C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

371as said before, this is not a natural fact, but the result of policy decisions hinged on funding, capabilityand political will. In the light of these refusals, the prospect of castigating American, British, Canadian,German, etc. intelligence for failing (albeit perhaps negligently) to do what the Dutch armed forces haddeliberately and consistently refused to do themselves seems not always justified.Nonetheless, various members of the MIS also believed that, for various other reasons,Srebrenica was an example of an intelligence failure. It was often posited that if the MIS had had moreresources it could have exchanged more with foreign partners and thus could have gathered moreintelligence through liaison. 2088 According to another MIS official it was a failure because the MIS/COwas not geared to supporting this operation in an adequate manner. Through its internal method offunctioning the organization also made it difficult for itself to get information about Srebrenica to theright places. Couzy and Voorhoeve were given different pictures of events. This could have had fatalconsequences in other ways too because, in the opinion of one MIS official, if things had gone a littledifferently an entire battalion could quite possibly have been killed. 2089 One official thought thatSrebrenica was an intelligence failure because the Army had learned nothing from the events. 2090 Forothers it was the refusal of the US offer that represented a major failure. 2091Metselaar was of course correct when he wrote that a major noise barrier was created byMladic’s plans, which changed constantly and often at the very last moment.‘Obviously, what an aggressor does not yet know himself can hardly beexpected to be determined by one’s own intelligence sources. Even the enemy’smilitary and political elite itself is often, until the last moment, not completelycertain about many of these elements’. 2092This does not detract from the fact that some indications of the preparations could still have beengathered in time. As it was, the assault but also the quick collapse of the enclave came as a total surpriseto Dutchbat and UNPROFOR. This was therefore a ‘miss’: no warning was given, but the event tookplace. The same probably went for most of the other Western services, although the American,Canadian and British services did receive indications. There was Imint regarding buses, but it wasthought that these would be used for the transport of troops. There was some Sigint about logisticalsupport by the VJ. 2093 Troop movements and tanks were reported. There were Humint sources close toMladic. But the indications were too unclear, the reliability of sources was doubted, intelligence wasoften interpreted wrongly or not analysed in time or had insufficient priority.How big was the intelligence failure actually and would the result have been different if moreintelligence had been available? This is of course a ‘what-would-have-happened-if’ question. Let ussuppose that intelligence had been available on the directives from Karadzic and Mladic, the planningfor operation Krivaja ‘95, the orders from the general staff of the Drina Corps and the operational planissued by the Drina Corps on 2 July. Let us suppose that the initial preparations had been noticed andcorrectly interpreted. Then UNPROFOR and NATO would still have had time to react. After all, theBosnian Serbs were not always insensitive to international political pressure, as the solution to thehostage crisis indicated, and as was later the case in Gorazde. This is also a conclusion drawn in the UNreport on Srebrenica. ‘Had the United Nations been provided with intelligence that revealed theenormity of the Bosnian Serbs’ goals, it is possible, though by no means certain, that the tragedy ofSrebrenica might have been averted.’ The UN report stated that this did not apply to Zepa. This2088 Confidential interview (22) and (36).2089 Confidential interview (26).2090 Confidential interview (37).2091 Confidential interview (78).2092 M.V. Metselaar, ‘Understanding Failures in Intelligence’, p.37.2093 Confidential interview (6).