C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

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158allow him (as one of the SDA confidants) to keep an eye on Vladimir Soljic (Croat and Minister ofDefence). The Americans (and Croats) agitated against the lack of cooperation in the creation of aFederal Army and Cengic’s contacts with Islamic countries. In protest, Washington refused to continuearms supplies and demanded his resignation. 774 He was dismissed on 6 November 1996 and was givenanother post.Cengic was a personal confidant of Izetbegovic and had fairly radical views. For instance, hestated that a Muslim may never receive blood from a non-Muslim and that a Muslim may also nevergive blood for a non-Muslim. He was also said to have insisted on striking a deal between the BosnianMuslims on the one hand and the Serbs and Bosnian Serbs on the other, and fighting out the war withthe Croats. This was consistent with the prevailing view of the rulers in Teheran. It was in the jointinterest of Islam and the orthodox faith to fight the Catholics together.In September 1997, it was reported that Cengic had been involved since 1993 in building anairfield in Visoko, which was intended for arms supplies. He was said to have invested a total of $ 5million in this project. According to British sources, this airfield was built by the Americans. It wassituated in a valley to the northwest of Sarajevo. The runway was long enough to handle C-130s orlarger transport aircraft. However, Visoko was within VRS artillery range. The airfield was managed in1995 by Hasan’s father, Halid Cengic; many arms were said to have been brought via Visoko, and theflights would not be observed by NATO and UNPROFOR. This was because the arms flights wouldalways arrive in Visoko when there were no NATO AWACS aircraft in the air, or only AWACS with apurely American crew. 775These assertions are incorrect, however. UNPROFOR certainly did report on flights to Visoko.For instance, in March 1995, Force Commander Janvier reported to Kofi Annan that Visoko was inuse. 776 Bosnian intelligence officers, incidentally, dispute that Visoko was important for arms supplies;according to them, arms arrived via convoys from Croatia, and not via Visoko. The airfield wasallegedly never finished and the meteorological conditions were said to be too poor; the reason for itsexistence was simply that the SDA wanted to build an airfield no matter what. 777Hasan Cengic also dominated the Bosnian military intelligence services, which were closelyinvolved in the arms supplies. In 1995 there were two military intelligence and security services, theVOS and Vojna KOS. The Vojna KOS was the counterespionage service of the Ministry of Defence,which collaborated closely with the military police. In December 1996, the former Chief of Staff of theABiH, Safet Halilovic, was head of the Vojna KOS. The Vojna Obavjestajna Sluzba (VOS) was theintelligence service of the ABiH. This was led by Brigadier Mustafa Hajrulahovic, alias Talijan (theItalian). He had worked for a long time for the pre war Yugoslav secret service, the KOS, and had beenstationed in Italy. The most important task of the VOS in other countries was to arrange logistics forthe ABiH. The service occupied itself with arms deals and raising funds. This was carried out viaumbrella firms and Islamic humanitarian organizations. The Cengic family was involved in many ofthese logistics activities: for instance, the arms imports from Iran ran mainly via the Cengic family’slogistics network. Iran supported the ABiH not only with arms, but also with advisers, though therewere never very many of them. In addition, the ABiH obtained its arms via the VOS from Austria,Germany, Turkey, Argentina and Czechoslovakia. 778 British services also came into the possession ofevidence that Iran supplied military equipment and arms directly to the ABiH. The supplies consistedof anti-tank weapons of the Red Arrow type (a Chinese variant of the Russian AT-3 Sagger) anddetonators for artillery and mortar ammunition. 779774 Christine Spolar, ‘US-Bosnian Dispute Delays Major Arms Delivery’, Washington Post, 27/10/96.775 Charlotte Eagar, ‘Invisible US Army defeats Serbs’, The Observer, 05/11/95.776 UNGE, UNPROFOR, Box 139. Janvier to Annan, Z-350, 02/03/95. Further: Confidential collection (4), G-2 Air Deskto COS, Visoko Airfield, 28/06/95.777 Confidential interview (5).778 Bulatovic, General Mladic, p. 192.779 Confidential information (31).
