C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

299war crimes had probably been perpetrated. On 25 July, she returned to Zagreb and asked Galbraithwhether this could be further investigated. On the same day, he sent a message to Washington throughspecial channels (probably the CIA) requesting an investigation into possible war crimes. Holbrooke issaid to have taken the telegram personally to Christopher, asked him to read it and take urgent action.This led to, amongst others, a mission by John Shattuck, who found more indications and reported hisfindings to Christopher on 4 August. 1624 The Deputy Director of Intelligence at the CIA, John Gannon,thought that it was a combination of reports and visual observations by Dutchbat and the interviews byShattuck, which had led to the discovery of Imint. 1625Galbraith also asked the CIA through the Intelligence and Research Bureau of the StateDepartment to find out whether there were satellite and U-2 photos of ABiH prisoners or the massmurders in Konjevic Polje. Enough intelligence had been gathered by 2 August to indicate search areas.After searching for twenty-four hours and comparing thousands of Imint photos, one analyst at theintelligence service discovered that such photos did indeed exist. 1626The third version is the most credible. The other two could easily be mistaken interpretations ofpersonal actions in response to Albright’s photos. What the fore-mentioned people could not knowwas that one US intelligence service had an invaluable Humint source. Only a handful of people knewthe identity of this source. Since 1992, the DIA had been running an extensive programme fordebriefing refugees. By the end of 1992, important intelligence had been gathered from over 800interviews. American debriefers, who officially worked for the UN, also went to work in Tuzla and,after the fall of Srebrenica, their reports went to the highest echelons in the US Administration.Nothing was yet known in mid-July.On 17 July, the Balkan Task Force of the CIA wrote in its secret daily report that countless eyewitnessaccounts had delivered details which strongly implied that atrocities had been committed. Italso added that ‘we lack authoritative, detailed information to substantiate this information’. Reportersof the Washington Post got no answer when they asked whether the intelligence analysts had taken anysteps to get hold of the missing information. ‘It was not a military priority,’ said a CIA official. ‘A lot ofthis [atrocity] stuff is not looked at at the time it is collected, the official said’. 1627 Another CIA workerwho wishes to remain anonymous told the New York Times that his service ‘lacked informationregarding specific places and atrocities’. 1628These scenarios are not entirely implausible because they do not contain the crucial data, suchas the dates and times of the executions, the locations and the units involved. This kind of informationcould not possibly have come from interviews with refugees. What is more, if this information ismissing, then a random search through old Imint is useless. Specific information is needed in order toselect and compare the right images from a collection that runs into hundreds of thousands. It was, infact, a crucial Humint source which eventually triggered the search for the execution sites and the massgraves. This source, who was unknown to Bringa, Galbraith and others, decided to pass on detailedinformation to an intelligence agency at the end of July. 1629The source claimed to have personally witnessed the atrocities of the Bosnian Serbs andprovided detailed information including dates, times, precise locations and drawings of the executionsites, such as the Branjevo state farm in the village of Donja Pilica on the road between Bijeljina andZvornik. A bloodbath had also taken place there in the local theatre. 1630 It was only after the witnesshad described the atrocities to the intelligence service that the search really got underway. It appears1624 American FOIA Declassification, John Shattuck to Secretary of State, 04/08/95.1625 DDI Speech by John Gannon for the SFRC, 09/08/95. See: www. 209.207.112/irp/cia/product/1626 Rohde, A Safe Area, pp. 334 - 335.1627 M. Dobbs & Jeffrey Smith, ‘New Proof Offered of Serb Atrocities’, Washington Post, 29/10/95.1628 ‘srebrenica: the Days of Slaughter’, The New York Times, 29/10/95.1629 Confidential interview (13).1630 See for photos: ICTY, (IT-98-33) Krstic Case, OTP Exhibits, Krstic Case, OTP Exhibits, Volume II, Ex. 25/6-25/14.