C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

258As far as the technological capabilities of the Bosnian Comint stations in Konjuh, Okresanicaand Tuzla were concerned, the ABiH only had old scanners at the start of the conflict. These couldonly be used for listening in to tactical intelligence at battalion level; strategic and operationalintelligence were not obtained with Comint. The Comint itself was analysed at the headquarters inSarajevo. There were no teleprinters or computers for crypto analysis. Though the ABiH did sometimesmanage to obtain strategic intelligence, this was more by coincidence and usually took the form ofcommunication between VRS soldiers.The search for frequencies in Konjuh and Okresanica took place manually. There were notenough tapes to record conversations, so the same tapes were used over and over again. Every eveninga report appeared containing the information collected on that day. In Konjuh only two or threepeople, working in eight-hour shifts, tried to follow the communication; they independently selectedthe frequencies and recorded only parts of the VRS communication on tape. No real-time intelligencewas possible here. The VRS also used the normal telephone connections between Bratunac, Skelani andMilici. The ABiH were unable to tap these lines for they could not get near it. They did not launch anyspecial operations to break this connection. 1362In Konjuh the ABiH also had several RUP transmitters and receivers with a range of over 50kilometres and a capacity of 20 Watts. They operated on a frequency of between 2 and 20 MHz. TheRUP could only listen in to one frequency at a time, and, though between four and eight receivers werein use, they could not all be used at once because of a shortage of fuel and batteries. A maximum offour frequencies could be listened to at the same time. In total, both Konjuh and Okresanica hadaround ten people, including security, who worked in shifts. So, work did not continue non-stop onComint. One person worked on two stations, concentrating on finding frequencies that were used forthe command. Sometimes there were long periods of silence, or the frequencies changed and the searchhad to begin again. Most of the VRS communication took place in the morning and evening. 1363The crew of the Electronic Warfare Unit of the 21 st Division in Okresanica was small,consisting of three interception positions which were manned round-the-clock in shifts. Each teamworked between four and eight hours a day for a whole week and then had a week off. Operators whointercepted the message made crude notes and worked it out later in their logbooks. These notes werepassed on to the commander, who typed out the messages on a computer. The intercepts were thensent by courier to the command of the 21 st Division for further analysis. Important messages werephoned through immediately to the 2 nd Corps in Tuzla. There was no direction-finding equipment andfrequencies were identified on the basis of the knowledge of the Comint operator. 1364In the course of the conflict the Electronic Warfare Unit of the ABiH in Konjuh, Okresanicaand Tuzla encountered more and more difficulties as it tried to intercept the messages of the BosnianSerbs. The civil authorities and the VRS made increasing use of crypto equipment, which theyborrowed or obtained from the VJ. The VRS used the KZU-31 system and frequently changed thekeys. For example, it would start with Code 11. After two hours it would change keys and use Code 12.This made it impossible to penetrate the traffic. The KZU-31 was mechanical and was used forconnections between headquarters of a corps and headquarters of a brigade.The constantly changing keys often presented the ABiH code breakers with insurmountableproblems. The Electronic Warfare Unit did, however, discover during the attack on Srebrenica that theBosnian-Serb General Milenko Zivanovic had a direct line to Mladic, who since 9 July had been in theforward commando post of the Drina Corps in Pribicevac. These communications were alwaysprotected by a crypto connection. The decoding programme of the Drina Corps ran via a telex and theKZU-31 encrypting machine which was produced in Serbia. According to a former ABiH general, this1362 Confidential interview (73).1363 Confidential interview (73).1364 ‘srebrenica Trial - Expert witness assesses key radio intercept evidence’, IWPR’s TRIBUNAL UPDATE 214, March 19-24, 2001. See also statement by witness CC (Radio Interception operator in Okresanica) on 27/06/00.