159An Islamic humanitarian organization that the Cengic family made much use of, was the ThirdWorld Relief Agency (TWRA). It was led by the Sudanese diplomat Elfatih Hassanein, and armstransactions were carried out, funds were collected, and intelligence gathered under its cover. It wassaid to have amounted to $ 350 million. TWRA had offices in Sarajevo, Budapest, Moscow andIstanbul. They had direct links with the Bosnian government: in October 1992, the Bosnian minister offoreign affairs, Haris Silajdzic, visited the First Austrian Bank in Vienna and issued a bank guarantee forHassanein, and in 1993 Izetbegovic sent a letter to this bank to the effect that this Sudanese official hadthe complete confidence of his government.Later, in 1994, incriminating material was found at the Third World Relief Agency office inVienna during a police raid. Cengic was a member of the supervisory board of this organization, andwas said to have used it in 1992 to smuggle arms from Sudan to Bosnia. The arms were collected inKhartoum and delivered to Maribor, Slovenia. Chartered helicopters from an American-Russiancompany continued the transport of the arms, with Croatian permission, to Tuzla and Zenica. Thefunds were also used to bribe Croatian officials after the conflict between Croatia and Bosnia had flaredup again. Cengic also used the Slovenian company Smelt International to have 120 tons of arms andammunition flown in from Libya using Slovenian cargo aircraft to Maribor in July 1993. 780 TWRA wasused by the military intelligence service, not by the Bosnian intelligence service, AID, which used theCenex company for arms transactions. The then Bosnian Minister of the Interior, Deli Mustafic, wasinvolved in 1991 in smuggling Kalashnikovs and ammunition from Vienna to Sarajevo. 781Even UNPROFOR was covered by Cengic’s network: his TWRA was also involved insmuggling light arms worth $ 15 million with the involvement of Turkish and Malaysian UNPROFORtroops. 782 Not only Turkish or Malaysian, but also other UNPROFOR detachments brought more armsthan they needed for themselves. For example, soldiers from Bangladesh sold ammunition on a largescale to the ABiH, which was officially to have been used during exercises, 783 and the battalion fromMalta ordered four thousand mortar-shells while they only had four mortars. 784 In other words: in spiteof the international arms embargo, Bosnia was to receive arms through a variety of channels. TheABiH even bought arms and ammunition in Serbia. In November 1993, the Military IntelligenceService (MIS) already reported the possibility that Arab donations were being used to purchase arms inSerbia. These arms transactions ignored the political differences in the Balkans. The Bosnian ministerMuratovic, frankly admitted to the European negotiator, the Swede Carl Bildt, that the ABiH hadcrossed the Drina in the vicinity of Zepa to buy arms in Serbia. Bildt apparently responded withsurprise, to which Muratovic answered: ‘This is the Balkans. Things sometimes work ratherdifferently.’ 785 A former VRS officer confirmed that the ABiH in Zepa received many goods fromSerbia for it was situated on the Drina. This took place both with convoys and by means ofsmuggling. 786780 MoD, MIS/CO. Developments in the former Yugoslav federation, no. 54/93, 08/09/93; Marko Milivojevic, ‘slovenia -An Arms Bazaar’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 6 (1994), 11, and a three-part series in Nasa Borba, Instalment 3, 26/09/96.781 Interview with Bozidar Spasic, 16/09/01. Many transactions were dealt with through the Bosnian embassy in Vienna.According to press releases, Osama Bin Laden received a Bosnian passport there. See: ‘Bin Laden was granted Bosnianpassport’, Agence France-Presse, 24/09/99.782 John Pomfret, ‘How Bosnia’s Muslims Dodged Arms Embargo’, The Washington Post, 22/09/96 and ‘Background ongroup’, Agence France-Presse, 22/09/96.783 MoD, MIS/CO. Developments in the former Yugoslav federation, no. 10/94, 15/02/94. Further: ‘UNPROFOR sellsWeapons’, in Strategic Policy, Vol. XXII (1994), pp. 11-12, and ‘Kriminalci u plavom’, Borba, 06/01/95.784 Confidential interview (34).785 MoD, MIS/CO. Developments in the former Yugoslav federation, no. 66/93, 24/11/93 and Carl Bildt, Peace Journey, p.70.786 Interview with Momir Nikolic, 20/10/00.
