C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

39example, the following is contained in the UNMOs’ Post Mission Report on the period 1992-1996regarding secure links: ‘that was a real disaster for UNPROFOR/UNPF’ [UNPF was the new name ofUNPROFOR after 31 March 1995]. Both the UNPROFOR headquarters in Zagreb and that of theUNMOs used insecure land lines for their daily reporting, and ‘for that period UNMO (and UNPF ingeneral) has become unwillingly (let’s hope) "the second intelligence agency" for the Croatian Army.’The satellite links that were used by UNPROFOR were also an easy target for the warringfactions’ monitoring services. Openness of communication traffic had until that time always beenconsidered one of the essential principles of a peacekeeping operation. One participant remarked: ‘It isright for an academic peacekeeping operation, but for such an active operation like UNPROFOR it isnot. There is a strong belief that it should be reconsidered on the basis of sad experience of thisMission.’ The report again indicated that all the warring factions had captured or confiscated muchUNPROFOR communication equipment. The VRS, ABiH and the Army of the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia Sigint units were therefore in a position to intercept UNMO communication traffic 24hours a day, and they regarded it ‘as the most reliable source of information’. 150The attitude of high-ranking UNPROFOR officials towards the MIO was unclear, and differedgreatly from one individual to another. Another problem was that some countries wished to maintaincommand over their own UNPROFOR units through national lines. The result was that ‘the overallUNPROFOR command process was deemed disorganized and unable to make use of the informationsupplied to it by the intelligence process’. 151 An MIO intelligence officer agreed with this observation insome areas, but felt that the Dutch G-3, Colonel H. De Jonge, as well as his cadre of Canadian officersunderstood the importance of intelligence very well, and were able to absorb it effectively for planningand operations purposes. But other elements of the staff did indeed not do nearly as well. The politicaloffice, headed by a Russian, Colonel V. Ratso also dealt with the intelligence provided to him very well.Furthermore, the UNMO’s, regardless of nationality, always absorbed and utilized the intelligenceprovided to them exceptionally well. 152 And according to a former MIO staff member, Akashi was aneager consumer of intelligence, and had a preference for consulting personally with the briefer whilereferring to detailed charts.There was also useful contact between the MIO and Akashi’s Analysis and Assessment Unit,and information was regularly exchanged. The Force Commander in 1994 and 1995, and later advisorto negotiator Carl Bildt, the French General De Lapresle, was also a fervent intelligence consumer, aswas the head of the Civil Affairs Department in Zagreb, Sergio Vieira de Mello, and General Rose, theBosnia-Hercegovina Commander in Sarajevo.Others were apparently less interested in intelligence, and some senior officers even openlyexpressed their opposition to the use of intelligence from outside the mission area. According to aformer MIO official, in early 1994 the Canadian Deputy Force Commander General John MacInnesobjected to the use of any intelligence from outside. He even told some members of the MIO team thatthey were only allowed to use information produced by UNPROFOR or UNMOs themselves becausehe did not permit the use of intelligence from national sources. 153The intelligence organization of Bosnia-Hercegovina Command (BHC) in SarajevoThe Chief of Staff under General Rose, General A.P.P.M. van Baal, confirmed that the UN did notindulge in intelligence. Rose did have his own intelligence channels through the British SAS. Van Baalserved from 24 February to 1 September 1994 in Bosnia-Hercegovina Command (BHC) in Sarajevo,and formally had 27 positions on his staff for intelligence officers. These were only partially filled,however. When he arrived in Sarajevo, there were still five officers who had little to do. This was150 Confidential collection (5), UNMO in UNPROFOR/UNPF, Post Mission Report 1992-1996, Zagreb 1996, p. 29.151 Välimäki, Intelligence, p. 87.152 Confidential information (80).153 Confidential collection (3).