C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

264as ABiH headquarters in Sarajevo and the senior politicians. The Bosnian national security service inOkresanica probably reported only to the Bosnian political leaders. 1391The question that now needs to be answered is: what was possible regarding the processing ofthe intercepts in real time? Simple arithmetic shows that, if the number of channels multiplied by thenumber of required personnel is greater than the number of available personnel, then near-real-timeprocessing and reporting is impossible. A conservative estimate indicates that the monitored channelsprobably covered telephone calls from Okresanica via live interception or relayed intercepts. Inaddition to non-military traffic, the Bosnian national security service was bound to have been interestedin the VRS high command and the operational levels immediately below. If we assume on the basis ofthis estimate that an absolute minimum of ten channels had to be monitored continuously, that threepersons were needed per channel for interception, transcription and reporting and that there was arotation of three shifts a day and a seven-day working week, then at least 90 Sigint operators wouldhave had to be active in Okresanica. Not to mention 15 or 20 staff for support, technology, security,catering and so on. Hence, if there were 20 channels – probably a more realistic estimate – then at least180 people would be needed. In reality, a maximum of ten people worked in Okresanica. Most of thecommunication was recorded on tape. It seems therefore that near-real-time analysis and processingwas unattainable.The VHF radio traffic was intercepted by the Electronic Warfare Units of the ABiH inOkresanica and Konjuh. We can perform some simple arithmetic on these activities as well. It appearsfrom all the descriptions that these were standard Comint sites where the listener tuned in manually tothe channels that were being monitored. On the basis of a very conservative estimate, around 30channels would have to be manned permanently, including five frequencies at the level of highcommand, ten at operational level and ten tactical frequencies between units in the field. Thirtyfrequencies are regarded as the absolute minimum by US Sigint experts. The command and operationalfrequencies had to be monitored round-the-clock and the tactical frequencies 18 hours a day by threeteams, each consisting of three listeners, who were individually responsible for interception,transcription and reporting. On the basis of this absolute minimum, around 210 people would have hadto be working in Okresanica and Konjuh. The station was, moreover, not only responsible formonitoring communications around Srebrenica, but also the battles around Mount Vis, the northernpart of Republika Srpska and other areas. At least 400 people would have been needed to follow all thistraffic. In fact, the level of personnel was no higher than twenty. So, near-real-time analysis wasimpossible here as well. 1392 We have already shown that the Electronic Warfare Units were also verymodest in size.The processing of Comint can only be described as long and laborious. With only a limitednumber of receivers at his disposal the interceptor probably decided to listen to the most valuablefrequencies. If the number of valuable frequencies was greater that the number that could beintercepted, then tape recorders were used. In addition, the interceptor missed much of the messageswhen he had to leave his post to make his transcriptions in rough notes. Presumably, the interceptorspent 25% of his working hours away from his receiver and missed a lot, because there was no-one torelieve him. The commander then had the thankless job of ‘handling’ the intercept for the third timeand typing it out. Probably, Okresanica did not have a direct phone line with Tuzla. As a result, theworked-out intercepts had to be stored on a floppy disk and sent by courier to the headquarters of the21 st Division or the 2 nd Corps.According to witnesses at the Tribunal, the working methods were exactly the same inOkresanica and Konjuh. 1393 In some cases the intercepted calls were first recorded on tape and thenlater worked out on paper or in a logbook. The messages were then typed out on a computer and sent1391 Confidential information (54).1392 Confidential interviews (6), (13), (54) and (62).1393 See: http://www.un.org/icty/news/krstic/krstic-cp.htm.