C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

95with its Granger antenna at Eemnes (Utrecht) then concentrated on international communicationtraffic (in the HF band), and via two satellite dishes in Zoutkamp (Groningen) on the message trafficsent via satellites. The military and political Sigint obtained in this way was primarily destined for theIntelligence Bureaus of the three branches of the Armed Forces. 436In addition, intelligence was obtained via (not from) NATO. The MIS had access to a fewNATO databases containing intelligence summaries and specific studies contributed by theparticipating intelligence services of the member states. Furthermore, intelligence was supplied to theMIS by its foreign counterparts, since the MIS maintained bilateral contacts with the intelligenceservices, military and otherwise, of a large number (over 30) non-NATO countries. 437 This outline ofthe MIS’s sources, which was taken from the historian Engelen, assumes the most ideal and desirablesituation. The everyday reality was often different and more complicated, however: the MIS had tomake do with what the its foreign counterparts were prepared to supply.What foreign services wanted the MIS to receiveIt was firmly stressed in various interviews that a NATO member state does not automatically haveaccess to the intelligence of the other member states. There is a persistent misunderstanding thatNATO member states can automatically receive intelligence data from NATO. This misunderstandingalso extends to ‘politicians’. 438 NATO has no capacity of its own for gathering intelligence. WhenNATO was founded in 1949, it was assumed that intelligence gathering always entailed a certain risk ofbeing compromised. Therefore, the gathering of data had to be carried out by the member statesexclusively. The member states did undertake to supply intelligence to NATO, but only those data thatthey wanted to make available: it was therefore a voluntary arrangement. The general picture is that in aqualitative and quantitative sense less intelligence could be obtained via NATO than via bilateralcontacts. A revealing fact is that NATO’s Intelligence Division appealed to the heads of the militaryintelligence services of the NATO member states in May 1994 to make more intelligence available tothe Organization. 439 NATO was completely dependent on intelligence made available by its memberstates.In June 1995, the MIS determined that the intelligence that was obtained via NATO wasinadequate for taking responsible decisions concerning crisis management operations. What is more,NATO intelligence was based on a consensus of allies, and was therefore politically coloured to someextent. With respect to countries and developments outside the treaty area, it was also the case thatissuing intelligence to NATO member states could be made subordinate to national (economic)interests of the member states.440According to a MIS memorandum from 1989, the internationalbilateral intelligence liaison between the Netherlands and other countries took place on the basis ofagreements - reached formally or informally - for collaboration and liaison and based on commonintelligence interest, according to subject and region. The extent to which, and the way in which, thesebilateral collaborative contacts were maintained varied greatly, however. It depended, among otherthings, on the willingness of the partner to engage in de facto collaboration, the quality of the partner’sinformation, the information that could be obtained from the partner in a quantitative and qualitativesense, the information that the partner wished to receive in exchange, and political considerations.As far as NATO member states were concerned, bilateral exchange between the Netherlandsand another NATO member state did not arise automatically out of NATO membership. It goeswithout saying that common interests are beneficial to the willingness to exchange. On NATO’sfoundation, the member states already emphasized that the Netherlands’ lack of its own adequate436 For this see in particular Chapter 5 in this study on S igint .437 Engelen, De Militaire Inlichtingendienst, pp. 146-147.438 Confidential interview (24).439 MoD, Archive CDS NATO, No. 375, Request from NAMILCOM, No. 2902, 05/05/94.440 MoD, Archive MI S / Air Force , CASS No. 49, File Reports DB, Letter + Appendix I, No. DIS/95/24.1/1486, 22/06/95.