C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

110disposal. Their intelligence officer, Wieffer, had two daily Situation Reports as input: one from SNEand one from BHC. On the basis of these, the intelligence officer held a briefing for the battalion staffand the commanders every day. Within a company, the commanders kept their staff and ranksinformed via a weekly briefing on developments in Srebrenica. 504The flow of information that Wieffer received from below once he was in Srebrenica camefrom patrols and OPs. They were reported on paper, via communications equipment, or both. Thisdata was then translated into a flow of information that was sent to the higher echelon. In his case, thiswas SNE in Tuzla. The problem with this flow of information was that on a number of occasionsWieffer found that when he wanted to have more information on a specific subject, this informationwas not forthcoming. Dutchbat knew, for example, that a reconnaissance flight had been carried out byNATO, because they saw the aircraft overhead. They then issued an ‘overflight report’. However, Imintfrom reconnaissance flights was not handed over to Dutchbat by UNPROFOR or NATO.What were Dutchbat’s intelligence needs?The question then is what sort of information did Dutchbat want. There was a need for intelligence onoverall developments in Bosnia in order to build up an accurate picture. If the fighting flared upelsewhere in Bosnia, this could have consequences for an intensification of the activities of the warringfactions themselves. Of more direct interest was knowledge of the events in the immediatesurroundings of the enclave, for example, within a radius of 5 to 10 kilometres. 505 Sector North East(SNE) and Bosnia-Hercegovina Command (BHC) did not supply this information, and the sporadicreconnaissance platoon patrols outside the enclave during Dutchbat I and II could only providefragments of the information requirement. The UNMOs were also barely able to fill this gap. Theirfreedom of movement was limited and they had no access to Bosnian-Serb areas. 506 Dutchbat patrolssometimes supplied information on activities around the demarcation line, but it was not possible forthem to patrol in secret. The departure of a patrol was often reported to the ABiH or VRScommanders by informants at the compound gate or in the vicinity of the OPs, so that measures couldbe taken to conceal military activities and weapons from the patrol.Did Dutchbat receive no intelligence at all, then?All of the problems listed above could lead to the conclusion that Dutchbat was completelyintelligence-blind, but that was most certainly not the case. As a result of its frequent contacts with thewarring factions and with the refugees in the enclave, Dutchbat I had a large amount of information atits disposal, which was also analysed. The battalion commander usually added a Commander’sAssessment to the Sitreps, in which he gave an evaluation of developments in the enclave, theirpossible relationship with external events and a short-term outlook. This happened to a lesser extentwith Dutchbat II, partly due to the deteriorating relationship with the ABiH. Under Dutchbat III, thistrend continued. 507 An important source of intelligence disappeared because of the sharp decline incontact with the ABiH and VRS.All in all, the intelligence picture remained limited for Dutchbat III. Information on militarydevelopments in the area around the enclave was barely available, which fostered the feeling ofisolation that visitors sometimes also noticed. General Smith spoke of a ‘siege mentality’ on the part ofDutchbat III, an assessment shared by the Operations Officer at SNE, the British Lieutenant Colonel508Le Hardy.504 Interview with E. Wieffer, 07/05/01.505 Interview with E. Wieffer, 18/06/99.506 Interview with E. Wieffer, 18/06/99.507 Dutchbat in vredesnaam,pp. 108 and 156.508 Interview s with R. Smith, 12/01/00 and C.A. Le Hardy, 08/10/97.