C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

302(mist and low-hanging cloud), the fact that Srebrenica was at the farthest edge of the UAV envelopeand partly because the US intelligence community still refused to give priority to Eastern Bosnia. 1643One source claimed that a U-2 reconnaissance flight was sent out over Srebrenica during theVRS attack around 10 or 11 July, but it returned with engine problems and no photos. 1644 Thisstatement was probably incorrect. It was not a U-2 but another Imint asset which actually took photosof the post-strike area on 11 July. These photos, shown in Washington DC to the author, wereclassified as ‘secret, Releasable to NATO’. They showed four bomb craters that were caused by the airattack of 11 July. The first was taken at 09.34 hours and showed the route to the south. The second wastaken at 13.17 hours and showed the four bomb craters. 1645 Did this Imint come from a U-2, a UAV oranother platform like a Tactical Air Reconnaissance (TACRECCE) flight with an F-14 or F-16?The standard classification on all U2 imagery was ‘Confidential: Releasable to NATO’. All U2imagery was subject to declassification upon approval of specific requests. But the standardclassification on all NATO TACRECCE photos was ‘secret: Releasable to NATO’. This suggests thatthe U2 photos described above, taken at 0934 and 1317 may have been in reality TACRECCE photos.Another rationalism for this was that the U2 would ordinarily not retrace its flight path for a revisit ofthe same area at all, much less four hours later. If the Srebrenica area just happened to correspond toan off-angle view from an adjacent track, a second look was feasible, but highly unlikely. In sharpcontrast to the improbability of the UAV and the U2, NATO aircraft flew 25-30 sorties per day overBosnia, most of which were at liberty to fly over the eastern enclaves. In addition to US Navy F-14’s,which were the only American TACRECCE capability, French and British TACRECCE capabilities(and of course Dutch F-16’s) all were much more probable platforms for any photos taken, by several1646orders of magnitude. So, the photo’s shown to the author came probably not from a satellite, U-2 orUAV.On 12 July, an Imint platform (probably a TACRECCE mission by a NATO-member) tookphotos of Potocari showing the Dutch compound.1647 The photos that were later released duringKrstic’s trial show the Fontana Hotel, the football pitch and other buildings. 1648 Presumably, this photoreconnaissancemission was specifically searching for clues about the situation on the ground. Anotherphoto, taken at 14.00 hours, shows a fleet of over twenty parked buses. Photos with a better resolutionshow the football stadium with the prisoners. 1649 At 14.00 hours on 13 July, photos were taken abovePotocari, which clearly showed the buses and lorries that had come to collect the women, the childrenand the elderly from the civilian population. It also registered signs of disturbed earth. 1650 On 13 July,photos were also taken of a warehouse in Kravica, situated between Bratunac and Konjevic Polje.Researchers of the Yugoslavia Tribunal in The Hague later found bloodstains and numerous bulletholes in this warehouse. 1651 The collection of Imint was difficult because of bas weather. US systemsconfirmed heavy cloud cover over eastern Bosnia. Finally, on 18 July US assets confirmed the presenceof two VRS tanks at Srebrenica HQ. 1652During this period the CIA conducted several test flights with Predators in Croatia and on 15July a Predator made a flight but the quality of the Imint was not what had been hoped for. The sameday other US national systems confirmed heavy cloud cover over eastern Bosnia. On 17 July a Predatortook off just after midnight and was recovered in the afternoon. All target areas were cloud coveredand the UAV encountered mostly thunderstorms mostly. The Predator collected good imagery of1643 Confidential interview (54).1644 Confidential interview (25).1645 Confidential information (55).1646 Confidential information (80).1647 ICTY, Krstic Case, OTP Exhibits, Volume I, Ex. 5/15.1648 ICTY, Krstic Case, OTP Exhibits, Volume I, Ex. 6/2.1649 ICTY, Krstic Case, OTP Exhibits, Volume I, Ex. 6/3 and 6/4.1650 ICTY, Krstic Case, OTP Exhibits, Volume I, Ex. 5/2-5/4.1651 ICTY, Krstic Case, OTP Exhibits, Volume I, Ex. 8/3 - 8/81652 Confidential information (80).