C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

139intended to monitor the border crossings on the Drina river. Section 5 will discuss the deployment ofmercenaries. Much press attention has been devoted to the Mujahedin, who were said to have takenpart in the conflict in substantial numbers on the side of the ABiH: numbers ranging from 1000 to3000 Islamic fighters were mentioned. 652 Attention will also be paid to the deployment of mercenaries,including Dutch ones, by the other parties. Section 6 will deal with the deployment of Special Forces,such as the British SAS. The final section will present the conclusions.2. Arms supplies to the ABiH: the Croatian pipelineWhen the Security Council adopted resolution 713 on 25 September 1991, a document was on the tablethat requested every member state to stop supplying weapons and military goods to the warringfactions from their own territory to the Balkans. It was the first Security Council resolution dealing withan embargo, three months after the outbreak of the conflict in Slovenia. By that time, various armstransactions had already been discovered. In early 1991, the Bosnian Minister of the Interior personallystarted purchasing Kalashnikovs and ammunition in Vienna. 653 On 15 August 1991, RussianmanufacturedKalashnikovs, American M-16 rifles, anti-tank grenades and rocket launchers destinedfor Yugoslavia were intercepted. The same happened in November. Furthermore, weapons that hadfirst been delivered to Lebanon were sold off by this country because of the ‘relative quiet’ there.Various lots were bought back by Yugoslavia. 654 The German foreign intelligence service, theBundesnachrichtendienst, was also said to be involved in arms supplies to Croatia via Hungary. 655 At thattime, the Bosnian Serbs had allegedly already received weapons. 656Resolution 713 did not imply that member states also had to stop the supplies from third partycountries to the region. An enforcement mechanism for resolution 713 was adopted only in November1992 via resolution 787. This called on the member states, individually or jointly via regionalagreements, to stop the import by sea. The arms embargo was further tightened by the UN on 30 May1992. On 9 October 1992, the Security Council adopted resolution 781, which imposed a ban onmilitary flights over Bosnia that had not been approved in advance. This was the well known No FlyZone resolution. According to the mediator Lord Owen, his lobbying for the No Fly Zone resolutionwas partly inspired by his fear that Iranian aircraft would land at Tuzla Air Base, and the Bosnian Serbswould retaliate by stopping all humanitarian relief to them. 657 In spite of all the resolutions,UNPROFOR was not given the mandate to monitor or enforce violations of the arms embargo onland; 658 NATO and the WEU did do so at sea.On 31 March 1993, the Security Council adopted resolution 816 to enforce the earlierresolution 781. It permitted military action by the UN against ‘fixed wing and rotary aircraft’, ifpermission was given by UNPROFOR. NATO Council imposed a No Fly Zone above the formerYugoslavia to monitor flight movements, and within the framework of Operation Sharp Guard, a fleeton the Adriatic Sea attempted to apprehend and inspect all suspicious vessels. Nonetheless, all thewarring factions attempted to purchase weapons, ammunition and military equipment from abroad and652 Harald Doornbos, ‘Het is tijd voor de jihad’ (‘It is time for the Jihad’), in Elsevier, 14/11/92 and ‘Bewijs tegen moslimgeneraalshele klus’ (‘Finding evidence against Muslim generals a tough job’), NRC Handelsblad, 09/08/01.653 Interview with B. Spasic, 16/09/01.654 ‘Beiroet en de Balkan-connectie’ (‘Beirut and the Balkans connection’), Trouw, 10/07/91; ‘Joegoslavische partijen op zoeknaar wapens’ (‘Yugoslav parties in search of weapons’), NRC Handelsblad, 16/08/91 and ‘Evacuatie waarnemers inDubrovnik vertraagd’ (‘Evacuation of observers in Dubrovnik delayed’, De Volkskrant, 13/11/91. See also: NMFA,DEU/ARA/00081, PR Geneva to Foreign Affairs, no. 0 Gevi478/15043, 26/07/91.655 Blank, Yugoslavia’s Wars, p. 115.656 Cekic, Aggression, pp. 86-88.657 Owen, Balkans Odyssey, p. 59.658 UNGE, UNPROFOR, Box 124, Akashi to Annan, Z-1106, 22/07/94.