C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

365thorny issue. A foreign intelligence service established that opinions were divided in Sarajevo on thisissue. 2060 That was understandable, because as long as the enclaves had military value and could be usedin the propaganda war against the Bosnian Serbs, some Bosnian ministers were not prepared toconsider giving up this bargaining chip.It was clear that in particular Srebrenica and Zepa would not be able to continue for long, inboth humanitarian and military terms. The VRS had the areas in a stranglehold and the ‘neck’ was beingsqueezed ever tighter. Less and less humanitarian aid was arriving and the Serbs had a constant militaryadvantage in equipment, firepower and troops, making a swift conquest a constant possibility. Inaddition, there were no logistical limitations. The main reasons why the Serbs had still not taken theenclaves were international political motives and because they would become responsible for thepopulation.2061 In short, most negotiators assumed that the enclaves would disappear sooner or laterthrough a political or military solution. Srebrenica was tolerated by Mladic. 2062 Nothing more andnothing less.However, strategic prior knowledge is not the same as tactical prior knowledge. Did the latterexist? According to some publications it did. US services reportedly had indications that the BosnianSerbs were planning an attack. It was even written that the US government was informed in detail threeweeks before the fall of the enclave. Washington was said to have intentionally withheld thisinformation. In view of the above, what evidence still stands?First of all it must be stated that no one can have known of an attack intended to conquerSrebrenica as a whole. Although the options contained in Krivaja ‘95 included the conquest of theenclave, it was only late in the evening of 9 July that it was decided to actually take this step. Hencethere cannot have been any prior knowledge of this. There can only have been prior knowledge of thepreparations, which had a limited military goal, namely the southern road.Furthermore, an essential element is overlooked in many publications: the attack was notcomparable to Operation Barbarossa or the invasion of Normandy, with hundreds of thousands oftroops, aircraft and tanks involved. This was a small military operation with a limited amount of troops,a maximum of ten tanks and APCs and supported by twelve artillery pieces and mortars that werealready in position around the enclave. The VRS needed to bridge only a short distance to reachSrebrenica, and since the troops and equipment were hidden in the wooded hills there was an extremelylimited chance of issuing a warning in time. 2063 ABiH reconnaissance troops observed something on 5July but this was not reported to Dutchbat until 6 July.But let us assume that preparations such as troop concentrations, tank movements, new artillerypositions, etc. had been observed and reported. The question then remains: preparations for whatprecisely? The intentions of the VRS remained unclear up to the last moment. The players in theenclave had little information; Dutchbat’s view of the situation was very limited view. The littleintelligence available came from patrols, observations posts, convoy commanders, the local populationand authorities, and at the higher level from SNE, BHC and UNPROFOR headquarters in Zagreb.Since operations were strictly limited due to lack of fuel and by military activities, Dutchbat becamedependent on static OPs. Reports based on Humint became ever fewer, partly because DutchBatCommander Karremans sharply reduced the interaction of Dutchbat with the local population. As littlewas supplied through other channels, the information situation of Dutchbat was very weak indeed. Thesources of information dried up more and more. The only possible method was photo-reconnaissanceflights, but these were limited after an American F-16 was shot down on 2 June. Besides this, the VRSapparently strengthened the air defences around the enclave after the decision to attack was taken. This2060 Confidential information (61).2061 Confidential information (59).2062 Interview with P. Neville-Jones, 15/11/01.2063 This conclusion is also drawn in the CIA report made available to the NIOD. See the chapter ‘srebrenica: Backgroundand Battle’, CIA, ‘Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1991-1995’, unpublished, p. 17,13/07/99.