, which was also led from the NSC. The CIA wondered,although the ambassador can do what he wants, whether Ambassador Galbraith might haveencouraged Tudjman to make requests for arms supplies. This fear would later be dismissed asunfounded by the Senate, but it did lead rapidly to speculations that the CIA had begun spying on StateDepartment staff. 717 However, this fear proved to be correct. But the station chief in question hadindeed decided to watch Galbraith’s movements. 718 The station chief also became concerned becauseIranian officials, who were apparently involved in the Croatian pipeline, visited the library of the UnitedStates Information Service, which was located immediately beneath Galbraith’s office, daily. Out of fearof terrorist attacks, from then on only visitors with a membership card were allowed to enter thelibrary, after which the Iranians disappeared. 719According to Langley, a covert operation had indeed been started in which the CIA was notinvolved. In response, the CIA in Washington took action at the highest level. The director of the CIA,Woolsey, approached in succession Lake, Christopher, and Talbott. On 5 May 1994, Talbott toldWoolsey ‘the essence of what had been decided’: 720 Galbraith had received no instructions. Incidentally,Woolsey later stated that he was not given the impression in this discussion that the policy on Iranianinvolvement changed with this instruction; although in practice this was definitely the case. Accordingto a senior US intelligence official, Woolsey did not ultimately approach President Clinton. Once it wasclear that the ambassador was acting on the authority of the White House and the Secretary of Stateand not off his own, the CIA interest stopped except to report the arms flows as intelligence. 721Talbott told Woolsey that another reason for permitting the operations had been that the ABiHwas at the end of its tether. The American intelligence community arrived at a different conclusion,however: it thought that the ABiH could retain the major part of Bosnia without needing militaryassistance. There were apparently divergent assessments of the power of the VRS versus the ABiH.According to Corwin, something else played a role in Sarajevo:717 Interview with R.J. Woolsey, 08/06/00; Tim Weiner & Raumond Bonner, ‘Gun-Running in the Balkans: CIA andDiplomats Collide’, The New York Times, 29/05/96.718 Interview with Tim Ripley, 12/12/99.719 John Pomfret, ‘US Allies Fed Pipeline Of Covert Arms in Bosnia’, The Washington Post, 12/05/096.720 See also his statement to the 1996 Congressional Hearings before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 23/05/96. Further:Walter Pincus, ‘Woolsey, in testimony, Criticizes White House’, The Washington Post, 11/06/96.721 Confidential interview (97).