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Srebrenica: a ‘safe’ areaAppend
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CIC - Current Intelligence CentreCI
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7SCS - Special Collection ServiceSE
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9still active staff of intelligence
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11Chapter 1The United Nations and I
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13with setting the objectives of gr
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15gathered, organized and analysed
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17The second phase in the intellige
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19can also be or become intelligenc
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21additional financial and other in
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23undermined the idea that the inte
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25that the safety of their personne
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27to generate an all-source perspec
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29in all, Van Kappen found it a ‘
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31The first step taken by the Bush
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33Virginia, where it was decided wh
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35a dual responsibility to support
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37had indications that this attack
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39example, the following is contain
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41played an important role. For thi
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43any indication of action taken. T
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45verification flights by unmanned
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47NATO’s most important troop-con
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49strategic systems were revamped t
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51Another problem was that good (no
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53American National Reconnaissance
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55Soviet Union’s intercontinental
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574. The perception and information
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59not detract from the fact that
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62intelligence officers even told t
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64the mandate differently or which
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67atrocities but the Bosnian Serbs
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70Republika Srpska. The work was no
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72from the fact that the Direction
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74involved in intelligence activiti
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76Forces were said to have received
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78exchange, then generally speaking
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80Chapter 3Dutch intelligence and s
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82reorganization of the MIS. In 199
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84commotion flaring up within the s
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86intelligence. 394 Until that time
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88their relief goods for Bosnia tha
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90The BVD collaborated closely on Y
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94cutbacks recommended by the Van I
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97information without compromising
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99Yugoslavia did not prove to be a
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101MIS/CO. Intelligence sharing wit
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103German, Italian and Danish intel
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105Originally, the European Bureau
Page 107 and 108: 107that an insight was obtained usi
Page 109 and 110: 109They made civil and military ris
Page 111 and 112: 111In other words, the flow of info
Page 113 and 114: 113three tasks: looking for indicat
Page 115 and 116: 115In reality the MIS/Army function
Page 117 and 118: 117his benefit, and many others. It
Page 119 and 120: 119too. This had already been estab
Page 121 and 122: 121negative assessment: not to go t
Page 123 and 124: 123capacity of the UN, but as descr
Page 125 and 126: 125organizations that could possibl
Page 127 and 128: 127Department, the Counterintellige
Page 129 and 130: 129MIS/Air Force officer went to Tu
Page 131 and 132: 131entering into close relationship
Page 133 and 134: 133One envelope contained several f
Page 135 and 136: 135any indications of continuous gu
Page 137 and 138: 137more and more clear, turned a de
Page 139 and 140: 139intended to monitor the border c
Page 141 and 142: 141opinion. 665 After Croatia had n
Page 143 and 144: 143Lake’s statement. 676 As a Can
Page 145 and 146: 145engage these countries, but each
Page 147 and 148: 147Later that day, Galbraith report
Page 149 and 150: 149form of photos taken by spy sate
Page 151 and 152: 151In the summer and autumn of 1994
Page 153 and 154: 153starting to have concerns about
Page 155 and 156: 155preferred provider of weapons to
Page 157: 157Because of the logistical useful
Page 161 and 162: 161and 1 rocket launcher for a TF-8
Page 163 and 164: 163the convoys from Croatia with ar
Page 165 and 166: 165The attempt at a cover-upAs ment
Page 167 and 168: 167Force Commander and with General
Page 169 and 170: 169urging it, because they suspecte
Page 171 and 172: 171General and researcher, Brendan
Page 173 and 174: 173mm guns, 2000 pistols, 211,000 h
Page 175 and 176: 175divergent opinions on the Serbia
Page 177 and 178: 177had total freedom of movement al
Page 179 and 180: 179violations were observed. These
Page 181 and 182: 181and Jugoslavija Publik. Accordin
Page 183 and 184: 183command and the rival Iranian, S
Page 185 and 186: 185much contact with the population
Page 187 and 188: 187from the enclave a total of 140
Page 189 and 190: 189The third party country strategy
Page 191 and 192: 191the warring factions, namely tha
Page 193 and 194: 193Chapter 5The Signals Intelligenc
Page 195 and 196: 195In addition Comint can be import
Page 197 and 198: 197policymakers, however. As a resu
Page 199 and 200: 199A second disadvantage of Sigint,
Page 201 and 202: 201All efforts can of course also b
Page 203 and 204: 203125 linguists to provide transla
Page 205 and 206: 205time intercepts involved here we
Page 207 and 208: 207conclusion that the contribution
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209happened during the Gulf War, wh
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211The Gulf War showed that there w
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213Despite this reservation there i
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215The NSA and CIA, as well as GCHQ
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217million messages, sent via Intel
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219Zagreb, Morgan, - Svensson was o
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221Monitoring targets in SerbiaOffi
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223jar’, said an US intelligence
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225Naturally the Serbs had taken pr
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227confirmed that monitoring walkie
