C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

168sometimes incorrect. Adding new building blocks would only further fuel this debate, Tharoorpredicted. His preference was therefore for a separate investigation and a supplementary NATO report,to which UNPROFOR would only attach its name if it incorporated its earlier information: this wouldbenefit UNPROFOR’s credibility. Bell told Akashi that General Smith was aware of this view.Meanwhile, a variety of rumours was circulating in the press. If a request was made for comment, NewYork would state that the report had been received but that a more detailed explanation had beenrequested. 843Akashi responded several days later. According to him, the NATO investigation team had notheard all the witnesses, because a few of them were on leave. Moldestad was interviewed by telephone.Akashi was disappointed with ‘the lack of rigorous documentation in the NATO team’s report, and itsfailure to substantiate contradictions with original UNPROFOR observations’. He had decided not toput NATO under further pressure by producing a more reliable report, but he had agreed with thesentence ‘We agree that the United Nations should not put its name to a report that falls short ofachievable standards’, which represented General Smith’s conclusion. 844 The new Force Commander,Janvier later referred back to the matter in a curious way: at the beginning of March he told Annan thatthe Hercules aircraft had actually been helicopters. 845The consequences of the reports about the Black FlightsThe Black Flights led to tense relations between the United States, the UN and NATO. According toSACEUR, General George Joulwan, Islamic countries were involved in the supplies to the ABiH. 846The commander of the southern NATO command, Admiral Leighton Smith, promised Janvier andAkashi that he would resign if it should appear that American uniformed military personnel wereinvolved in this operation, and wanted a thorough investigation. It had become known to him that onthe day in question, 10 February, indeed no AWAC aircraft had flown above Bosnia. E-2 jet fightersfrom US aircraft carriers had taken over this task at the last moment. However, these fighters do nothave the same capabilities as AWACS. So, it is no surprise that they spotted nothing. This then raisesthe question as to the nationality of the transport aircraft: Smith wanted to know if perhaps they wereTurkish aircraft. Some British officials told him later that in Gorazde too the ABiH had been providedwith new uniforms. 847 The Bosnian Minister Toholj also claimed that the entire affair led to tenserelations within the UN. Akashi’s spokesman, Williams, had told him so. He hinted that NATO did notwant UNPROFOR to reveal the secret supplies to Tuzla. 848It was not only in New York that this was a sensitive matter. The British Foreign Secretary,Hurd, also took the matter seriously. According to Lord Owen, he informed various embassies bytelegram that the United Kingdom certainly was not involved in a cover-up of the Black Flights. Hurdstated that the flights were observed on 10, 12 and 23 February; meanwhile, according to Hurd, it wasalso known that there had been many more flights. Hurd reported further that one of the observers wasa British officer who was at the head of the Operations Section in Sector North East, referring to LeHardy. Hurd referred to Jones’s report and then established that neither NATO, nor UNPROFOR hadbeen able to produce a complete and definitive report. He therefore deemed it possible that theseclandestine flights had taken place, although there was still no hard evidence.According to Hurd, it had now been decided that both the UN and NATO should end thisaffair. NATO had decided not to investigate the affair further as long as no new facts appeared on thetable. However, Hurd pointed out that Moscow did want further investigation, and Paris was also843 Confidential collection (12), Memo Jesudas Bell to Akashi, 24/02/95.844 UNGE, UNPROFOR, Box 124, Akashi to Annan. Z-328, 27/02/95.845 UNGE, UNPROFOR, Box 139, Janvier to Annan, Z-350, 02/03/95.846 Interview with George Joulwan, 08/06/0.847 Interview with Leighton Smith, 06/06/00.848 Interview with Miroslav Toholj, 14/12/99.