C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

140to import them into the region. 659 The question now is what military impact these secret weaponssupplies had on the events in Yugoslavia.The supplies were firstly a violation of the arms embargo imposed by the internationalcommunity on the warring factions. The embargo was officially sanctioned by the Security Council.The supplies to, for example, the ABiH, could be interpreted by the other warring factions, such as theVojska Republika Srpska (VRS, Bosnian-Serb Army) and the Hrvatsko Vijece Odbrane (HVO, the CroatianDefence Council, the army of the Bosnian Croats) as a violation of the embargo, and thus couldprovoke a military response. In retaliation, the VRS could shell airfields with tanks, mortars or artillery660so as to impede the supply.The supply of arms to the warring factions also affected the stability in the region, and in manycases inflamed the armed conflict. It is no coincidence that military equipment was often delivered afew weeks before the start of new large-scale offensives by the ABiH, VRS or Croats. This often wentaccording to a fixed pattern: clandestine supplies; training, possibly supervised by instructors, foroperating the new weapons; and subsequently the start of military offensives. Logically this could lead,or did lead, to situations in which UN troops were put in immediate mortal danger. After all, the UNtroops’ task was to control or monitor these airfields.Finally, the secret operations are of interest because various statements pointed to theconclusion that the clandestine supplies usually led to rapid transit to the eastern enclaves, such asSrebrenica and Zepa. The VRS complained that the supply of new weapons usually facilitated newsorties from the enclaves into Bosnian-Serb villages and military positions, which in turn provoked aresponse from the VRS. This action-reaction cycle again put UNPROFOR troops in danger. In theenclaves, the ABiH actually all too often used the Observation Posts (Ops) as a cover in military actionsagainst the VRS. It is important to reconstruct the secret arms supplies from Iran via the ‘Croatianpipeline’ and the Black Flights to Tuzla, because this will make clear that different NATO memberstates had different political and military views on the possible consequences for the UNPROFORtroops on the ground .The background to the Croatian pipelineOn 4 September 1992, the CIA discovered an Iran Air Boeing 747 at Zagreb airport. Subsequentinvestigation revealed that the jumbo jet was loaded with weapons, ammunition, anti-tank rockets,communication equipment and other military equipment, such as uniforms and helmets, destined forthe ABiH in Bosnia. 661 President Tudjman informed mediator Lord Owen accordingly. Apparently, herejected Iranian involvement. 662 The Bush administration protested in Zagreb and the arms wereconfiscated, after which Croatia appeared to stop all further clandestine arms transport via Zagreb.On 29-30 October 1992, Bosnian President Izetbegovic paid a visit to Teheran and entered intoan agreement according to which Iran would again attempt to supply necessary goods via Zagreb.Turkey and Saudi Arabia also offered assistance but attached the condition that Izetbegovic should notrequest assistance from Iran. This did not dissuade the Bosnian from reaching an agreement withTeheran.663 According to officials of an European intelligence service, Izetbegovic was a president whowas less tied to the apron strings of the United States than everyone thought. 664 At least the formerchairman of the British Joint Intelligence Committee, Dame Pauline Neville-Jones, was of this659 Confidential information (14).660 James Risen and Doyle McManus also point specifically to this danger in ‘U.S. Okd Iran Arms for Bosnia, Officials Say’,The Los Angeles Times, 05/04/96.661 Jacques Charmelot, ‘Arms supply embargo is copiously violated’, AFP press release, 08/04/96.662 Owen, Balkans Odyssey, p. 47. The reporter Robert Dulmers was a witness to the arms smuggling with the Iranian aircraft,but refused to make it public. See: Karskens, Pleisters op de Ogen, p. 263.663 MoD, MIS/CO, Developments in the former Yugoslav federation, no. 30/93, 28/04/93.664 Confidential information (48). It was even asserted that the CIA had evidence that Izetbegovic was on Iran’s payroll. See:Vesti, 03/01/97.