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229The same month new articles appe
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231‘They more or less admitted th
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233have been part of a Bosnian gove
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235get O’Grady out of Bosnian Ser
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237as the Balkans. Two to three yea
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239Comint archive and other archive
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241Bokhoven Couzy supported him in
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243communications traffic of UNPROF
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245Moreover, the NSA is reported to
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247The role of the Netherlands: no
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249made by Krstic and other Bosnian
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251messages, which were intercepted
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253later treetops were used. Throug
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255Conclusions on the interception
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257equipment, planned operations, t
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259made it impossible to follow the
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261community that the situation was
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263commander of the Bosnian-Serb Dr
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265to headquarters. The Comint oper
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267Intelligence Community had no ac
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269aid being sent to Sarajevo. Both
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271established in 1991, also receiv
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273crypto telephone and fax with th
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275to Baxter, the Military Assistan
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277Chapter 7Imagery Intelligence in
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2792. What instruments were availab
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281would leave around 18 hours out
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283and has provided policy-makers w
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285operational in Bosnia, like the
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287lines and troop movements. After
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289around Sarajevo and Gorazde. Thi
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291that especially American, French
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293So, it would have been impossibl
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2953. With whom was imagery intelli
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297available. 1606 The head of the
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299war crimes had probably been per
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301a US national asset (unknow is w
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303Mostar and loitered in Zepa area
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305Albright shows the photosOn 10 A
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307was taken some time in 1999, eve
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309tracking the civilian toll had v
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311solution to such problems in ad
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313Chapter 8Was ‘Srebrenica’ an
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315gathered intelligence, then it m
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317the VRS attack should aim to tak
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319In January 1995 a European intel
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321stated that the deployment of th
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323The Military Intelligence Servic
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325by the Norwegian Brigadier Gener
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327Bosnian Serbs decided that they
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329the enclaves in the very near fu
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331enclave was seriously confined b
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333The VRS’s most important commu
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335archives, together with intervie
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337the hills and mountains along th
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339from Sarajevo, because they were
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341The UN headquarters in New YorkT
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343Who did have prior knowledge? In
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345offensive was stopped before the
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347leadership of the Republika Srps
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349coming 24 hours. 1963 On 11 July
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351that it was established that the
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353very short period: 2 to 6 July.
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355transport VRS troops. 2006 Howev
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357In this respect the author Russe
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359(presumably they were referring
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361nations and within NATO never to
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363expectation that ‘on balance i
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365thorny issue. A foreign intellig
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367was a correct analysis, as was l
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369believes any news in Sarajevo.
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371as said before, this is not a na
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373Chapter 9Survey of archival reco
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375Collection of the Economic Inves
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377archive a number of messages fro
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37930. Uiterweer Post Collection: n
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Bodansky, Y., Offensive in the Balk
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Halberstam, David, War in a Time of
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O.O’shea, Brendan, Crisis at Biha
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387Woolsey, R.J., Partners for Peac
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Boyle, Alan, ‘spies in the watch
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Macdonald, Lt.-Colonel Oliver A.K.,
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393Zumach, A. ‘US intelligence kn
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Arafat YasserAristide J.B.‘Arkan
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Felix M.C.J.Franken R.A.Franssen N.
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Makar AndjelkoMarchal LucMarguin J.
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Soljic VladimirSoubirou AndréSoyst
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C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

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