C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

311solution to such problems in ad hoc peacekeeping operations, where the communication lines areshorter. 1713It also must be stated that the Dutch Government was not properly briefed on Imint. AnAmerican memorandum, which was drawn up for The Hague in response to questions posed by theDutch, proved to contain incorrect statements. The memorandum stated that there ‘was no usablecoverage, however, between 13 and 27 July, because of bad weather or poor image quality - theprincipal factors affecting whether we have coverage’. 1714 This was factually untrue: there was certainly‘usable coverage’. On 15 July, a Predator flew to Eastern Bosnia with the primary mission: ‘Bratunacmales: key priority’. The quality of the subsequent video was disappointing, but other Imint wasavailable: on 17 July, a U-2 flew over Branjevo farm at Donja Pilica, the scene of countless executions.A – rather blurred – photo of people who were executed shortly afterwards was released later by noneother than the US Administration. 1715 The NIOD was even shown far sharper photos of the sametarget, which clearly showed a larger and a smaller group of bodies and lorry tracks and diggingoperations. 1716 Similar but less sharp photos were later given to the Yugoslavia Tribunal for use at thetrial of General Krstic. 1717At 18.12 hours on 18 July, Imint on Srebrenica was again available within the US intelligencecommunity. An asset had identified two tanks outside the headquarters in Potocari. U-2 photos alsoshowed an APC in Glogova. The availability of US Imint came to light in Belgrade on 15 July duringthe negotiations with Milosevic and Mladic on Srebrenica. American Imint was lying on the table.According to an intelligence analyst with access to Imint, Satint of Srebrenica and the surroundingswere already available on 19 July. 1718 Despite all of this, there was probably no conscious attempt tomislead: the American memorandum with the answers to the questions asked by the Dutch in whichreference was made to these photos is dated 24 August 1995. At that time, the US community still didnot have full insight into and access to all the Imint on the events around Srebrenica. The DutchGovernment was therefore not incorrectly informed, but the US memorandum was certainlypremature.Finally, a word about the Dutch intelligence community and Air Force could have played in thisrespect. It is of course also a bit ‘easy’ to blame the US intelligence community for conceivableshortcomings. It is also not true that the Dutch were totally dependent on other sources for their Imint.As said earlier, the Dutch had excellent TACRECCE capabilities in the area. However, the last flight ofthe 306 th Squadron (mission 1357) of the Royal Dutch Airforce, which was stationed in Villafranca andin charge of photo reconnaissance missions above Bosnia, dates from 27 May 1995. The activities onthe western side were more or less stopped after the American F-16 of Scott O’Grady was shot down.In fact, no reconnaissance flights were carried out at all between 11 and 30 June. Apparently, it wasconsidered too dangerous to operate after this date, given the mounting threat from the Bosnian-Serbanti-aircraft guns.As said earlier in this study. In brief, there were no additional enhancements in the area ofintelligence; neither Parliament nor the Ministry of Defence nor the Cabinet insisted on it. However, the306 th Squadron of the Royal Dutch Airforce could have provided the Dutch with an uniqueopportunity. One of the best, if not the very best Imint asset in the theatre was the Dutch RF-16TACRECCE capability. It was newer, more flexible and better technology than any other TACRECCEsystem in the theatre. It can provide better resolution, more flexible coverage and offset the effects offoul weather better than any satellite. Unlike the UAV, it has a man on-scene, at the controls, with a full1713 Mark Stout and Thomas Quiggin, ‘Exploiting the new high resolution satellite imagery: Darwinian imperatives?,Commentary, No. 75 (Summer 1998), pp. 5 - 10.1714 MoD, DCBC, box 61, No. 2850, American memorandum, 24/08/95.1715 For the photos: www.fas.org.irp/Imint/bosnia16.html1716 Confidential interview (7). During this interview classified U-2 photos could be studied.1717 See: ICTY, Krstic Case, OTP Exhibits, Volume II, Ex. 24/2-24/3.1718 Confidential interview (54).