C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

333The VRS’s most important communications station was located on Mount Veliki Zep close toHan Pijesak. This communications tower had a wide range and, according to Bosnian militarypersonnel, the Electronic Warfare unit had access to real-time intercepts and intelligence. In each case,it would seem that the ABiH in Tuzla was aware of the preparations. Lieutenant Colonel SemsudinMurinovic, as Deputy Commander responsible for security in the 24th Division of the ABiH, statedthat the 2nd Corps had prior knowledge. About four months before the attack reports were alreadybeing sent to the headquarters in Sarajevo that ‘something’ was going to happen. This was indicated inparticular by intercepts of VRS traffic. According to Murinovic it was chiefly Comint that betrayed thisfact. The surface-to-air missiles at Srebrenica had to come from another area, and the instructions fortheir relocation were intercepted. All air defence resources were concentrated in Eastern Bosnia.Comint also showed that Mladic was seriously planning, in the event of continued air strikes, to takeDutchbat hostage and to expose the soldiers to the strikes.Another Sigint expert, Captain Hazrudin Kisic, confirmed that thanks to Comint the 2nd Corpswas informed well in advance. 1856 His unit intercepted real-time intercepts and intelligence from its basein Tuzla. On 3 June the ABiH received new indications that something was about to happen; 1857 thiswas after the attack on OP-E. General Sead Delic confirmed that intercepts of messages from Mladicshowed that he was planning an attack. 1858 On the basis of Comint it was possible to report to Tuzla bythe ABiH in the enclave about the results of the Muslim attack on Visnjica. A day later the armyreceived an overview of the most important intercepts relating to this attack. The VRS wanted to trackdown the units involved in this attack and to this end sent special instructions to troops, codenamed‘yellow’. 1859 On 2 July Kisic discovered, through intercepts, the plans for an attack on Srebrenica: oneweek before the actual attack he had intercepted messages which incontrovertibly showed that the VRSwas going to attack. This also indicated that the VRS was requesting logistical support and a largenumber of buses. The intercepts were of conversations between Krstic and his deputy; the operationwas led from Prebicevac. 1860The trial of Krstic showed that around 5 July the ABiH in Srebrenica and the 2nd Corps inTuzla were informed about the planned military operations. Humint from the local populationindicated that extra VRS units had arrived. ABiH reconnaissance groups discovered that these freshunits arrived in the afternoon of 5 July. The aim of the VRS operation was to cut the line ofcommunication between Srebrenica and Zepa. 1861Some of the intercepts at the disposal of the Yugoslavia Tribunal had already been published byMehmed Pargan in Sarajevo Slobodna Bosna. Pargan revealed that at the end of June the commander ofthe Drina Corps passed on to the local commander in Zvornik Mladic’s instruction to prepare for theattack. Following initial reconnaissance, on 3 July the Drina Corps sent more than 40 vehicles,including buses and trucks, towards Srebrenica. The next day the Corps already had more than 1200litres of fuel and four tanks were dispatched. On 6 July the logistical preparations were complete andthe armbands were distributed. 1862 In Pargan’s article the transcriptions of the intercepts made of theattack by the 2nd Corps are printed. His account also indicates that the intelligence section in Kladanjclosely followed the progress of the battle.In short, the ABiH and the Bosnian security service seem to have been well-informed about theimminent attack, but also about the battle and the later murders. In this context one can also refer tothe statements by Becirovic, who on 6 July told Dutchbat that the ABiH had observed the build-up by1856 Interview with Hazrudin Kisic, 17 and 18/05/99.1857 NIOD, Coll. CD-ROMs. 28e Division to Section MV, 2nd Corps, No. 02-06-25/95, 06/06/95.1858 Interview with Sead Delic, 10/03/99.1859 NIOD, Coll. CD-ROMs. Section MV, 2nd Corps to 28th Division, No. 02/8-01-998, 27/06/95 and 02/8-01-1012,28/06/95.1860 Interview with Hazrudin Kisic, 17 and 18/05/99.1861 Rapport Butler, Srebrenica Military Narrative – Operation Krivaja 95, 15/05/00, pp. 950763 - 950764.1862 Mehmed Pargan, ‘B-H Army Eavesdropped on VRS’, Sarajevo Slobodna Bosna, (FBIS translation), 11/07/98.