C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

230The Bosnian government and the ABiH as Comint targetThe traffic between Pale, Han Pijesak and Belgrade was not the only target of the Americans. The NSAalso intercepted the communications of the Bosnian government in Sarajevo. This became apparent in1994 when the NSA intercepted conversations between a number of Bosnian government officials,who talked on the telephone about future secret weapons deliveries that had obviously been arrangedby the US government. The NSA also intercepted conversations between Bosnian officials in Sarajevoand several foreign governments, in which the Bosnians let drop that they were receiving militarysupport from Washington.Furthermore, in 1996 intercepts of Bosnian government communications revealed thathundreds of militant Iranian fighters of the Revolutionary Guard were still operating throughoutBosnia, despite the government’s promise that they would be removed from the country, as agreed inthe Dayton Accord of 1995.1221 The Americans probably leaked this information to the press onpurpose to give a political signal to the government in Sarajevo. Also Iranian intelligence agents wereactive in Sarajevo. There were even accusations that these agents were using advanced German spytechnology to eavesdrop on US peacekeeping forces in Bosnia. This equipment was bought from theBND but the German service denied this. 1222As described above, the British Army Intelligence Corps also conducted operations against theBosnian government and the ABiH from Gornji Vakuf. The Bosnian Army was well aware of this, aswas revealed by an internal memorandum of the National Security Service, which warned about Britisheavesdropping activities from Base A in Gornji Vakuf. The security service also reported that newlyarrived British troops on the Kiseljak - Kresevo line possessed the same Sigint equipment. Thisinvolved operations chiefly intended to gather tactical military intelligence on the ABiH, for use inbriefing commanders. 1223The French intelligence services were also active, from both France in Sarajevo, in interceptingBosnian traffic. Not only the communications of the government was targeted but also the messagesbetween ABiH snipers. These snipers caused a large number of dead and wounded among FrenchUNPROFOR soldiers. According to a member of the Canadian Military Intelligence Service, theFrench in Sarajevo had the best-working intelligence system of all UNPROFOR participants, with bothSigint and Imint capacities. According to the Canadians, the French service was the best-organized inSarajevo: it had an excellent, centrally operated all-source intelligence system that stood head andshoulders above the other services in operational, tactical and strategic terms. The problem, however,was that the French service simply refused to share its intelligence with NATO allies. The Canadianintelligence officials in Sarajevo did however, thanks to the bilingual character of this country and somegood personal relations, receive some French intelligence. 1224UNPROFOR as target of the US Sigint operations and the British-American animosityDespite the close relationship within the UKUSA framework, fundamental differences of opinionabout Bosnia remained between the Americans and the British. London was particularly disturbed bythe wish for a more substantial use of air power, and the US refusal to deploy ground troops. Thiscreated animosity between the American and British services, which at one moment led to some of theUS intelligence flow to London being cut off. Captain Cooke of the UK Defence Intelligence Staffcommented on this:1221 Walter Pincus, ‘US Sought Other Bosnia Arms Sources’, Washington Post, 26/04/96 and James Risen, ‘Iran PaidBosnian Leader, CIA Says’, Los Angeles Times, 31/12/96.1222 ‘Bonn denies Tehran using German spy gear in Bosnia’, Reuters Report, 09/12/96.1223 NIOD, Coll. CD-ROMS. 2nd Corps ABiH to 28th Division, no. 06-05-173/95, 14/06/95.1224 Confidential interview (9).