C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

339from Sarajevo, because they were at too much risk. Srebrenica was indeed mentioned in the Zagrebbriefing, but only because UNHCR reported that it had heard from Bosnian sources that 13 people haddied of hunger. UNHCR was however unable to confirm this. 1899 The Canadian Major David Last,Military Assistant to General Ashton, also emphasized that the attack came as a total surprise toZagreb. Srebrenica was a low-profile point of attention, and an issue that was marked with a yellow andnot a red flag. Zagreb needed to concentrate on much more urgent matters, and in this respectSrebrenica was only a minor issue. 1900 The same picture is provided by the diary of Emma Shitaka,personal assistant to Akashi in 1994-1995. On 7 July all she noted with regard to the Zagreb briefingwas that Gorazde was of strategic importance. No attack on the enclave was expected. The VRS wouldtry ‘to reduce size of enclaves and cutting of humanitarian aid’. 1901At that time the intelligence section in Zagreb was led by the Swede Svensson and his militaryassistant Ljunggren. Their diary notes reveal that on 11 July they still expected that the VRS would nottake the entire enclave. When that actually happened, it came as a total surprise to Zagreb. The twoSwedes noted that the French officer General Andre Soubirou held a briefing that morning in theZagreb headquarters in which he declared that the VRS wanted a stronger hold on the enclave.Soubirou did not expect the VRS to conduct a major attack with infantry. Mladic needed these troopsin Sarajevo and the VRS would mostly attack Srebrenica with artillery. But at that moment the enclavehad already fallen. Both Swedes came to the conclusion afterwards, on the basis of all availableinformation, that Srebrenica was a retaliation for the ABiH hit and run operations conducted from theenclave, the use of Close Air Support and the creation of the Rapid Reaction Force. 1902 However,Srebrenica did not remain a topic on the agenda for long. Major Last noted in his diary at 4 pm on 12July that all attention had shifted to the Croats and the Krajina. 1903Officials who worked for the intelligence staff in Zagreb were later to declare that informationwas withheld by the Americans. Their claims were, however, fiercely disputed by US and Europeanintelligence officials. According to them The US Deputy G-2, Morgan, had indeed direct access to allUS intelligence, but there was no prior knowledge of the assault. Up to the last moment, according toan UNPROFOR official who worked in Zagreb at the time, Morgan and others remained convincedthat the VRS planned only to take the southern part of the enclave. 1904The fact that also the US military establishment was taken by surprise can be deduced from alater analysis. The document was drawn up by the wholly US Joint Analysis Center in Molesworth inthe United Kingdom, the final destination of all available intelligence from various (inter)nationalchannels, and gives an overview of the event. The analysis of the operation notes that the VRS attack‘runs counter to what has been expected of them for several years’. Normally pressure was exerted onlyon the borders of the enclave to take control of the high ground. No attempt to attack the entireenclave or the town was expected, due to the number of soldiers needed for house-to-house fighting.The US Joint Analysis Center in Molesworth thought that the VRS had insufficient infantry and thatthe ABiH would be too strong. In retrospect it was supposed that ABiH units had departed at the endof June and that those who remained behind had insufficient courage and fortitude to put up a longand determined resistance. 1905The British intelligence cell in Sarajevo also had no insights whatsoever into the true intentionsof the VRS. In fact, consultation took place between G-2, Zagreb and the British cell in Sarajevo, but1899 NIOD, Coll. Banbury. Diary Banbury, 06/07/95 and UNNY, DPKO coded cables. Code Cables Akashi to Annan, No.Z-1104, 06/07/95 and Janvier to Annan, No. Z-1111, 06/07/95.1900 Interview with David Last, 05/07/00.1901 Interview with Emma Shitaka, 11/05/00.1902 Interview with Jan-Inge Svensson and Ingmar Ljunggren, 04/11/99.1903 Interview with David Last, 05/07/00.1904 Confidential interview (54) and confidential information (80).1905 Confidential collection (4), JAC Analysis Balkan Crisis Group to Capt Theunens, 14/07/95. Also: Interview withGeneral George Joulwan, 08/06/00.