C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

266It is more likely that the Electronic Warfare Units did not realize at that moment what theintercepted messages actually meant. Though the ABiH intercepted many messages, they did notconduct enough analysis to form a measured judgement. Perhaps priority was accorded to other targetsin the region so that Sigint on Srebrenica had to take a back seat. 1396 It is also quite likely that Sigint onSarajevo had top priority. Another American intelligence officer also believed the tapes had beenprocessed weeks, months or possibly even two years after the event. 1397 The Bosnians openly admittedthat the ABiH had a huge backlog of unprocessed intercepts. 1398There is yet another indication that the Bosnian Muslims did not have real-time Sigint. Themany intercepts that were later published and disclosed at the trial of General Krstic give theimpression that the VRS troop movements were efficiently followed by the Muslims in real time. Therewere dozens of intercepts which showed that the ABiH interception stations in Konjuh, Okresanicaand Tuzla closely followed the VRS conversations about the column heading for Tuzla. However, atKrstic’s trial no attention was paid to whether this intelligence was shared with UNPROFOR. Thiswould, after all, have been a logical step, given that the Bosnian Muslims dearly wanted to getUNPROFOR or NATO on their side in the fight against the VRS.Why did the ABiH not share intelligence with the western powers?According to Lieutenant-Colonel Baxter, military assistant to General Smith, the ABiH in Sarajevonever delivered as much as a snippet of intelligence to Smith, his staff or the rest of UNPROFOR.ABiH General Rasim Delic only consulted with Smith four times a year. Smith’s door was always opento the Head of the Bosnian Intelligence Service, General Taljan Hajrulahovic, but he never dropped by.On the other hand, the ABiH had excellent intelligence contacts with the Americans. Smith’s staffdiscovered, through a slip of the tongue of the US Ambassador John Menzies, that General WesleyClark called General Delic in Sarajevo every day from the Pentagon to discuss the latest militarydevelopments. 1399 General Janvier also denied ever having received Bosnian intercepts of VRScommunication. 1400 Members of the US Intelligence Community said they were sure that, if the BosnianMuslims had passed on these intercepts to the CIA or NSA, the US Administration would certainlyhave done something. Balkan experts from the CIA stated that the reports of the executions firstreached Washington after soldiers from the column arrived in Tuzla.It did not take long for rumours to circulate about the executions, but no one had the slightestidea of the scale. The ABiH did not share its Comint on the executions or the VRS hunt for themembers of the column with the CIA. Rumours about mass graves and various stories prompted asearch for the truth. No-one could confirm the rumours or give any indication of the scale. TheAmericans had never seen intercepts by the ABiH which referred to ‘parcels’ or ‘swine’. According tothe US intelligence officials, the ABiH frequently made ‘a lot of noise’ during the conflict but it was1401very difficult to prove such rumours.Other officials who were working for the US Intelligence Community in 1995 stated that theytoo were unaware of the existence of the Bosnian intercepts; it was definitely news to them. If the NSAor CIA had known about these intercepts in 1995, then the officials would have known as well throughtheir close involvement in the Balkan Task Force at the State Department. 1402 Canadian intelligenceofficers made similar statements. 1403 Journalist Roy Gutman also heard from US officials that the US1396 Confidential interviews (13) and (54).1397 Confidential interview (13).1398 Interview with S. Arnautovic, 05/11/99.1399 Interview with James Baxter, 16/10/00.1400 Assemblee Nationale, Srebrenica: rapport sur un massacre, (Srebrenica, report of a massacre) Assemblee Nationale, no 3412,2 Vols, Paris 2001, Vol 2, Interview with M. Bernard Janvier, 21/06/01, pp. 106-139.1401 Confidential interview (7).1402 Confidential interviews (12) and (13).1403 Confidential interviews (9), (62) and (90).