C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

351that it was established that the initial analysis of the previous week had been off the mark. Everythingseemed to indicate that the lack of ABiH resistance had led to the rapid conquest. 1978What precisely did the MIS/CO receive from its foreign counterparts? According to MIS/COpersonnel they never received any hard intelligence which gave explicit warning of an attack. 1979 Staff ofa Canadian intelligence service claim that a warning did go to the MIS but ‘in disguised form’ so as notto reveal the Humint source. 1980 This was nowhere to be found in the MIS archives. A British warningcan, however, be reconstructed. Interviews with British and Canadian officials revealed that at the endof June the DIS became concerned about the eastern enclaves. 1981 This was also indicated on 28 and 29June during a bilateral meeting between the MIS/Army and the DIS. A Dutch analyst was told inconfidence that there were indications for a VRS attack on the eastern enclaves. 1982 This intelligenceoriginated from MI-6 and according to a DIS official this threat deserved particular attention. It wasassumed that the VRS was busy increasing the pressure on all three enclaves, whereby the Britishexpected that the first move would be an attempt to take Srebrenica. The threatening, reduction orconquest of the enclaves could be an extra means of bringing Sarajevo to the negotiating table. It wouldalso put the UN in a difficult position. Karadzic’s position was still seen as stable, but Mladic’s attitudewas a cause for concern. He wanted to solve the conflict on the battlefield, while Karadzic envisaged asolution through political consultation. 1983The assessment of the conversation with the DIS led to a difference of opinion within theMIS/Army. The most important question was whether this was an official DIS position that had beentaken outside the bilateral discussions. This proved not to be the case, because it was revealed inconfidence. A fierce discussion then ensued within the MIS. How seriously should this report be taken?The majority of the analysts continued to believe that the VRS aimed only to take the southern road.Another problem was that Dutchbat reported no military details, making it difficult to form a completepicture. Sometimes the gathered intelligence was confusing. Several analysts weighed up the Britishreport and set it off against the other intelligence available at the time. The British intelligence soundedunlikely. The VRS would never have the ‘sheer nerve’ to do something like that. The report on thebilateral talks with the DIS was never passed to the Heads of the MIS or the MIS/CO. The onlyBalkans analyst in the MIS/CO first heard about this report years later. The MIS/Army was a veryclosed organization and the DIS information remained ‘stranded’ there. The matter needed to beweighed up because there was no further corroboration. 1984In an assessment after the attack the MIS/CO concluded that the international communityseemed to accept the fall as a fait accompli and to be awaiting the further course of events. Theunexpected nature and speed of the operation had taken the international community by surprise. Howcould this have happened? It was unclear whether the VRS plan had been established beforehand orwhether the VRS had exploited its unexpected success in taking the south-western part of the enclave.On the other hand the occupation of the enclaves had always been a strategic goal. Perhaps the easyconquest of OP-E had given the impetus for further action. Following this more VRS troops wereshifted to the southern edge of the enclave, also serving to cut off the link with Zepa. The speed andeffectiveness of the VRS showed – according to the MIS – that Srebrenica had been taken with clearintent. The entire operation indicated lengthy preparation and the presence of Mladic ruled out aspontaneous local offensive. 19851978 MoD, MIS/CO. ‘Developments in the former Yugoslav Federation’, No. 34/95, concluded 20/07/95.1979 Confidential interviews (25) and (40).1980 Confidential interview (9).1981 Confidential interviews (8) and (9).1982 Confidential interview (38).1983 Confidential information (30) and MoD, MIS/CO. Report Bilat 28-29 June 1995, q.v. (late June/early July 1995).1984 Confidential interviews (25), (26), (28), (37) and (38).1985 MoD, MIS/CO. The situation in the former Yugoslavia, briefing, ± 13/07/95.