C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

151In the summer and autumn of 1994, brainstorming continued at an informal level within theAmerican government on the possibility of executing secret operations. Plans were elaborated fortraining the ABiH. 729 An US ‘mercenary outfit’ was to arrange this training. This was carried out byMilitary Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), a company based in Virginia that employedvarious retired American generals and intelligence officials, such as the former director of the DIA,Lieutenant General Harry Soyster. With the consent of the State Department, MPRI trained theHrvatska Vojska (HV, the Croatian Army) and later also the ABiH. 730 MPRI’s role arose from thesigning of the agreement between the United States and Croatia on military collaboration. By engagingMPRI, Washington also reduced the danger of ‘direct’ involvement. 731 Interestingly, DPKO was neverofficially informed about these activities of MPRI. 732Holbrooke, meanwhile appointed 733 as Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs withthe primary task of bringing an end to the war in Bosnia, 734 was becoming increasingly actively involvedwith the option of secret arms supplies to Bosnia. In reality, he was against this, because of the dangerfor European ground forces in Bosnia. On 6 September, he met Akashi and stated ‘on a strictlyconfidential basis’ that he wanted to avoid the embargo being lifted, because of the far-reachingconsequences for UNPROFOR on the ground. ‘He appeared to be genuinely looking for alternativepolicies’, according to Akashi. 735What these alternatives were would soon be apparent. When in October Holbrooke visitedZagreb, Galbraith told him about the ‘no instructions’ instruction and the Croatian pipeline. Holbrookeapparently knew nothing of the matter; 736 which is remarkable because various articles had already beenpublished on the subject. The political adviser to the British prime minister, Pauline Neville-Jones, wasalso convinced that Holbrooke was aware of the ‘no instructions’ instruction. 737On 2 November, the Dutch Permanent Representative to NATO also reported to the Ministryof Foreign Affairs about cargo aircraft from Teheran, which were delivering arms to Croatia via theUkraine. His Canadian counterpart had tipped him off, referring to the Globe and Mail, which stated thatUNPROFOR was aware of the matter, but was turning a blind eye. 738Holbrooke also spoke on this trip (on which he was accompanied, among others, by BrigadierGeneral M. Hayden 739 , the head of intelligence of US European Command) 740 with the Bosnian primeminister, Haris Silajdzic, who urged him to do more for Bosnia. Holbrooke came up with a plan inwhich Sarajevo would accept that the arms embargo would not be lifted for the coming six months inexchange for American encouragements to third party countries to violate the UN embargo and to stepup the supplies of military goods. Holbrooke had already instructed State Department lawyers toinvestigate the legal snags attached to such a separation of words and actions. Holbrooke said that theirrecommendation was ‘encouraging’:729 Ed Vulliamy, ‘America’s Secret Bosnia Agenda’, The Observer, 20/11/94.730 Danile Burton-Rose and Wayne Madsen, ‘Corporate Soldiers. The U.S. Government Privatizes the Use of Force’,Multinational Monitor, March 1999, pp. 17-19 Ripley, Operation Deliberate Force, p. 90 and Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, pp.334-335.731 Thomas H. Henriksen, ‘Covert Operations, Now More Than Ever’, Orbis, Vol. 44 (2000) 1, p. 153.732 F.E. van Kappen,’ Strategic Intelligence and the United Nations’, Paper presented at the NISA/IDL Conference‘Peacekeeping and Intelligence’, Delft, 15/11/02.733 For the difficult relationship between Lake and Holbrooke: Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, pp. 178-182.734 Doder & Branson, Milosevic, p. 218.735 UNGE, UNPROFOR, Box 124. Akashi to Annan, Z-1367, 06/09/94.736 James Risen and Doyle McManus, ‘U.S. had options to let Bosnia get arms’, Los Angeles Times, 14/07/96. See also: Ripley,Operation Deliberate Force, p. 91.737 Interview with P. Neville-Jones, 15/11/01.738 Paul Koring, ‘Iran believed arming Bosnia’, Globe and Mail, 03/11/94; John Pomfret, ‘Iran ships material for arms toBosnians’, The Washington Post, 13/05/94 and NMFA, PVNATO, PVNATO to Foreign Affairs, no. Brni1718/17242,02/11/94.739 General Michael Hayden declined to be interviewed by the author.740 Ed Vulliamy, ‘America’s Secret Bosnia Agenda’, The Observer, 20/11/94.