C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

164military and other assistance from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Malaysia and other Islamic countrieswould eventually enable the ABiH to conduct a long war. Toholj asserted that Pale knew of the flightsof the C-130s - according to him not American but Turkish Hercules aircraft, with an element of‘logistics patronage’ from the United States. According to Toholj, the arms were transported fromTuzla to Srebrenica and Zepa. 819 The VRS would not have dared to fire on these aircraft for fear thatthis would be interpreted and presented by the media in the West as an attack on an aircraft withhumanitarian relief goods. Attempts had been made, however, to take photos of the Turkish C-130s,but without success. 820A problem with Toholj’s statements is that it is unclear whether the former minister alreadyknew this in March 1995 or that he found out with the passing of the years through the manypublications. However, the fact that Mladic already complained about the matter in writing at an earlystage is a clear indication that Pale already knew about the Black Flights in March 1995. Anotherindication is that after the first flight the VRS immediately moved its anti-aircraft missiles (SAMs) fromHan Pijesak to a position that was the closest to Tuzla Air Base. 821There are indications that the Bosnian Serbs turned a blind eye to the Black Flights, for examplein Bihac, where similar flights took place. This siege made the situation for ABiH General Dudakovic’s5th Corps in the Bihac enclave almost untenable. He told General Rupert Smith so via the JointCommission Observers. One night, the Danish General Helsø - the UNPROFOR commander in theBihac enclave - heard the sound of propellers on a gravel airstrip in the enclave. He recognized thespecific sound of the four propellers of the Hercules C-130, because they kept turning. The KrajinaSerbs fired a number of shells, but they all fell next to the runway, and this while the Krajina Serbs atother times fired very accurately with their artillery. This was, according to General Helsø, a warningalong the lines of: ‘we know what you are up to, but don’t go too far’. This is an indication that the onlyreason for the VRS to permit the flights was that the VRS did not want the Americans against them.Helsø wanted, like his colleagues in Tuzla, to start an investigation, but he and his patrol were alsoobstructed by ABiH soldiers. In the following days it became clear that American-manufactured arms,uniforms and helmets had arrived. 822The Netherlands MIS also knew as early as 1992 of the existence of supplies transported bysmaller aircraft from Cazin airfield to the north of Bihac. 823 From 1992 onwards, daily helicopter flightswere made into Bihac. East European pilots were paid $ 5000 per trip by the Bosnian Army’s 5thCorps. In August 1994, a large Antonov An-26 transport aircraft, owned by a Ukrainian air charter, wasshot down by the VRS and the crew killed while flying from Croatia to Bihac. 824 There were also BlackFlights to the besieged Muslims in the Maglaj. According to a former SAS officer the flights wereexecuted by C-130s and the CIA was involved. These flights departed from a US Air Force base inGermany, like Ramstein or Rhein-Main. 825 However, the reliability of some Russian and East Europeanpilots was not always that great. In the spring of 1995 a helicopter pilot flying amongst others 150.000Deutschmarks into the enclave Gorazde disappeared with his cargo. 826 The many independentobservations of UN observers who had night vision equipment were included in Le Hardy’s very firstreport, which was sent by means of a Code Cable from De Lapresle to the UN headquarters in NewYork. It was time for damage control on the American side.819 Interview with Miroslav Toholj, 14/12/99.820 Interview with Milovan Milutinovic, 20-22/03/00.821 Confidential interview (31).822 Interview with K. Helsø, 28/11/99. See also: Confidential collection (4), UNMO HQ Bihac and UNMO HQ BHC,01/08/94.823 MoD, MIS/CO, No. 2721, Developments in the former Yugoslav federation, no. 94/92, 07/12/92.824 Ripley, Mercenaries, p. 59.825 Spence, All Necessary Measures, pp. 99 - 104.826 Ripley, Mercenaries, p. 59.